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 ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis, I discuss the ethics of civilian protection in armed conflict from the 
perspective of applied ethics. Specifically, I attempt to explore a way to supplement the 
limitations of just war theory in civilian protection by providing a fundamental case for 
civilian protection, by way of considering insights gleaned from David Hume’s 
conception of justice, and from the perspective of professional military ethics. Moreover, 
I will further defend my argument for the protection of civilians in armed conflict by 
demonstrating the immorality of torture. In Chapter 1, I discuss the status of civilians by 
examining legal and ethical concepts. In Chapter 2, I critically discuss the scope and 
limitations of just war theory in civilian protection. In Chapter 3, I analyse how civilian 
protection was considered and how civilians were harmed in the Israeli–Palestinian 
conflict. In Chapter 4, I critically examine civilian protection as part of just conduct in 
armed conflict by referring to Hume’s conception of justice. In Chapter 5, I examine 
civilian protection from the perspective of military ethics. In Chapter 6, I make a case 
against the moral justifiability of torturing civilians in order to illustrate how civilians 
should be protected in an extreme situation. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
Civilian protection during armed conflicts1 is one of the most discussed and debated 
topics in war/military ethics as well as international ethics, both of which are branches 
of applied ethics. In these fields, it is one of the most important issues in the discussion 
of the ethical aspects of war and international relations, not only because war usually 
causes civilian casualties, but also because the number and proportion of civilian 
casualties has dramatically increased over the past one hundred years.2 Some of the 
most ferocious recent campaigns are, for example, the Rape of Nanjing by the Imperial 
Japanese Army, the Allied bombings of German and Japanese cities and the nuclear 
bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the Second World War. Despite the fact 
that civilian protection is stipulated in the laws and customs of armed conflict, a large 
number and high proportion of civilian casualties are observed in many contemporary 
armed conflicts.3 
In the fields of war/military ethics and international ethics, there are at least 
                                                  
1 In this thesis the terms armed conflict and war are used synonymously. 
2 Richard M. Garfield and Alfred I. Neugut, ‘Epistemological analysis of warfare: a historical view’, 
Journal of American Medical Association, 266:5 (1991), pp. 688–92; Ruth Sivard, World Military and 
Social Expenditures 1985 (Washington D.C.: World Watch Institute, 1985), p. 11; and Mary Kaldor, New 
and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Age (Cambridge: Polity, 1999), p. 8. 
3 David Southall and Kamran Abbasi, ‘Protecting civilian from armed conflict: The UN Convention 
needs an enforcing arm’, British Medical Journal 316 (1998), pp. 1549–50; and D. R. Meddings, 
‘Civilians and war: a review and historical overview of the involvement of non-combatant populations in 
conflict situations’, Medical Conflict Survival 17:1 (2001), pp. 6–16. 
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 two different, yet widely overlapping and promising, approaches to the ethical issues 
concerning civilian protection: one is just war theory, a set of ideas to restrain ‘war by 
legitimating certain types of actions and de-legitimating others’4, which is primarily 
based on macro (collective entities) level analysis; and the other is the professional 
ethics of military personnel in Western industrial democracies such as the United 
Kingdom and the United States, which is primarily based on meso (group-focused) and 
secondarily on micro (individual-focused) level analysis. Ethical issues surrounding 
civilian protection are predominantly debated in the context and discourse of just war 
theory, in which civilian protection is discussed as part of the overall consideration for 
the morality of war.5 
Just war theory is useful for macro level analysis of the (un)justifiability of a 
particular war undertaken by states and other political communities; however, this 
theory does not sufficiently serve to provide adequate protection for civilians. While 
many just war theorists focus on the requirements of civilian protection to a greater or 
                                                  
4 Alex J. Bellamy, Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), p. 5. 
5 See, for example, Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical 
Illustrations 2nd ed. (New York: Basic Press, 1992), pp. 138–75; Richard Harries, Christianity and War in 
a Nuclear Age (London: Mowbray, 1986), pp. 76–88; Richard Norman, Ethics, Killing and War 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), passim; Richard Regan, Just War: Principles and Cases 
(Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), pp. 87–99; A. J. Coates, The Ethics of 
War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), pp. 235–72; David Oderberg, Applied Ethics: A 
Non-Consequentialist Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 215–24; Anthony Hartle, 
‘Discrimination’, in Bruno Coppieters and Nick Fotion (eds.), Moral Constraints on War (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2002), pp. 141–58; Brian Orend, The Morality of War (Peterborough, Ontario: 
Broadview Press, 2006), pp. 105–37; Frederik Kaufman, ‘Just War Theory and Killing the Innocent’, in 
Michael W. Brough, John W. Lango, and Harry van der Linden (eds.), Rethinking the Just War Tradition 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), pp. 99–114. 
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 lesser degree in their different arguments, civilian protection is often submerged under 
the other principles in just war theory. The reason for this is that in just war theory, 
civilian protection is just one of the necessary conditions to be met, along with several 
others, all of which are used together for the overall consideration of the rightness and 
wrongness of war. As a result, civilian protection is often sidelined by other 
considerations such as military necessity and politico–military objectives. 
This shortcoming of just war theory towards civilian protection may also draw 
attention to the other promising approach to civilian protection; that is, the professional 
ethics of military personnel, which is more focused on the conduct of individual 
commanders and soldiers in combat situations. The volume of literature about the 
professional ethics of military personnel has recently increased in the United Kingdom 
and the United States,6 but among these texts there are few which deal directly with the 
ethical issues concerning civilian protection as a major topic: most discuss civilian 
protection only as part of just war theory and/or the laws of armed conflict. 
                                                  
6 See, for example, N. Fotion and G. Elfstrom, Military Ethics: Guidelines for Peace and War (Boston: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986); Sydney Axinn, A Moral Military (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1989); Patrick Mileham , Value, Values, and the British Army: A Seminar Report (Edinburgh: 
Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities, University of Edinburgh, 1996); Iain Torrance, Ethics and 
Military Community (Camberley: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1998); J. Carl Ficarrotta (ed.), 
The Leader’s Imperative: Ethics, Integrity, and Responsibility (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University 
Press, 2001); Patrick Mileham and Lee Willett (eds.), Military Ethics for the Expeditionary Era (London: 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001); Patrick Mileham (ed.), War and Morality (London: Royal 
United Services Institute, 2004); Anthony E. Hartle, Moral Issues in Military Decision Making 2nd ed. 
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2004); and Martin Cook, The Moral Soldiers: Ethics and 
Service in the US Military (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 2004). 
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 It is worthy of note that civilian protection is explicitly or implicitly codified in 
the professional code of ethics of the UK and Israeli Armed Forces, although Maxwell 
Taylor, a US general, argued at the twilight era of the Cold War that ‘there are no 
official texts or authoritative codes [of military ethics] to which to refer, and possibly 
there never will be’.7 In our time, 25 years after his remarks, one of the most explicit 
codifications of civilian protection in a professional code of military ethics is found in 
the Israel Defence Forces’ doctrine entitled ‘Ethics’, in which the protection of 
non-combatants is envisaged as one of the values of ‘purity of arms’. The document 
reads: ‘The IDF soldiers will not use their weapons and force to harm human beings 
who are not combatants or prisoners of war, and will do all in their power to avoid 
causing harm to their lives, bodies, dignity and property’.8 Less explicit, yet equally 
indicative of the same codification is the British Army’s ‘Core Values’, which lists 
‘respect for others’, among whom civilian victims of war are included, as one of its 
main values.9 
The two approaches of just war theory and professional military ethics 
                                                  
7 Maxwell D. Taylor, ‘A Do-it-Yourself Professional Code for the Military’ in Lloyd J. Matthews and 
Dale E. Brown (eds.), The Parameters of Military Ethics (Washington D.C.: Pergammon Brasseys, 1986), 
p. 126; quoted in Patrick Mileham, ‘Military Ethics: Questions for a New Chapter’, in Patrick Mileham 
(ed.), War and Morality, pp. 157–64 at p. 157. 
8 http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English/about/doctrine/ethics.htm, accessed on 15/8/2007. 
9 UK Army, The Values and Standards of the British Army: Commanders’ Edition (Army Code No 63813, 
2000), p. 11, para. 18. 
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 examined above do not necessarily oppose or contradict each other on civilian 
protection: although their primary focuses are different, these two approaches have the 
potential to concur on the support and promotion of civilian protection. However, it 
seems that this does not occur in practice, especially given the current situation, in 
which civilian protection is marginalised in both approaches. 
As a result, the purpose of this thesis is to link these two partly overlapping 
approaches to the issue of civilian protection by filling the gap left by their 
shortcomings in dealing with this issue. Specifically, this thesis aims to explore a way to 
supplement the limitations of just war theory concerning civilian protection by 
providing a fundamental case for civilian protection, by way of considering insights 
gleaned from David Hume’s conception of justice, and from the perspective of 
professional military ethics. 
This is not to deny, however, the validity of just war theory for civilian 
protection; rather this thesis points towards the importance and need for just war theory 
to be supplemented by these sorts of considerations, which it does not incorporate, 
because it is primarily concerned with the macro level protection of civilians. In order to 
explore how it can be supplemented, I will consider civilian protection from the 
perspective of military ethics. 
 - 5 - 
 In order to discuss the ethical issues concerning civilian protection, a number 
of why and how questions need to be considered. The first question is: why do civilians 
matter? The initial response is that there are differences between the status of civilians 
and that of combatants, which characterise the protected status of the former group of 
people. In order further to explore this question, I need to examine the legal and moral 
status of civilians and civilian protection. The purpose of my investigation into this why 
question is to show how civilian protection is morally significant. I will explore this 
question in detail in Chapter 1. 
I will also consider a second why question: why is just war theory inadequate 
as a framework for civilian protection? In order to explore the answer to this question, I 
will critically examine the theory and its approaches to civilian protection in Chapter 2. 
The purpose of my investigation into this why question is to show how just war theory is 
limited as a theory for civilian protection. 
I will further investigate the second why question by examining the 
Israeli–Palestinian Conflict as a case study. In the course of my investigation into the 
practice of civilian protection among warring parties in Chapter 3, I will clarify why just 
war theory is inadequate to ensure civilian protection by showing how it is difficult to 
put this into practice both at the collective and individual levels. 
 - 6 - 
 The third why question is raised in Chapter 3: why do I consider the 
Israeli–Palestinian Conflict in particular as my case study, rather than another conflict? 
The reason is that not only is the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict a kind of asymmetrical war 
in which national armed forces (in this case, the Israeli Defence Forces or IDF) and 
non-regular members of national armed forces (members of various Palestinian militant 
groups) are involved, but also the stakes of national security and survival are incredibly 
high for the both sides. This characteristic of the conflict is epitomised by the fact that, 
in a particular period of this conflict, the idea of civilian protection was almost entirely 
ignored by both sides and civilians were directly or indirectly harmed in tit-for-tat 
attacks by both the IDF, one of the most advanced armies in the world in terms of their 
professional code of military ethics, and Palestinian militant groups that did not always 
commit themselves to protect civilians. As a result, civilians in the occupied territories 
were particularly at risk of being harmed by both warring parties. This characteristic of 
the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict validates my choice of this conflict specifically as a case 
study in order to show that the protection of civilians in the operational theatre is a 
particularly fragile rule in an armed conflict in which national survival is a high stake 
for both sides. If I can show this characteristic of military conduct in regard to civilian 
protection through the case study in Chapter 3, this could point to possible ways that 
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 civilian protection should be incorporated as part of a professional code of ethics for the 
military personnel of Western industrial democracies’ armed forces. I will consider the 
this further, drawing examples primarily from the UK and US armed forces, in Chapter 
5 of the thesis.  
In the first part of the thesis (Chapters 1, 2 and 3), therefore, I will clarify the 
issues surrounding civilian protection and how the approach of just war theory is 
inadequate to ensure this. In the second part of the thesis (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), I will 
explore further how and why questions. When considering a Hume-inspired conception 
of justice in Chapter 4 in order to explore how to supplement just war theory on civilian 
protection, two more why questions may arise. Firstly, I need to examine why I should 
reconceptualise justice as utility – a public good. The answer to this question is that the 
conception of justice is not explicitly discussed in discourse on just war theory, and the 
lack of such discussion may prevent civilian protection being exercised as part of just 
conduct in war, as revealed in the analysis of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. In Chapter 
4, I therefore attempt to reconceptualise justice as utility in order to explore a concept 
which may further ensure civilian protection. 
Secondly, I also need to address another, related why question: why do I use 
the Hume-inspired conception of justice? Hume’s theory of justice is controversial, just 
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 as his moral theory is also debated. His theory of justice is also unique in that utility is 
considered to be the foundation of justice, and this conception is useful and 
advantageous to reconceptualise civilian protection as utility. It is not the purpose of this 
thesis, however, to debate Hume’s theory of justice per se, or to explore the 
philosophical position that underpins his theory. The purpose is, by using a 
Hume-inspired conception of justice, to conceptualise justice as a human artifice and 
thus as a societal utility, in order to demonstrate how this conception of justice serves to 
help us to understand civilian protection as utility. Hume’s recognition of the foundation 
of justice in utility is useful to conceptualise civilian protection as part of justice in war 
at a macro level. I will draw material from Hume’s works as well as those of several 
commentators to underpin this argument. 
In order to open up the discussion in Chapter 5, I need to clarify another why 
question: namely, why do I discuss one example of professional ethics among Western 
industrial democracies’ armed forces in order to explore an assurance of civilian 
protection? Having discussed the limitations of the macro level approach of just war 
theory to civilian protection in Chapter 2, in Chapter 5 I will explore the professional 
ethics of military personnel as a primarily meso level and secondarily micro level 
approach to civilian protection that emphasises its focus on the professional group (i.e. 
 - 9 - 
 the armed forces) and its members (individual military personnel). The reason for this is 
that although I have defended my position that civilian protection should be understood, 
recognised and exercised as utility at the global level by using the macro level approach 
of Hume’s conception of justice, I have not discussed concrete ideas or specific 
prescriptions to implement civilian protection. Indeed, the meso and micro level 
approaches do not compete with the macro level approach, but supplement and 
reinforce the idea and ideal of civilian protection envisaged in just war theory, as well as 
Hume’s conception of justice.  
In addition to this I will suggest, using examples, possible ways that the armed 
forces in so-called Western industrial democracies such as the United Kingdom and the 
United States could uphold civilian protection as part of their code of ethics. I use these 
examples, not only because membership of the armed forces is considered to be a 
profession in those countries,10 but also because UK and US military personnel have 
increasingly been sent as expeditionary forces to foreign lands where the protection of 
civilians in the operational theatre is one of the top mission priorities. The armed forces 
of these two countries have become involved in military operations on foreign soil that 
are not necessarily directly linked to national defence, let alone major war-fighting in 
                                                  
10 Cook, The Moral Soldiers, p. 56. 
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 and around their homeland, whereas the Israeli and Palestinian sides examined in 
Chapter 2 were fighting over and across the neighbouring borders that roughly divided 
these two groups. The difference between these two kinds of armed conflict indicates 
that the US and UK Armed Forces cannot avoid moral culpability if and when they 
breach the code of civilian protection. The reason for this is that many of the wars in 
which the US and UK have become involved over the last 60 years were expeditionary 
ones, to which their national survival was not necessarily directly linked. In other words, 
these two countries have fought many extravagant wars, not only in terms of (human, 
material and financial) resources, but also in the sense that they conducted 
expeditionary wars in which their national survival was not immediately at stake. If the 
US and UK Armed Forces are engaged in armed conflicts in which the survival of their 
own nations is not so seriously at stake, unlike the Israelis and Palestinians in that 
conflict, and if this factor of the basic need for national survival is part of the reason that 
civilian protection was often breached in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, then the US 
and UK Armed Forces may be expected or even required to hold a higher standard for 
the protection of civilians when fighting in conflicts outside their national boundaries. 
Furthermore, since these two armed forces have often conducted joint operations with 
other NATO member countries, many of whose member states may also be categorised 
 - 11 - 
 as Western industrial democracies, their ethics of conduct might imply that the examples 
drawn from these two armed forces are also applicable to those of other Western 
industrial democracies. In order to discuss these issues, I will primarily focus on the UK 
and US Armed Forces as examples of agents who commit to and promote civilian 
protection in armed conflict. 
I will then consider another how question: how can civilian protection be 
incorporated into military professionalism so that the protection of civilians can further 
be ensured? In Chapter 5, I will consider civilian protection in relation to the 
professional code of military ethics in Western industrial democracies’ armed forces by 
drawing examples primarily from the UK and US Armed Forces as promising examples, 
possibly among many, of opportunities to improve civilian protection. This 
individual-focused approach on moral education may be a way to illuminate an 
imperative to force individual professionals to comply with the code envisaged in 
professional ethics in Western industrial democracies’ armed forces. In this context, the 
professional ethics approach to civilian protection may raise awareness among military 
professionals of the requirement to follow the professional code of military ethics in 
order further to promote and sustain the threshold of civilian protection once recognised 
and understood in depth. 
 - 12 - 
 Lastly, in Chapter 6, I need to clarify the final why question: why do I examine 
torture as an example of the need for civilian protection in order to defend my position 
that civilians should be protected? The reason for this is that torture and other cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment are performed for the purpose of interrogation on 
civilians, other non-combatants and combatants alike. While these activities can occur 
in peacetime, it is at times of armed conflict that there is often the greatest danger of 
such mistreatment of civilians. Indeed, the torture of civilians is one of the most 
horrendous acts, which completely opposes the idea of civilian protection if conducted 
at a time of armed conflict. Furthermore, if those kinds of ill treatment are conducted 
against civilians by members of armed forces, this raises a serious concern about the 
ethics of civilian protection by the military, as well as the professional ethics of military 
personnel. In this thesis I hope to demonstrate the moral unjustifiability of arguably the 
least controversial case of torture against a possibly culpable person; as a result, I can 
defend my position against any form of torture of civilians in armed conflict. In addition, 
I will show that the moral unjustifiability of any torture against civilians prescribes an 
addition to the professional ethics of military personnel, requiring their protection of 
civilians from torture.  
In order to argue against the moral justifiability of torturing civilians in armed 
 - 13 - 
 conflict, I also need to consider the final how question: how can I demonstrate the moral 
unjustifiability of torture against civilians? Although just war theory might not be the 
best framework from which to consider the protection of civilians in armed conflict 
because it is primarily concerned with a macro level analysis, the spirit of the theory 
inspires a framework of moral judgment and reasoning on civilian protection at the 
meso and micro levels. By extending the core idea of just war theory – namely, 
prevention, prohibition and restraint of a certain kind of violence – I can modify the 
original just war framework and adjust it to a set of moral principles for an individual 
agent who might be engaged in using violence against another. 
In the latter part of the thesis (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), therefore, I will 
demonstrate that these two ideas, one based on a Hume-inspired conception of justice 
and the other based on the professional code of ethics, balance the shortcomings of just 
war theory in civilian protection by showing ways for further ensuring this protection. 
In addition, I will also demonstrate that I can revitalise the spirit of just war theory by 
adjusting the just war framework as an ethical guideline against torture and other 
inhuman treatment, which civilians are often faced with in armed conflicts. 
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 Thesis Outline 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. In Chapter 1, I examine the status of civilians in 
legal and ethical contexts, which will provide the basis for my investigation of the ethics 
of civilian protection in armed conflict. In order to examine this status, I explore the 
legal and ethical sources that address the status of civilians. Initially, in order to consider 
how the status of civilians and their protection are addressed in the legal context, I focus 
on the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 Additional Protocols 
to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. Secondly, I proceed to consider the ethical 
reasons that civilians should be protected in armed conflict by examining concepts that 
could differentiate civilians from combatants and justify civilian protection. In order to 
assess how the status of civilians can be characterised and their protection justified by 
ethical concepts, I examine the five following concepts: moral innocence, innocence as 
harmlessness, responsibility, rights, and personal project. When combined, investigation 
of these concepts allow me to clarify the complex issues concerning the legal and 
ethical status of civilians. 
In Chapter 2 I critically examine just war theory in relation to civilian 
protection in order to consider the scope and limitations of the theory. Specifically, I 
investigate how civilian protection is envisaged in the framework of just war theory, 
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 which is currently a dominant framework for deliberating and contemplating ethical 
issues concerning civilian protection in armed conflict, in order to assess whether or not 
it provides an adequate ethical framework for considering civilian protection. Chapter 2 
is divided into three sections. Initially, in Section 2. 1, I outline the structure of just war 
theory in order to demonstrate how civilian protection is envisaged in this framework. 
Secondly, in Section 2. 2, I examine the problems of ambiguity in the principles used to 
judge the issue of civilian protection in just war theory, to explore whether or not it 
provides an adequate framework to consider these ethical issues. Finally, in Section 2. 3, 
in order further to demonstrate the limitations of just war theory in civilian protection, I 
consider the issue of reparation for the loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and 
damage to civilian objects caused as a result of military operations. 
In Chapter 3, in order to consider whether and how civilian protection is 
practised in an armed conflict, I examine the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict as a case study. 
Specifically, I focus on one of the bloodiest periods (2002–3) during the Second Intifada 
period (2001–5). Chapter 3 is divided into two sections. In Section 3. 1, I explore the 
overall pattern of military operations between warring parties in the Israeli–Palestinian 
Conflict during this period of Second Intifada, in order critically to examine whether or 
not civilian protection was properly practised and how civilians were harmed in the 
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 conflict. In Section 3. 2, in order to consider how civilian protection is used not only as 
a rhetorical method for justifying military operations, but also as a means of excuse for 
harming civilians, I investigate four different occurrences of these practices. 
In Chapter 4, I explore one of the two potentially promising ways to 
supplement the macro level approach of just war theory in civilian protection; namely a 
Hume-inspired conception of justice, another macro level approach, in order to propose 
a global utility-based understanding of civilian protection as part of just conduct in 
armed conflict. Chapter 4 is divided into six parts. Initially, I discuss a Hume-inspired 
conception of justice as an artificial virtue, and its relevance regarding civilian 
protection, in order to explore a possible method of justifying civilian protection as part 
of just conduct in armed conflicts. Secondly, I examine utility as an ethical case for 
civilian protection as part of just conduct in times of war, in order to consider whether 
or not this concept contributes to civilian protection. Thirdly, I examine the first of the 
two interpretations of the utility of civilian protection – utility as a mutual benefit 
between warring parties – in order to consider whether or not this interpretation of 
utility contributes to civilian protection. Fourthly, I critically examine the issues 
presented by the first interpretation of reciprocity-based utility for the parties to the 
conflict, in order to consider whether or not this interpretation of utility leads to the 
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 protection of civilians. Fifthly, I examine the concept of non-reciprocity-based utility 
between the warring parties, in order to consider whether or not this interpretation of the 
utility of civilian protection can be appropriate. Finally, I examine the second 
interpretation of utility as the ethical foundation of civilian protection – namely the 
utility of civilian protection at the global level – in order to consider whether or not this 
interpretation of utility contributes to civilian protection. Through the discussion in 
Chapter 4, I consider these six issues in turn, in order to portray how the concept of 
utility as a way of justifying civilian protection plays a role not only to justify civilian 
protection, but also to ensure the better protection of civilians during armed conflicts. 
In Chapter 5, I examine the professional ethics of military personnel in Western 
industrial democracies’ armed forces, by drawing examples primarily from the UK and 
US Armed Forces as examples of agents that commit to and promote civilian protection 
as utility at the global level, in order to consider how civilians could be better protected 
within this framework. The reason for this is that although I defend my position that 
civilian protection should be understood, recognised and exercised as utility at the 
global level by using the macro level approach of Hume’s conception of justice in 
Chapter 4, I have not yet discussed concrete ideas or specific prescriptions to implement 
civilian protection. In order to conduct my research on civilian protection from the 
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 viewpoint of military ethics, I draw on theoretical and empirical discussions and 
materials, primarily from the examples of the UK Armed Forces and its coalition partner, 
the US Armed Forces. These armies are usually considered to be two of the most 
modern military bodies in our time, and have also played an active and important role in 
international expeditionary interventions in the contemporary international arena. 
Chapter 5 is divided into three sections. Initially, in order to consider why civilians are 
not always protected in armed conflicts, I explore the four reasons that combatants fail 
to protect civilians from a moral–psychological point of view. Secondly, I proceed to 
examine military professional ethics by drawing examples primarily from the UK and 
US Armed Forces with regard to civilian protection in order to conclude whether or not 
it is possible to incorporate civilian protection into a professional code of military ethics 
in Western industrial democracies’ armed forces. Finally, in order to explore possible 
ways that civilian protection could be promoted within the framework of military ethics, 
I consider the role of the government and the tasks of the military in Western industrial 
democracies when incorporating civilian protection as part of a professional code of 
military ethics. 
In Chapter 6, I examine the moral unjustifiability of torturing civilians in order 
to demonstrate the moral justifiability of civilian protection in an extreme situation. 
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 More specifically, I develop and analyse a theory of ‘just torture’ by reference to the 
framework of just war theory, which is based on a moral presumption against war, in 
order that I can critically consider the morality or otherwise of torture; even that 
undertaken for interrogation purposes against civilians. Chapter 6 is divided into four 
sections. Initially, I open up my discussion on the ethics of torture by briefly addressing 
the ethical concerns surrounding torture brought up by current practice. Secondly, in 
order to recognise the presumption against torture, I explore the legal definitions and 
regulations of torture. Thirdly, in order to demonstrate the moral unjustifiability of 
torture, I investigate several ethical aspects of torture. Finally, in order further to 
demonstrate the moral unjustifiability of torture against civilians, I establish a 
framework of just torture, by reference to which I argue that torture is never justified in 
practice. 
 
Key Concepts 
Before embarking on the journey to explore the ethics of civilian protection, it seems 
beneficial briefly to outline the key concepts which are relevant to the discussion of this 
thesis; namely, international humanitarian law and just war theory. 
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 International Humanitarian Law 
According to the document created by the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), the guardian of international humanitarian law (IHL), IHL ‘is a set of rules, 
which seeks, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effect of armed conflict’.11 IHL is 
also called the law of war or the law of armed conflict, in the sense that IHL is 
applicable in time of armed conflict. IHL has two main objectives: the first is the 
protection of people who do not, or who no longer, take a direct part in hostilities, and 
the other is to limit the means and methods of war-fighting. 
The origins of IHL go back to the rules and customs of war in antiquity, and a 
set of rudimentary ideas for IHL can be found in the works of classical just war theorists 
such as Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas in the Christian just war tradition. 
Aquinas’s ideas concerning the rules of war were further developed by natural law 
scholars and jurists such as Francisco de Vitoria, Alberico Gentili, Francisco Suarez, 
Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf and Emerich de Vattel between the sixteenth and 
eighteenth centuries, in the same way that just war theory has developed in the modern 
context. 
It was in the mid-nineteenth century that an initial set of rules recognisable as 
                                                  
I
11 ICRC, ‘What is International Law?’ (7/2004), p. 1. Obtained from the ICRC 
webpage; http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/humanitarian-law-factsheet/$File/What_is_
HL.pdf, accessed on 21/1/2008.  
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 modern positive IHL, characterised by its focus on the scope of application to matters 
concerning jus in bello, was codified. The first of these was the Declaration Respecting 
Maritime Law or the Treaty of Paris (1856), which stipulates the rules concerning 
maritime practice in time of war. A more direct origin of IHL can be traced to the 
establishment of the ICRC in 1859, according to Michael Byers: ‘when the Swiss 
businessman Henri Dunant witnessed the aftermath of the Franco–Austrian Battle of 
Solferino – in which 40,000 men died, many as the result of untreated wounds – and 
initiated a movement that became the International Committee of the Red Cross’.12 
Further codification of the rules of war can be found in the Instructions for the 
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (the Lieber Code) adopted in 
1863. Although the Lieber Code might not be considered to be IHL in a strict sense, 
because it was prepared during the American Civil War and applied to forces solely in 
the United States, it may well be considered to be the first explicit codification of a set 
of rules concerning the restrictions of war conduct, including the protection of 
non-combatants, in modern positive humanitarian law. Indeed, the idea of civilian 
protection can be found in Article 23 of the Lieber Code, which stipulates the general 
protection of non-combatant citizens, requiring that: ‘private citizens are no longer 
                                                  
12 Michael Byers, War Law: Understanding International Law and Armed Conflict (New York: Grove 
Press, 2005), p. 115. 
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 murdered, enslaved, or carried off to distant parts, and the inoffensive individual is as 
little disturbed in his private relations as the commander of the hostile troops can afford 
to grant in the overruling demands of a vigorous war’. Article 25 also confirms that the 
protection of non-combatants is considered a general rule of warfare, asserting that: ‘in 
modern regular wars of Europeans, and their descendents in other portions of the globe, 
protection of inoffensive citizens of the hostile country is the rule’. According to the 
ICRC, the Lieber Code played a very important role in the development of IHL because 
it ‘strongly influenced the further codification of the laws of war and the adoption of 
similar regulations by other states’.13 The ideas of this code were reflected and further 
developed into the Hague Convention of 1907, which primarily regulates the means and 
methods of warfare.  
The most systematic legal attempt to limit human suffering was undertaken 
after the Second World War. Contemporary IHL is found primarily in the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, and the protection of civilians is codified in the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. The ideas and ideals of the Fourth Geneva Convention to mitigate the 
effect of war were further developed and articulated in its Additional Protocols of 1977, 
in which the current legal source of the codification of the protection of civilians is 
                                                  
13 ICRC webpage: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/110?OpenDocument. Accessed on 23/1/2008. 
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 found. Details of the legal framework for civilian protection will be examined in 
Chapter 1. 
 
Just War Theory 
Just war theory is a set of ideas concerning rightness and wrongness of conduct 
appertaining to war. Its origins can be traced back to the teachings of Augustine of 
Hippo, who is often considered to be the father of just war theory. A general form of just 
war theory consists of a set of criteria or principles with which to form a moral 
judgement of war itself and also of conduct within the theatre of war. There is a 
distinction, which is usually accepted when considering conditions of just war, between 
jus ad bellum (justice of war) and jus in bello (justice in war), into either of which 
categories several criteria fall.14 In the words of James Turner Johnson, jus ad bellum is 
a set of ‘concepts relating to the justification for going to war’, and jus in bello is a set 
of concepts concerning the ‘restraining or limiting of war once begun’.15 The number of 
criteria varies according to the theorist, and the numbers usually range between six and 
                                                  
14 Nigel Dower World Ethics: The New Agenda (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), pp. 
121–2. It is worthy of note that not every just war theorist agrees on the distinction between jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello. For example, John Finnis argues that the distinction 'is scarcely part of the Catholic 
natural law tradition' and that it is not a ‘helpful distinction’, in ‘The Ethics of War and Peace in the 
Catholic Natural Tradition’, in Terry Nardin (ed.), The Ethics of War and Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), pp. 15–39, at p. 25 
15 James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry 
(Princeton Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. xxii-xxiii. 
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 nine; at most eleven.16 The criteria are not independent of one another, but rather a set 
of principles which are inter-connected and interactive when being applied and operated 
for moral judgement. Below is a brief introduction to the seven most commonly used 
just war criteria (five for jus ad bellum: just cause, proper authority, right intention, last 
resort, proportionality in ends, and probability of success; and two for jus in bello: 
non-combatant immunity and proportionality in means). 
Just Cause: the criterion of just cause states that war must be waged on rightful 
grounds. Self-defence, for example, is almost always accepted as a just cause,17 and the 
self-defence justification against aggression coincides with international law as 
stipulated in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Punishment and restitution are also regarded 
as just causes.18 Johnson argues that in the classical just war tradition, in contrast to 
                                                  
16 For example, nine criteria are listed in ‘The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response’, 
the Pastoral Letter on War and Peace of the US Catholic Bishops. Seven conditions are for jus ad bellum: 
(1) Just Cause, (2) Competent Authority, (3) Comparative Justice, (4) Right Intention, (5) Last Resort, (6) 
Probability of Success and (7) Proportionality; and two are for jus in bello: (8) Proportionality and (9) 
Discrimination. Reprinted in Jean Bethke Elshtain (ed.), Just War Theory (New York: New York 
University Press, 1992), pp. 77–168. See also Richard B. Miller (ed.), War in the Twentieth Century: 
Sources in Theological Ethics (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992), pp. xiv-xv. On the 
other hand, David Fisher counts six in total: four for jus ad bellum (competent authority, last resort, just 
cause, and proportionality), and two for jus in bello (proportionality and non-combatant immunity). David 
Fisher, Morality and Bomb: An Ethical Assessment of Nuclear Deterrence (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 
p. 16. In another example, John Howard Yoder lists eleven; six criteria for jus ad bellum: (1) Legitimate 
Authority, (2) Just Cause, (3) Right Intention in objective sense, (4) Right Intention in subjective sense, 
(5) Due Process, and (6) Necessary, and five for jus in bello: (7) Proportionality, (8) Immunity of the 
Innocent, (9) Discrimination, (10) Dignity of Humankind as Rational and Social, and (11) Compliment of 
Positive Law and Treaty. John Howard Yoder, When War is Unjust: Being Honest in Just-War Thinking, 
Second Edition (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1996), pp.147–161. Richard Norman, among others, counts a 
'formal declaration of war' as a jus ad bellum criterion, in Ethics, Killing and War, p. 118.    
17 An exception is pointed out by Fisher: ‘a state, even if attacked, does not eo ipso have a just cause, if 
its threatening and provocative or genocidal behavior invited such attack’. Fisher, Morality and Bomb, p. 
23.  
18 Harries, Christianity and War, p. 65. 
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 positive international law, ‘retaking something wrongly taken’ and ‘punishment against 
evil’ may also be included in this heading.19 Contrary to this view, the contemporary 
Catholic natural law version of just war tradition is inclined to justify war only for 
self-defence purposes.20 Recent ‘representatives’ to the Catholic natural law tradition 
(such as Pius XII, John XXIII and the Second Vatican Council) ‘have spoken as if the 
only justifying ground for war were defense’, observes Finnis.21 Conversely, Johnson 
argues that the two classical ideas of punishment and restitution ‘have been absorbed 
into a broadened concept of defense in contemporary international usage’.22 Protection 
of human rights is also suggested as a just cause by David Luban, who argues that 
infringement of ‘socially based human rights’ would be a just cause. 23  Fisher 
conditionally agrees to include the protection of human rights, such as stopping 
genocide, as a just cause, ‘provided it is kept as minimal as possible’.24 However, it may 
be a matter of interpretation whether the protection of human rights may be included in 
the criterion of just cause. 
                                                  
19 James Turner Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1999), pp. 26–7.  
20 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Women and War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 152–4. 
21 Finnis, ‘The Ethics of War and Peace’, p. 23. 
22 Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare, pp. 29–31.   
23 David Luban, ‘Just War and Human Rights’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Winter 1980), 
reprinted in Charles Beitz (ed.), International Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 
195–216. A ‘socially based human right’ is a ‘right whose satisfaction is necessary to the enjoyment of 
any other rights’, according to Luban, who employs this concept from Henry Shue. Luban, ‘Just War and 
Human Rights’, pp. 209–10, and p. 209n24 
24 Fisher, Morality and Bomb, p. 23. 
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 Proper Authority: the criterion of proper authority, sometimes also called 
proper, legitimate or competent authority, stipulates that war must be waged by a 
legitimate sovereign authority. Traditionally the legitimate authority to wage war is 
limited to sovereigns. However, in contemporary international relations, it is usually 
understood to mean a state or group of states, and exceptionally, some non-state agents 
such as self-determination movements. One remarkable development in modern history 
is that the UN Security Council is sanctioned by its resolutions to use, or to authorise a 
state or a group of states to use, force. Johnson argues that the ‘core concept of right 
authority has the prima facie effect of favoring certain interventionary uses of force in 
the interest of internationally recognized standards of justice’. 25  One extreme 
interpretation may be a ‘conservatively interpreted’ one, which is ‘to rule out all 
non-state or unofficial resort to physical force (other than by individuals in 
self-defence)’ and therefore ‘serves to justify all de facto government and leads to 
political quietism’, as Coates warns.26 However, it is a matter of debate whether states 
alone are qualified as legitimate authorities to use force. Whether or not it actually 
would result in maintenance of the status quo depends on the interpretation of other 
criteria, such as that of just cause. If the protection of human rights and some forms of 
                                                  
25 Johnson , Morality and Contemporary Warfare, p. 31. 
26 Coates, The Ethics of War, p. 128. 
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 pre-emptive attack were accepted as just causes, then it does not necessarily mean that 
some states, such as those which are tyrannical or expansionist, are not safe from attack 
by other states. By contrast, the chances of war might increase if a state or group of 
states decided to diffuse certain values (say, democracy and freedom) by force or took 
up a war on oppression. 
Right Intention: the criterion of right intention stipulates that war must be 
waged for an appropriate purpose, which is, as commonly understood, to achieve peace. 
Michael Donelan argues that the principle of right intention is the cornerstone of just 
war ethics: 
 
The mistress principle of all the six principles of Just War is Right 
Intention: from the first to last in war there must be no other aim 
than enforce justice and make peace. If this is not our sole intention, 
and we are moved by greed, envy, pride and other such passions our 
authority is questionable, our Cause is suspect, and we lose sight of 
Discrimination and Proportion.27 
 
It is always difficult to determine a state’s true intention for waging war, not least 
because national interest is always involved, and thus there are always suspicions and 
doubts about the true intention. A question may arise: is the war really waged along with 
                                                  
27 Michael Donelan, ‘Minimum Force in War’, International Relations, vol. 12 no. 5 (August, 1995), 
pp.37–45, at p. 37.  
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 the right intention in accordance with just cause? One might argue that this criterion 
leaves room for accommodating national interest as long as it does not override or 
damage the right intention but keeps it in accordance with just cause. Warning that a 
‘puritanical’ interpretation of the criterion of right intention is wrong, as a ‘common 
assumption that the only just war is a disinterested one is not shared by the just war 
tradition’, Coates argues that ‘justice and interest are not mutually exclusive’ and 
therefore the ‘real issue is whether the interest that is present is itself legitimate, and 
whether the legitimate interest is relevant to the case of war’.28 
Last Resort: The principle of last resort states that war should only be waged as 
a final necessity after all possible peaceful means to solve the conflict have been 
exhausted. This principle appears to be standard practice, according with international 
law, deontological reasoning, and perhaps common sense. However, it could be argued 
that there are some cases in which the use of military force at the very first moment 
brings a better outcome in terms of justice in war, and consequently reduces injustices, 
such as preventing the killing of a huge number of civilians. There are two ways in 
which just war theorists could respond to this challenge. One response may be to lower 
the threshold of last resort or abandon the principle entirely on the above grounds. The 
                                                  
28 Coates, The Ethics of War, p. 162. 
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 other may be to move the ideal of a just war towards the end of the absolutists; that is, 
to keep the threshold at the high level and make the justification for war more restrictive. 
Again, the position one takes seems to depend on how to interpret this criterion by itself 
and/or in relation to other criteria.  
Proportionality in Ends: the criterion of proportionality in ends stipulates that 
the use of force must be appropriate in terms of ends and means, or the proper 
cost-effectiveness of war. The total evil of a justifiable behaviour cannot outweigh the 
good achieved by its execution. Proportionality possesses a feature characteristic of 
consequentialist ethics. Harbour comments: ‘The just war tradition completely forbids 
intentionally causing wrongful harm, but the tradition switches to a consequentialist 
mode to justify foreseeable but unintended harm’.29 The problem is, in Coates’s words, 
that ‘the application of the principle in an exaggerated and uncritical way is 
commonplace’. Perhaps Coates’s suggestion is correct that ‘inclusively and evenly’ 
applying the criterion of proportionality is a ‘key element in the moral assessment of 
war’.30 However, again, whether and how the criterion may be applied ‘inclusively and 
evenly’ may be a matter of interpretation. 
Probability of Success: the criterion of reasonable hope of success is, like the 
                                                  
29 Frances V. Harbour, Thinking About International Ethics: Moral Theory and Cases from American 
Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview, 1999), p. 122. 
30 Coates, The Ethics of War, pp. 182, 184. 
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 criterion of proportionality in ends, a consequentialist one. This criterion is based on 
‘prudential calculation of the likelihood that the means used will bring the justified ends 
sought’. 31  Harries argues that this criterion is an ‘extension’ of the principle of 
proportionality in ends.32 As does Fisher, who expounds his reasoning: ‘because any 
assessment of the overall balance between benefits and disbenefits likely to accrue from 
a war must inevitably be weighted by the probabilities of the various outcomes, and, 
hence, take into account the probability of success’. 33  Coates also observes the 
‘interlocking’ of the criteria of probability of success and proportionality.34 
Non-combatant Immunity and Proportionality in Means: in just war theory, 
civilian protection is discussed in the jus in bello framework as the principle of 
non-combatant immunity or the principle of discrimination, together with the other 
principle of proportionality. The principle of non-combatant immunity ‘emerged, as a 
formal ethical rule, rather late in the tradition’, according to Richard Harries.35 Details 
of these two jus in bello principles will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
 
                                                  
31 Jonson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare, p. 29. 
32 Harries, Christianity and War, p. 65. 
33 Fisher, Morality and Bomb, p. 24. 
34 Coates, The Ethics of War, p. 179. 
35 Harries, Christianity and War, p. 76. 
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 Methodology 
The methodology used in this thesis combines different types of methodology common 
to the field of applied ethics, as the thesis is situated within this discipline; more 
specifically, within the discipline of war/military ethics and international ethics. Applied 
ethics is a branch of ethics primarily concerned with our practices and activities, such as 
medicine, business, science and technology and war. 
The term ‘applied ethics’ might imply a simple model; namely, applying an 
ethical theory to issues that may cause ethical concerns. This methodological model can 
be called a high-level approach. However, there are other methodological models of 
applied ethics such as a mid-level approach, a contextualist approach and casuistry. 
Ruth Chadwick’s definition categorises different methodological models of applied 
ethics (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Methodological Models of Applied Ethics 
1. Top-down models 
a. theory application such as fruits of theory approach 
b. mid-level principle application 
2. Various forms of contextualism 
3. Bottom-up model such as casuistry36 
  
                                                  
36 Ruth Chadwick, ‘What is “applied” in Applied Ethics?’ Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy 
Vol.1 (2009), pp. 1–7 at p.2. 
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The fruits of theory approach is, according to Chadwick, based on the view that 
‘applied ethics must involve application of some ethical theory’, and is one of the most 
commonly used methodological models of applied ethics. Indeed, some of the most 
influential works of war ethics in the early period of applied ethics in 1970s, such as 
those of Thomas Nagel and George Mavrodes, are written from this methodological 
model, as I will consider in the Literature Review section. 
The strength of this approach is that it often provides a clear-cut moral 
judgment and reasoning, by applying a theory when considering the moral rightness or 
wrongness of a particular act. For example, imagine a case in which killing an innocent 
person would save the lives of five innocent people. On the one hand, if we apply 
deontological ethics – one of the two dominant approaches in applied ethics that 
prescribes following obligations – if not killing an innocent person is considered to be 
an obligation we should perform, then deontological ethics prescribes not killing the 
innocent, despite the fact that such an omission causes the death of the other five. On 
the other hand, if we apply consequentialist ethics – the other dominant approach, which 
prescribes bringing out the best consequence possible from all options – and if saving 
the maximum number of lives is considered to be the best consequence, then 
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 consequentialist ethics prescribes killing the single innocent person in order to save the 
lives of the five others. 
The weakness of this latter approach is that it often overlooks particularity of a 
situation and context in which an action is undertaken. Let us consider the consequence: 
if killing the innocent person is a one-off situation, then the judgment can be considered 
to be right for a short-term consequence, at least; however, what if we were to consider 
that killing a small number of innocent people in order to save a large number of 
innocent people could become common practice. If it becomes common practice, it 
might bring about detrimental long-term consequences, such as insecurity of society and 
instability of law and order. If we use the fruits of theory approach, it is indispensable 
for us to take into account the background and context in which theories are applied to 
judgment of a particular act. 
The mid-level principle approach attempts, again, in Chadwick’s words, ‘both 
to be in accordance with the “common morality” and to be reconcilable with different 
underlining theories’.37 One of the most important works in applied ethics that employs 
this mid-level principle approach is Principles of Biomedical Ethics written by Tom 
Beauchamp and James Childress, in which they propose four principles; namely, 
                                                  
37 Chadwick, ‘What is “applied” in Applied Ethics?’ p. 3. 
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 autonomy, beneficence, harm, and justice.38 By reference to these four principles, they 
consider ethical dilemmas in medical treatment and healthcare policy. 
One of the greatest merits of employing the mid-level principle approach for 
constructing an argument is that when considering ethical dilemmas by reference to 
principles, it is relatively more simple and straightforward than employing the fruits of 
theory approach, in which an ethical theory is involved. However, a problem with the 
mid-level principle approach occurs inherently when two or more principles conflict. 
One solution to the above problem is to compare and assess the conflicting principles by 
reference to the moral significance of the various situations, and then to decide to 
employ one against others. The question remains whether or not the same principle is 
employed by anyone else in the same situation. The mid-level approach does not give us 
a clear answer, but responds that principles provide a common language so that we can 
locate, understand, communicate and consider ethical dilemmas with others. Indeed, 
that is the strength of this approach. 
Contextualism is, according to Chadwick, ‘more concerned to apply traditions 
of reflection that emphasise context’, and ‘exercises a stronger role in discussions of the 
                                                  
38 Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001). 
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 responsibility of professionals’.39 In this thesis, I will primarily focus on professional 
ethics for meso (or group-focused) level analysis, which can appropriately be 
categorised as contextualism. In Chapter 5, in order to explore civilian protection from 
the perspective of the professional ethics of military personnel, I use this meso level 
approach, 
Chadwick briefly defines casuistry as a ‘case analogy’ approach, in the sense 
that it ‘starts from cases and principles (analogous to case law), and emerges from 
these’.40 In order better to understand this methodological approach as used in this 
thesis, however, I need to examine further the concept of casuistry, not only because 
Chadwick discusses casuistry as a form of anti-theory particularism, to which I do not 
fully commit in the thesis, but also because I find it of greatest benefit to use casuistry 
as a method of discussion to explore grey areas in which moral judgments are involved. 
The most fruitful form of casuistry, from which this thesis benefits most, can be 
characterised in the following way: in Hugo Adam Bedau’s words, casuistry is a 
‘multiple triangulation of the region in which the best answer lies, the parameters or 
boundaries of the region being determined by the relevant ethical principles’.41 Its 
                                                  
39 Chadwick, ‘What is “applied” in Applied Ethics?’ pp. 3–4. 
40 Chadwick, ‘What is “applied” in Applied Ethics?’ p. 4. 
41 Hugo Adam Bedau, Making Mortal Choices: Three Exercises in Moral Casuistry (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), p. vii.  
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 method is, again in Bedau’s words: ‘the solution to a morally problematic case is 
obtained by comparing and contrasting its features with various paradigm cases whose 
moral status is settled’, and then the ‘solution to the problem cases rely both on moral 
principles and maxims that express the received wisdom concerning such paradigms 
and on analogies to them’. Casuistry will therefore proceed in the following way: 
 
One thus attempts to find the best advice for the decision-makers by 
canvassing a wide range of possibilities, no one of which is dispositive 
– no one of which zeros in precisely on the target. The principles in 
question and the counsel they provide (given the facts of the case) 
emerge, bit by bit, at various stages of analysis.42 
 
Indeed, casuistry is not very popular as a methodological tool for discussion in applied 
ethics in general and in ethics of civilian protection in particular. Michael Walzer 
employs casuistry in his work Just and Unjust Wars, arguing that ‘the proper method of 
practical morality is casuistic in character’.43 Casuistry used in this thesis is thus a 
methodological framework for discussion, in the sense that this approach starts from 
clear-cut cases and examples on which no or few moral disagreements are involved, and 
then proceeds to not-so-clear ones on which moral judgments may or may not differ, 
then further to ambiguous ones on which moral agreement might rarely be attainable. 
                                                  
42 Bedau, Making Mortal Choices, pp. 101, vii. 
43 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. xxx. 
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 The primary role of casuistry envisaged in this thesis is to elucidate some of the most 
morally ambiguous and ambivalent cases and examples so that moral judgments can be 
reflectively attained by reference to the theories or principles concerned. 
In order to explore how the issue of civilian protection can best be discussed, 
this thesis uses several different methodological approaches of applied ethics; namely, a 
fruits of theory approach, a bottom-up approach or micro level analysis, casuistry, and 
an approach of professional ethics as a contextualist approach or meso level analysis. 
However, these methodological approaches are not exclusive to each other when 
discussing the ethical issues of civilian protection. In order to consider the moral status 
of civilians in Chapter 1, for example, I consult not only with ethical concepts and 
principles, but also with contextualist and casuistic approaches. More specifically, in 
order to argue that the concept of moral innocence cannot fully explain the moral status 
of civilians, I take a casuistic approach by comparing a pacifist conscript with 
enthusiastic war-supporting civilian. In Chapter 4, I primarily consult with a top-down 
approach, but also use a contextualist one; first, in order to understand civilian 
protection as justice in war, I apply Hume’s theory of justice by extending the scope of 
justice from a domestic level to an international one, and then, in order to defend the 
revised Humean perspective on civilian protection as utility at the global level, I draw 
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 attention to the context in which civilian protection is actually exercised, implemented 
and enforced at international and domestic levels. 
To summarise, the methodology used in this thesis might be called a reflective 
equilibrium in a broader sense, which is aimed at searching for a point of equilibrium 
between theories and principles, and producing a considered moral judgment by 
reference to contexts, cases and examples. 
 
Literature Review 
There is a large quantity of literature concerning the ethics of civilian protection: just as 
one of the main concerns in the study of normative ethical theories is exemplified in a 
debate between consequentialism and deontology, war ethics is also discussed on the 
same axis. The majority of the literature of war ethics is written from the 
consequentialist approach, and most of the rest from the deontological approach. 
There is a huge volume of literature on non-combatant immunity argued from a 
consequentialist approach. Several works on war ethics employ just war criteria, 
especially a jus in bello criterion of non-combatant immunity. One of the most 
acclaimed and influential works on this subject matter is Walzer’s Just and Unjust War, 
which is written from a consequentialist perspective, despite the fact that he uses 
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 casuistry as a methodology for discussion. Although Walzer argues for the distinction 
between combatants and non-combatants as two classes of which one is immune from 
attack and the other not, his consequentialist idea of civilian protection appears to be 
epitomised in his concept of ‘supreme emergency’, which allows agents to break the 
code of non-combatant immunity if and only if this prevents ‘imminent’ and ‘serious’ 
disaster. In other words, in what he calls the situation of ‘extremity’, Walzer, although 
cautiously, permits the requirement of discrimination to be relaxed or even broken when 
the stakes are high, such as when the survival of a nation, let alone the oblivion of 
civilisation, is at stake. Walzer argues: 
 
Can a supreme emergency be constituted by a particular threat—by 
a threat of enslavement or extermination directed against a single 
nation? Can soldiers and statesmen override the rights of innocent 
people for the sake of their political community? I am inclined to 
answer this question affirmatively, though not without hesitation 
and worry. What choice do they have? 
 
Walzer does not single-handedly support breaking the code of civilian immunity. Indeed, 
he seems to make the possibility of exceptions very rare by making the requirement that 
constitutes the situation ‘supreme emergency’ very strict, and actually points out the 
dangers of abuse in that ‘the mere recognition of such a threat is not itself coercive; it 
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 neither compels or permits attacks on the innocent, so long as other means of fighting 
and winning are available’.44 However, by the same token, this shows that Walzer, albeit 
reluctantly, concedes that the killing of the innocent is permissible as a last resort.  
The debate on war ethics is not necessarily limited to contemporary just war 
thinkers. Many consequentialist moral philosophers, including utilitarians, are 
concerned about war ethics, primarily out of their interest to demonstrate that their 
theory can better be applied to worldly matters. The methodology which these 
philosophers prefer is thus a top-down, fruits of theory approach. There are a substantial 
number of works on the subject matter from the early 1970s, and one of the most 
interesting is R. M. Hare’s discussion of the rule of non-combatant immunity examined 
from an utilitarian viewpoint.45 He suggests on utilitarian grounds that breaking the 
rules of war might not be always unjustified.46 From an utilitarian point of view, there 
would be a limitation of the rules, even though the rules are useful most of the time. 
Hare’s two-way utilitarian moral thinking leads to the same conclusion. Similarly, J. E. 
Hare and Carey Joynt also argue that breaking the rules is sometimes justified, and they 
call the rule of non-combatant immunity a ‘prima facie rule’.47 
                                                  
44 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 254–5. 
45 R. M. Hare, ‘Rules of War and Moral Reasoning’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1.2 (1972), pp. 
166–81. 
46 Ibid., p. 177-8 
47 J. E. Hare and Carey B. Joynt, Ethics and International Affairs (London: Macmillan, 1982). 
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 The protection of non-combatants is also argued from the rule-utilitarian point 
of view. One of the most interesting attempts to apply a rule-utilitarian ethical 
framework to war ethics is undertaken by Richard. B. Brandt.48 Brandt argues that the 
code of civilian immunity could be broken for victory, which he thinks is an intrinsic, 
absolute value of utility. He then argues that the code of non-combatant immunity is 
wrong if the killing of civilians to stop the war means that the operation ends swiftly, 
thereby saving numerous lives which would otherwise have been lost in an extended 
war. 
George Mavrodes uses utilitarian reasoning to discuss a moral obligation to 
comply with war conventions, by arguing that the combatant/non-combatant distinction 
is a convention-dependent obligation: 
 
[The moral obligation of non-combatant immunity] is 
convention-dependent if and only if (1) given that a certain 
convention, law, custom, etc., is actually in force one really does have 
an obligation to act in conformity with the convention, and (2) there 
is an alternative law, custom, etc. (or lack thereof) such that if that 
had been in force one would not have had the former obligation.49  
 
                                                  
48 R. B. Brandt, ‘Utilitarianism and the Rules of War’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1:2 (1972): pp. 
145–65.   
49 George Mavrodes, ‘Conventions and the Morality of War’, in Beitz et al, International Ethics, pp. 
75–89, at p. 84. 
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 There are two problems with Mavrodes’s argument. One is the logical ambiguity 
concerning the justification of which moral obligations are convention-dependent and 
which convention-independent. The other is his discussion of the moral relevance of 
such killings. Mavrodes sets out his discussion on the premise that war could be fought 
with the minimum moral requirements such as ‘justice and proportionality’, 
independent of conventions if these conventions were not in force. In his reasoning, the 
moral requirements of justice and proportionality are convention-independent 
obligations. However, without further clarifying the reason that civilian immunity can 
be regarded as a convention-dependent obligation, Mavrodes regards the protection of 
civilians as one of the attempts ‘in the long struggle, in the western world at least, to 
limit military operations to “counter-force” strategies’.50 
Another issue is that his discussion falls short of explicitly showing a clear 
utilitarian reasoning on the moral relevance of killing non-combatants. Mavrodes seems 
to suppose that it is plausible for him to ‘have a moral obligation to refrain from 
wantonly murdering my neighbours’,51 but, again, he gives no further reasoning. It 
might be possible, although he does not expressly so argue, to assume by extendedly 
following his line of argument, that murdering the neighbours would be justified if it 
                                                  
50 Mavrodes, ‘Conventions and the Morality of War’, p. 83. 
51 Ibid., p. 84. 
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 were the way to prevent the deaths of the same number plus more than one. In the same 
manner, his act of killing would be judged wrong if he saved fewer than the number of 
the neighbours killed by his act. Presumably, this is because the number calculation in 
the consequence of these cases is the essence and the virtue of the utilitarian approach. 
If this is correct, then it seems that the utilitarian approach has no rules but the 
rule of utility, which can be regarded as absolute. Mavrodes argues that the moral 
relevance of the convention is determined by the generalisation test. In utilitarian ethics, 
the moral duty to abide by the convention-dependent obligation is determined by 
whether the convention is ‘actually in force’ or not.52 By this formula, acting in 
conformity with a preferable convention which is less abided by is worse than acting in 
conformity with a less preferable but more abided-by convention, if the result of the 
former is worse than that of the latter. If the convention is operative, then it has a moral 
importance and thus becomes an obligation. The utilitarian approach leads to the 
conclusion that it is right for agents to abide by the convention-independent obligation if 
so doing maximises the aggregation of well-being as a whole, but that it is wrong for 
them to abide by the convention-independent obligation if so doing does not bring about 
a better state of affairs. Mavrodes, however, concedes that there might be a more 
                                                  
52 Mavrodes, ‘Conventions and the Morality of War’, p. 86. 
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 general, convention-independent law. His recognition that there are absolute rules is, in 
fact, his justification of utilitarianism. In utilitarian ethics, the maximisation of utility is 
the only convention-independent general moral obligation. For this reason, presumably, 
Mavrodes has to concede that there might be convention-independent obligations in 
order to defend his argument. This is because by doing so he can justify the utilitarian 
rule of maximisation of aggregate well-being. 
Other texts on war ethics are written from a deontological approach, and many 
of them refer to the just war formula.53  Thomas Nagel, for example, argues for 
non-combatant immunity from an ‘absolutist’ point of view. Nagel states that the 
absolutist position prescribes that ‘hostility or aggression should be directed at its true 
object’ (that is a combatant, not a civilian) because a civilian is ‘peripheral’.54 Richard 
Norman also discusses civilian immunity from a deontological, or what he calls 
‘pacificist’ point of view, arguing that all killings in war are wrong, but some are 
‘worse’ than others, because the difference between killing combatants and 
non-combatants is ‘a difference in degree, not a difference in kind’, and concluding that 
‘indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population are worse than attacks on the armed 
                                                  
53 See, for example, Oderberg, Applied Ethics, pp. 215–24. 
54 Thomas Nagel, ‘War and Massacre’, in Beitz et al, International Ethics, pp. 53–74, at p. 67. 
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 forces of enemy’.55 However, the position of calling all killings in war wrong seems 
untenable; either it simply aligns itself with Nagel’s premise or collapses into pacifism 
when it is faced with hard cases. In the event that there are two choices between one 
wrong act (such as killing a combatant in Norman’s framework) and a worse (such as 
killing a civilian) one of them must be chosen to avoid the result that both people perish 
as a consequence of inaction. Norman’s pacifism might mean that he passively sticks to 
giving moral judgement, refusing to act in the death of either person, or it might mean 
that he would choose to act to kill the combatant in order to save the civilian thereby 
opting for the lesser evil, in which case his reasoning may be considered to be the same 
as Nagel’s. 
One of the most interesting works written from a deontological just war 
approach to civilian protection is found in James Turner Johnson’s Morality and 
Contemporary Warfare, written from the perspective of a pluralist version of the 
deontological approach, which is called ethical pluralism or intuitionalism. On the issue 
of civilian protection considered as part of international obligations to ‘protect the 
victims of conflicts’, Johnson argues the ‘international community’ and individual states 
have ‘obligations to those who are in a target state’ in the context of military 
                                                  
55 Norman, Ethics, Killing and War, pp. 188–9. 
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 intervention.56 Johnson further argues that the obligation to protect the victims must be 
considered together with other obligations such as ‘obligations to international order’, 
and ‘obligation to political communities which may contribute to the ending conflicts 
and the succor of victims’. These competing obligations appear to cause the ‘clash of 
obligations’, which he calls a ‘serious problem’. Although this appears the most critical 
part of his moral reasoning, Johnson does not explicitly present a method to resolve the 
moral dilemmas brought by the conflicting obligations, and can only concede that ‘how 
to find the balance’ between these competing obligations, ‘unfortunately, can only be 
found case by case’.57 This suggestion seems very attractive in general terms, but fails 
to offer specific options to deal with individual cases. This aspect of Johnson’s 
framework does not go further than what IHL already prescribes, and is likely to lead to 
the same conclusion that the consequentialist approach recommends; that is, if other 
obligations are considered to outweigh the obligation to protect non-combatants, then 
civilian protection can at best be understood as a second order rule, and may therefore 
be more frequently breached for the sake of discharging the superior obligations. 
Johnson does not consider or answer this potential problem which his argument raises. 
Having surveyed some of the most influential and leading works on war ethics, 
                                                  
56 Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare, p. 102.  
57  Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare, pp. 102–3, 112. 
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 I have found that those works do not develop a systematic analysis or argument on 
ethics of civilian protection or succeed in establishing a fully committed strong case for 
their protection. What the relevant literature overlooks is the consideration of the ethics 
of civilian protection from different perspectives at different levels such as macro, meso 
and micro ones. More specifically, the relevant literature often commits itself to either 
utilitarianism or deontology in constructing an argument; in addition, the deontological 
arguments do not offer a sufficiently strong case for providing adequate protection for 
civilians in warfare. 
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 CHAPTER 1: EXPLORING THE STATUS OF CIVILIANS IN LEGAL AND 
ETHICAL CONTEXTS 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter 1, I will examine the status of civilians in the legal and ethical contexts, 
which will provide the basis for my investigation of the ethics of civilian protection in 
armed conflict. In order to examine this status, I will explore the legal and ethical 
sources that address the status of civilians. Initially, in order to consider how both the 
status of civilians and civilian protection are addressed in the legal context, I will focus 
on the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 Additional Protocols 
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Secondly, I will proceed to consider the ethical 
reasons that civilians should be protected in armed conflict by examining ethical 
concepts that could differentiate civilians from combatants and justify civilian 
protection. In order to assess how the status of civilians can be characterised and their 
protection justified by ethical concepts, I will examine the five following concepts: 
moral innocence, innocence as harmlessness, responsibility, rights, and personal project; 
the first four are very frequently cited in literature on just war theory and ethics of war, 
while the last one is less so. When combined, investigations of these concepts will allow 
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 me to clarify the complex issues concerning the legal and ethical status of civilians. 
 
1. 1. The Legal Status of Civilians 
In Section 1. 1, I will not only clarify the status of civilians who are protected under 
international humanitarian law (IHL), but also explore whether or not there is a 
workable definition of the status of civilians in the legal context. In other words, I will 
explore how IHL dictates civilian protection, to understand under which conditions 
civilians are entitled to protection in the legal context. The relevant legal literature 
potentially assists us to make sense of how civilians should be protected, because IHL 
clarifies some ambiguities concerning civilian protection. Although IHL might not be 
helpful when it comes to the issue of clarifying why civilians should be protected, it is a 
logical starting point when initially exploring the definition of civilians and the methods, 
procedures and conditions of protection under IHL, to give a general understanding of 
the status of civilians and their protection. In order to clarify the legal definition of 
civilians and their protection in the legal context, I must first explore the overall concept 
of civilian protection in armed conflict within IHL by focusing on the two basic 
principles of distinction and proportionality, by which the lawfulness or otherwise of 
harming civilians is judged. Secondly, I will examine the conditions under which the 
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 legal code of civilian protection is applied. Finally, I will consider the limitations of the 
legalistic approach to civilian protection. 
 
1. 1. 1. Legal Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts 
In order to shed light on the foundational ideas about civilian protection in the legal 
context, in Section 1. 1. 1, I will examine the two basic principles for the protection of 
civilians. The legal protection of civilians in situations of armed conflict is codified in 
the provisions of IHL, in which civilian protection is based on the two basic principles 
of distinction and of proportionality, which are both confirmed in customary IHL as 
well as formal treaty-based IHL. 
Firstly, I will consider the principle of distinction, which stipulates the basic 
rule that ‘the parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and 
combatants’, that ‘attacks may only be directed against combatants’, and that ‘attacks 
must not be directed against civilians’. 58  According to the Commentary on the 
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
which clearly states the official view of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) on the Additional Protocols, this principle of distinguishing civilians from 
                                                  
58 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1: Rules, (eds.) Jean-Marie Henckaert and 
Louise Doswald-Beck (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 3.  
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 combatants is a ‘basic rule’ for the protection of civilians because it is the ‘foundation 
on which the codification of the laws and customs of war rests’. It reads: 
 
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilians 
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all 
times distinguish between civilian population and combatants and 
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall 
direct their operations only against military objectives.59 
 
The principle of distinction in the case of international armed conflict is codified in 
Articles 48 and 51 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
Article 48 stipulates the basic rule of distinction: ‘the Parties to the conflict shall at all 
times distinguish between civilian population and combatants and between civilian 
objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against 
military objectives’. 60  Subsequently, Article 51 codifies the protection of civilian 
population in detail. In Paragraph 1, protection of civilians is spelled out as ‘general 
protection against dangers arising from military operations’.61 Attacks against civilians 
are prohibited in Paragraph 2, and indiscriminate attacks against civilians are prohibited 
                                                  
59 ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, (eds.) Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann, with Jean Pictet 
(Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 598. 
60 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Additional Protocol I, 1977), Art. 48. 
61 AP(I), Art. 51, para. 1. 
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 in Paragraph 4. Article 51 is, according to the Commentary, ‘one of the most important 
articles in the Protocol’ because it ‘explicitly confirms the customary rule that innocent 
civilians must be kept outside hostilities as far as possible and enjoy general protection 
against danger arising from hostilities’.62 Thus the principle of distinction sets out the 
fundamental guideline for the protection of civilians in international armed conflict. 
In addition, the principle of distinction is also applicable to non-international 
armed conflicts. General protection of civilians in non-international armed conflicts is 
codified in Article 13 of Additional Protocol II, which reads that civilians ‘shall not be 
the object of attack’.63 According to the Commentary, the ‘absolute prohibition of direct 
attacks’ against civilians in times of non-international armed conflict is essential. ‘To 
ensure general protection for the civilian population consequently implies’, according to 
the Commentary, ‘an absolute prohibition of direct attack against the civilian population 
as such, or against civilians’.64 It can therefore be concluded that the principle of 
distinction has been developed with the purpose of providing legal protection of 
civilians in both international and non-international armed conflict, which is the basic 
premise of IHL. 
                                                  
62 ICRC, Commentary, p. 615. 
63 Geneva Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict (Additional Protocol II, 1977), Art. 13. 
64 Commentary, pp. 1448–9. 
 - 53 - 
 The second basic principle for civilian protection in the legal framework is the 
principle of proportionality, which stipulates that the use of military force should not be 
disproportionate in relation to incidental civilian losses. The principle can be explained 
in the following way: ‘Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental 
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated, is prohibited’.65 In the same vein, the Commentary stipulates that 
combatants and military objects ‘may be attacked whatever they are, except when the 
attack could incidentally result in loss of human life among the civilian population, 
injuries to civilians, and damage to civilian objects which would be excessive in relation 
to the expected direct and specific military advantage’.66 This view of the interpretation 
of the principle of proportionality for civilian protection to prevent unnecessary civilian 
losses and minimise unavoidable incidental civilian losses can also be found in 
literature such as the Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, commissioned by the UK 
Ministry of Defence. It reads: ‘The principle of proportionality is a link between the 
principles of military necessity and humanity. It is most evident in connection with the 
                                                  
65 ICRC, Customary IHL, p.46. Similar wordings are also found in AP (I) Art. 51, para. 5(b). 
66 ICRC, Commentary, p. 620.  
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 reduction of incidental damage caused by military operations’.67 This principle is also 
reflected in the provisions codifying precautionary measures in Article 57(2)(a)(iii) of 
Additional Protocol I, which stipulates that the military planners and commanders shall 
‘refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental 
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians damage to civilian objects, or combination of 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated’.68 In support of this view, Article 57(2)(b) stipulates that ‘attack 
shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent…that the attack may be expected 
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or 
combination of thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated’.69 Thus, the principle of proportionality has been created 
with the intention of limiting harm and damage inflicted upon civilians. 
In Section 1. 1. 1, I have outlined the two basic principles of distinction and 
proportionality in order to clarify how civilian protection is envisaged and codified in 
the legal framework relating to armed conflicts. 
 
                                                  
67 UK Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 2.6.2, p. 25. 
68 AP (II), Art. 57, para. 2(a)(iii). 
69 AP(II), Art. 57, para 2(b). 
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 1. 1. 2. Conditions of Protection 
In Section 1. 1. 2, I will proceed to examine the conditions of civilian protection in 
order to consider under which circumstances civilians forfeit, retain and/or regain their 
legal status as protected people. In order to clarify this point, I will consider the 
conditions under which civilians are entitled to the status of protected people. 
The protected status of civilians in IHL depends on the basic condition that 
they do not directly participate in hostilities: this is confirmed in national by-laws of the 
UK, for example, as well as in IHL. Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I stipulates: 
‘Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such times 
as they take a direct part in hostilities’.70 In other words, civilians are entitled to 
protected status as civilians unless and until they commit ‘hostile acts’ which are ‘acts 
of war which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel 
and equipment of the enemy armed forces’. This viewpoint is reinforced in the 
Commentary, which states that the ‘immunity afforded individual civilians is subject to 
an overriding condition, namely, on their abstaining from all hostile acts’.71 Similarly, in 
non-international armed conflicts, individual civilians are entitled to ‘general protection 
                                                  
70 AP(I), Art. 51. para. 3.  
71 ICRC, Commentary, p. 618. 
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 against the dangers arising from military operations’.72 At the level of national by-law, 
civilian immunity is guaranteed in several countries. For example, in the UK Army’s 
Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, civilian protection is prescribed: ‘Those who do 
not take an active part in hostilities are to be spared from direct attack and, so far as 
possible, from the incidental effects of military operations’.73 Similarly, the US Army’s 
Field Manual implicitly confirms that civilian individuals who do not participate in 
hostilities are entitled to protection under the Geneva Conventions of 1949, by stating 
that they nevertheless lose their right to protection if and when taking part in hostilities. 
It reads:  
 
Where, in a territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter is satisfied 
that an individual protected person is definitely suspect of or 
engaged in activities hostile to the State, such individual person 
shall not be entitled to claim such rights and privileges under the 
present Conventions as would, if exercised in the favour of such 
individual person, be prejudicial to the security of such State.74 
 
These legal provisions indicate that non-participation in direct hostilities is the key 
condition under which civilians are entitled to protection. 
                                                  
72 AP (II), Art. 13. 
73 UK Ministry of Defence, Manual, p. 389. 
74 US Department of the Army, Field Manual 27–10 (Washington D.C., 18/71956), ch. 5, section 1, para. 
248a. 
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 While no provisions of the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols explicitly 
stipulate under which circumstances civilians forfeit their right to protection, the 
Commentary mentions that they do so when they take a direct part in hostilities. 
Commentaries on Article 13(3) of Additional Protocol II clearly state the conditions in 
which civilians forfeit their right to protection: ‘civilians lose their right to protection 
under this Part if they take a direct part in hostilities and throughout the duration of such 
participation’. The rationale for this is, according to the Commentary, that ‘there is a 
sufficient causal relationship between the act of participation and its immediate 
consequences’.75 These commentaries indicate that civilians retain their legal status as 
protected people until and unless they take part in hostilities, and that those civilians 
who are deprived of their legal status as protected people due to direct participation in 
hostilities regain their legal status as protected people once they cease to play their part 
in hostilities. 
In Section 1. 1. 2, I have outlined the conditions under which civilians are 
entitled to protected status. In addition, I have explained the fundamental condition 
under which civilians forfeit their right to this status. 
 
                                                  
75 ICRC, Commentary, p. 1453. 
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 1. 1. 3. Limitation of the Legalistic Approach to Civilian Protection 
In Section 1. 1. 3, I will assess the limitations of the legalistic approach to civilian 
protection. As has been clarified in Sections 1. 1. 1 and 1. 1. 2, the provisions of IHL are 
useful to shed light on the complex issues concerning the definition of civilians, the 
status of civilians and the condition of their protection. However, there are problematic 
issues in the legalistic approach, in that IHL does not always give a clear-cut distinction 
between civilians and combatants applicable to the realities in the battlefield. There are 
two main points worthy of examination in order to reveal the limitations of the legalistic 
approach to civilian protection: one is technical and the other subjective. The first 
problematic issue to consider is the applicability of the principle of distinction; the 
second is the interpretation of the legal provisions concerning civilian protection. 
The first problem arises because the legalistic approach leaves some 
ambiguities in applying the provisions, in which the definition of civilians and the 
condition of their protection are codified, to the actual, specific situations in armed 
conflict. The problem regarding the applicability of distinction between civilians and 
combatants in contemporary modes of warfare is acknowledged by lawyers and 
practitioners. For example, Jacob Kellenberger, the then ICRC President, conceded in 
an official statement that the application of the legal provisions to actual practice ‘has 
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 often proved problematic’. In Kellenberger’s words: 
 
The implementation of the principle of distinction is further 
challenged by the trend of the military to use civilian infrastructure, 
telecommunications and logistics also for military purposes. Such 
practices may be difficult to reconcile with states’ obligations to 
‘avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated 
areas’ and to ‘take the other necessary precautions to protect civilian 
population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their 
control against the dangers resulting from military operations’ to the 
maximum extent feasible.76 
 
In the same vein, this type of concern was expressed in the Commentary more than 15 
years prior to the statement above. It states: 
  
There should be a clear distinction between direct participation in 
hostilities and participation in the war effort. The latter is often 
required from the population as a whole to various degrees. Without 
such a distinction the efforts made to reaffirm and develop 
international humanitarian law could become meaningless. In fact, 
in modern conflicts, many activities of the nation contribute to the 
conduct of hostilities, directly or indirectly; even the morale of the 
population plays a role in this context.77 
 
When discussing the case of non-inter-state/intra-state armed conflict, the applicability 
                                                  
76 ICRC, an official statement by Jacob Kellenberger, ‘International Humanitarian Law at the Beginning 
of the 21st Century’, at the 26th Round Table in San Remo on current problems of international 
humanitarian law ‘The two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions: 25 year later - challenges 
and prospects’ (5/9/2002). 
77 ICRC, Commentary, p. 619.   
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 of the principle of distinction becomes even more ambiguous. State practice is, 
according to Customary International Humanitarian Law, ‘ambiguous as to whether 
members of armed opposition groups are considered members of armed forces or 
civilians’.78 This is not only because Additional Protocol II does not contain a definition 
of civilians or the civilian population, but also because most military manuals ‘define 
civilians negatively with respect to combatants and armed force and are silent on the 
status of members of armed opposition groups’.79 
In addition to the above discussed difficulties, the second major problem 
surrounding the legalistic approach to civilian protection is the interpretation of the 
legal provisions concerning this protection. This is not only because there are competing 
interpretations of the legal provisions, but also because these interpretations are often 
contested. In order to illustrate how the legal provisions concerning civilian protection 
are differently interpreted, I will look at the two different interpretations of the principle 
of proportionality, explored in Section 1. 1. 1 as one of the two principles that are IHL’s 
backbone on civilian protection. The principle of proportionality, codified in Article 
51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I, prohibits ‘an attack which may be expected to cause 
                                                  
78 ICRC, Customary IHL, p. 17. 
79 Ibid. One notable exception is, according to Customary IHL, the military manual of Colombia, in 
which the term civilians are defined as ‘those who do not participate directly in military hostilities 
(internal conflict, international conflict)’. 
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 incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated’.80 
The core issue of this provision for civilian protection is how to interpret 
incidental losses as being not excessive in relation to military advantage. There are at 
least two points of view on the interpretation of the principle of proportionality. The 
first view contends that humanitarian considerations prevail over military considerations 
when they are in conflict or in question, and the second view considers that military 
interests override humanitarian interests. The first view is, for example, expressed in the 
Commentary, which states that humanity prevails over military necessity when these 
two are in conflict. It states: 
 
Of course, the disproportion between losses and damages caused a 
delicate problem; in some situations there will be no room for doubt, 
while in other situations there may be reason for hesitation. In such 
situations the interest of the civilian population should prevail…81 
 
This restrictive interpretation safeguards the principle of proportionality against sliding 
down the scale of being proportionate towards the less restrictive side. Evidence of this 
                                                  
80 AP (I), Art. 51, para. 5(b). 
81 ICRC, Commentary, p. 626. 
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 can also be observed in the Commentary, which states that the idea that ‘civilian losses 
and damages may be justified if the military advantage at stake is of great importance’ is 
‘contrary to the fundamental rules of the Protocol’ concerning civilian protection. The 
Commentary sets the threshold of prohibition very high, arguing that ‘the Protocol does 
not provide any justification for attacks which cause extensive civilian losses and 
damages’ and that ‘incidental losses and damages should never be extensive’. Thus, in 
this limiting interpretation of the principle of proportionality, according to the 
Commentary, the principle ‘only intervenes when it is not possible to ensure the total 
immunity of the population’.82 
Contrary to this restrictive interpretation of the principle of proportionality, the 
second interpretation is less restrictive and inclined to take the sliding scale into 
consideration. By sliding scale, I mean an utilitarian calculation to justify such ideas as 
‘the greater the justice of my cause, the more rules I can violate for the sake of the 
cause—though some rules are always inviolable’, in Michael Walzer’s words. When 
this sliding scale is applied, as Walzer points out, this ‘leaves only the restraint of 
usefulness and proportionality’ and ‘makes way for those utilitarian calculations that 
rules and rights are indented to bar’.83 A. P. V. Rogers, for example, argues in the line of 
                                                  
82 ICRC, Commentary, pp. 626, 1450. 
83 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 229–30. 
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 the sliding scale framework, that the scale and degree of the principle of proportionality 
interpreted and applied are determined by the nature of military objective: ‘Clearly, the 
more important the military objective, the greater the incidental losses before it could be 
said that the rule of proportionality had been violated’.84 In the same vein, Michael N. 
Schmitt argues that ‘the extent of harm and damage is relevant only in relation to the 
military advantage reasonably expected as the attack was launched’ because the 
‘standard’ for the principle of proportionality ‘is “excessive” (a comparative concept), 
not “extensive” (an absolute concept)’.85 In order to consider this interpretation, take the 
US bombing in Baghdad at the beginning of the 2003 Iraq War. The so-called shock and 
awe bombing campaign using cruise missiles aimed at various targets in and around 
Baghdad at the beginning of war in March 2003 reportedly caused substantial damage 
to civilians and their property.86 This level of damage might be considered to be 
acceptable collateral damage if the stakes of war are high. This line of thought is 
succinctly expressed in the words of Donald Rumsfeld, then US Secretary of Defence; 
‘Ultimately, if it’s a high enough value target, you accept a higher risk of casualties’.87 
                                                  
84 A. P. V. Rogers, Law on the Battlefield 2nd ed. (Manchester: Juris Publishing, 2004), pp. 21–2. 
85 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Precision attack and international humanitarian law’, International Review of Red 
enberg, ‘War in the Gulf: Rogue Missile wrecks home: Target 
Cross 859 (2005), pp. 445–66 at p. 457. 
86 John F. Burns, ‘A Nation at War: Baghdad; Officials in Iraq voice defiance after airstrikes’, New York 
Times (23/3/2003), A1; and Suzanne Gold
miss reduces five Baghdad houses in rubble’, Guardian (24/3/2003), p. 10. 
87 Quoted in Eric Schmitt, ‘A nation at War: Civilians; Rumsfeld says dozens of important targets have 
been avoided’, New York Times (23/3/2003), B12. 
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 These two different interpretations of the principle of proportionality show us 
that met
gal 
context, 
Section 1. 2, therefore, in order to explore the reasons for civilian protection, I will 
hods of interpreting the fundamental principle of IHL are still contested among 
legal experts. This in turn implies that the legal concepts and terms used for civilian 
protection in IHL are capable of, and indeed at risk of, being misused and abused for 
purposes other than the protection of civilians (i.e. military and political advantage). 
In Section 1. 1, in order to understand civilian protection outlined in the le
I have considered the legal status of civilians and their protection in IHL. 
Initially, I have considered the overall concept of civilian protection in armed conflict in 
IHL by focusing on the two basic principles of distinction and proportionality for the 
protection of civilians. Secondly, I have considered the conditions under which the legal 
code of civilian protection is applied. Finally, I have argued that the limitation of the 
legalistic approach to civilian protection is that the degree of protection of civilians 
depends on the interpretation of proportionality envisaged in IHL. I have also argued 
that this characteristic of proportionality potentially becomes harmful to civilians if 
proportionality is loosely interpreted and applied in favour of military and political 
agendas that do not coincide with the maximum protection of civilians. I have also 
discovered that IHL is less helpful for explaining why civilians should be protected. In 
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 examine ethical concepts that can characterise the status of civilians and justify their 
protection. 
 
1. 2. Concepts for Distinction of Civilian Status and for Justification for Protection 
aving discussed the status of civilians and the condition of their protection in the legal 
 
ocence 
itially, I will examine moral innocence in order to assess whether or not this concept 
ise the status of civilians as protected people. 
orally pure’ in 
Thomas 
H
framework in Section 1. 1, in Section 1. 2 I will explore the reasons that civilians should
be protected in armed conflict. In order to consider why civilians should be protected, I 
will explore five concepts emerging from the literature of war ethics and just war theory 
that could characterise the status of civilians and justify their protection in the ethical 
context; namely, moral innocence, innocence as harmlessness, responsibility, rights, and 
personal project. 
 
1. 2. 1. Moral Inn
In
could potentially character
It has been widely accepted in literature on the ethics of war, as well as on just 
war theory, that the distinction between being morally innocent (or ‘m
Nagel’s words) and being morally guilty does not necessarily coincide with the 
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 distinction between civilians and combatants. If such a distinction were made by the 
concepts of moral innocence and moral guilt, according to Nagel, the army ‘would be 
justified in killing a wicked but non-combatant hairdresser in an enemy city who 
supported the evil policies of his government, and unjustified in killing a morally pure 
conscript who was driving a tank toward us with the profoundest regrets and nothing 
but love in his heart’.88 That is to say, being morally innocent does not confer immunity 
from attacks on combatants, and being morally guilty does not deprive civilians of 
protected status. To make this case, let us consider a civilian war supporter and a 
conscript. If we subscribe to the idea that being morally innocent predicates the 
protected status and being morally guilty predicates the loss of that status, we might feel 
uneasy about the legal prescription that the morally guilty (on the grounds that he 
supports the war for a racial reason, for example) civilian war supporter enjoys his 
protected status, whereas the morally innocent (on the grounds that he opposes the use 
of military force, for example) conscript could not be afforded the same protection as a 
civilian.89 
Indeed, some conscripts would be willing to go to war, whereas others, for 
whom initially joining the military was against their will, would become attuned to the 
                                                  
88 Nagel, ‘War and Massacre’, p. 69. 
tants are not entitled to protection at all in combat. They are still 89 NB This does not mean that comba
entitled to protection under the First, Second and/or Third Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
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 cause of
 education may 
niform, trained for a few weeks, and sent to the 
w-grade unit. He may have no 
nderstanding of what the war is about, and no heart for it. He might 
 
Although such a conscript’
, as Mavrodes rightly describes, a ‘without doubt a combatant’ who is considered to be 
pacifist but was conscripted against his will, and who in combat deliberately shoots over 
                                                 
 the military through training, part of the purpose of which is to align their 
mentality and attitude with those of the military. Jonathan Glover argues that: ‘Military 
training has to make people do things which they would not do in civilian life’90 If 
successful, military training can fit the conscripts for soldiering and make them harmful 
to the enemy while maintaining moral innocence such as a sense of self-dedication and 
selflessness for the defence of others. In an extreme case, there might be a conscript 
described by George Mavrodes; 
 
A young man of limited mental ability and almost no
be drafted, put into u
front as a replacement in a lo
u
want nothing more than to go back to his town and the life he led 
before. 
s moral innocence might be qualified, the person in question 
is
a legitimate target in combat.91 
To clarify this point further, we can take the example of a conscript who is a 
 
han Cape, 
onvention and the Morality of War’, p. 81. 
90 Jonathan Glover, Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century (London: Jonat
1999), p. 51.  
91 Mavrodes, ‘C
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 the head of an enemy in order to avoid harming him. This pacifist conscript may be 
consider
he may contribute to it for both 
knows best how to do, and he may 
vidly hope to share in the unjust gains…92  
If we ap
the unpr
whereas the conscript might be entitled to protection. 
ocence too readily to combatants 
and civi
                                                 
ed to be a morally innocent person. Suppose also that there is an enthusiastic 
war-supporting civilian who donates as much money as he can afford to contribute the 
war effort. To borrow a case from Mavrodes again, this civilian can be more precisely 
characterised by the following descriptions:  
 
A person may be an enthusiastic supporter of the unjust war and its 
unjust aims, he may give to it his voice and his vote, he may have 
done everything in his power to procure it when it was yet but a 
prospect, now that it is in progress 
his savings and the work which he 
a
 
ply the concept of moral innocence to the distinction between the protected and 
otected, then the civilian might be considered a legitimate military target, 
However, this line of argument on moral innocence does not necessarily help to 
clarify the protected status of civilians. As several commentators argue, it is problematic 
to apply the distinction between moral guilt and inn
lians.93 Jeffrie G. Murphy points out a moral dilemma brought about by the 
 
ple, Nagel, ‘War and Massacre’, p. 69; Mavrodes, ‘Conventions and Morality of War’, 
92 Ibid., p. 80. 
93 See, for exam
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 concept of innocence in war: 
 
Suppose, then, we try to make use of notions of moral innocence of 
the ar and moral guilt of the war (or something within the war). 
Even here we find serious prob
civilian in Dresde
w
lems. Consider the octogenarian 
n who is an avid supporter of Hitler’s war effort 
(pays taxes gladly, supports warmongering political rallies, etc.) and 
contrast his case with that of the poor, frightened, pacifist frontline 
a
 
Geoffrey
between the concept of innocence an
ared all but accidental ill-effects of 
eal their support or for which, as 
was usually the case, their support was credibly claimed by their 
ruling representatives?95 
 
These ar
                                                                                                                                                 
soldier who is only where he is because of duress and who intends 
lways to fire over the heads of enemy. It seems reasonable to say 
that the former is much more morally guilty of the war than the 
latter…94 
 Best also poses a series of critical questions on the awkward relationship 
d civilians: 
 
but what about the adult who shared in the political and 
psychological encouragement and support of war? Was it reasonable, 
was it right that they should be sp
a war for which they did not conc
guments show that although the concept of moral innocence might give us 
 
nd Law since 1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 260. 
pp. 80–1; Norman, Ethics, Killing and War, pp. 166–9; and Coates, The Ethics of War, pp. 234–5.  
94 Jeffrie G. Murphy, Retribution, Justice and Therapy: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (D. Reidel: 
Dordrecht, 1979), p. 6. 
95 Geoffrey Best, War a
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 some im ts and wrongs of killing in 
armed conflict, the concept of moral innocence is not always useful when it is used as a 
means of distinguishing civilians from combatants. There are morally innocent 
combatants who are conscripted and not engaged in military activities. As discussed 
above, it seems rather doubtful whether we can accept that their moral innocence can be 
considered the primary reason for making civilians immune from direct attack. In many 
ways, some civilians, such as infants and children, are morally innocent. However, it 
seems less clear whether or not moral innocence as a concept can be used to 
characterise the status of civilians and to differentiate them from combatants when we 
consider, for example, civilian war-supporters. 
In Section 1. 2. 1, I have argued that being morally innocent cannot be seen as 
grounds for affording protected status to combatants, and that at the same time, being 
morally guilty does not deprive civilians of their protect status. 
 
 
1. 2. 2. Innocence as Harmlessness 
Having raised the argument in Section 1. 2. 1 that being morally innocent does not 
necessarily characterise the status of civilians as protected people and thus cannot be the 
portant prima facie insights concerning the righ
 - 71 - 
 only reason to justify their protection, in Section 1. 2. 2 I will explore the second of the 
xample, argues that ‘“innocent” means “currently harmless”’.97 People who 
are calle
e civilians and 
                                                 
five concepts – namely innocence as harmlessness – in order to consider how this 
concept characterises the status of civilians as protected people and justifies their 
protection. 
In just war theory and the ethics of war, those who are immune from attack are 
distinguished from those who are not by the concept of innocence as harmlessness.96 
Nagel, for e
d innocent are people who are not harmful: literally, as Hugo Slim points out, 
the ‘word innocent comes from Latin nocens’ (meaning harmful).98 Indeed, as Best also 
argues, those people who were entitled to protection were usually harmless to others; 
useful from the military, political and/or economic points of view, or helpless; such as 
clerics, peasants, pregnant or nursing women, and young children.99 
The concept of harmlessness is not an axiomatic concept that distinguishes 
civilians from combatants, however. Indeed, not every commentator on the ethics of war 
necessarily agrees that harmlessness is a valid concept to characteris
 
96 See, for example, Norman, Ethics, Killing and War, p. 69; Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 235; and 
David Rodin, War and Self-Defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 84. 
97 Nagel, ‘War and Massacre’, p. 69. 
98 Hugo Slim, ‘Why Protect Civilians? Innocence, Immunity and Enmity in War’, International Affairs, 
79:3 (2003), p. 499. 
99 Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare: The Modern History of the International Law of Armed Conflict 
(London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1980), p. 55. 
 - 72 - 
 justify t
                                                 
heir protection. For example, Jenny Teichman argues that the legitimate and 
illegitimate targets in war are not differentiated by a single dichotomy of guilt and 
innocence because there are other concepts necessary to distinguish legitimate targets 
from illegitimate ones, although she does not specify what constitutes those other 
concepts.100 The problem of the concept of innocence as harmlessness is that it does not 
necessarily guarantee civilian status qua civilians as protected people, because civilians 
are not necessarily harmless in war. It is incontestable that some civilians, such as 
babies and the senile, are generally harmless in war. But, let us consider a test case, 
which can be used throughout Section 1. 2: a bishop who blesses military conduct that 
involves the killing of harmless civilians. It is arguable whether or not he is really 
innocent as harmless. We can agree that the clergyman is physically harmless in the 
sense that he does not harm civilians by himself. However, what is obviously a different 
matter is whether or not he acts in a harmful way by abetting atrocities against civilians. 
Let us consider another test case: an hors de combat trooper who used to serve in an 
unpopular war of indiscriminate attacks. After being injured in combat, he was captured 
as a prisoner of war and tortured by interrogators, but finally succeeded in escaping 
from the enemy and came back alive, although permanently disabled. His story about 
 
100 Jenny Teichman, Pacifism and the Just War: A Study in Applied Philosophy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1986), pp. 63–8. 
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 his ordeals and the trauma inflicted upon him was so inspiring that people began 
supporting the war enthusiastically enough to push the government to increase the scale 
and degree of indiscriminate offences against the enemy population. It is questionable 
whether or not he can be considered a harmless person. The above illustrated clergyman 
and ex-trooper are not considered harmful in just war terms because they do not take a 
direct part in hostilities. However, it seems difficult to regard these people as entirely 
harmless because they may appear greatly to contribute to the war effort while enjoying 
their protected status as harmless. 
It therefore seems that the concept of harmlessness does not give a clear 
insight regarding the distinction between those people who are entitled to protected 
status and those who are not. Although it is a useful concept to the extent that we might 
gain a general sense of who should be protected and who should not, being harmless is 
not enough to characterise the status of civilians as protected people. This is because 
being harmless does not precisely correspond to the definition of civilians as protected 
people within the commonly understood just war theory that non-combatants include 
not only civilians, but also hors de combat people such as the wounded, the sick, and 
prisoners of war. This additional complication indicates that the distinction between the 
harmless and the harmful does not coincide with the distinction between civilians and 
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 combatants. 
Thus far, my argument has revealed that the distinction between the innocent as 
harmless people and the guilty as harmful people is not identical with the distinction 
between civilians and combatants. In other words, harmlessness is not necessarily a 
clear-cut
If innocence as harmlessness is not able to 
offer a c
 concept that can be used to distinguish civilians from combatants: as discussed, 
if guilt is based on harmfulness, a bishop who rallies moral support for war might be 
seen as a legitimate target because of his presumed harmfulness to the enemy as being a 
moral/ideological leader to war effort. Upon examination of these cases, therefore, it has 
been found that the concept of innocence as harmlessness is not a useful definition to 
characterise the protected status of civilians. 
In Section 1. 2. 2, I have considered the concept of innocence as harmlessness, 
arguing that the idea of innocence as harmlessness does not always clarify the protected 
status of civilians or justify their protection. 
lear-cut justification for civilian protection, some other concept is required to 
characterise more completely the status of civilians, which could aid the cause of 
civilian protection.  
 
1. 2. 3. Responsibility 
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 Having considered in Section 1. 2. 2 that harmlessness does not necessarily characterise 
e protected status of civilian protection, in Section 1. 2. 3, in order to consider how 
e conduct of war characterises the status of civilians and justifies 
tators such as G. E. M. 
Anscom
th
being responsible for th
their protection, I will examine the concept of responsibility. 
Responsibility – whether or not a person in question is responsible for military 
action – is often considered to be a means of characterising the status of civilians and 
justifying their protection, and is supported by commen
be.101 In the same vein, Richard Hartigan claims that whether or not a person in 
question is a civilian is determined by his responsibility for military actions. According 
to Hartigan, the protection of civilians is justified on the grounds that a civilian is ‘not 
responsible in any personal way for the conduct of war.’ Hartigan also argues that the 
concept of responsibility for military actions coincides with the contemporary 
characterisation of civilians: ‘The modern classification of the civilian, the 
non-combatant who should be treated in some special, protective fashion, rests on an 
assumption of nonresponsibility’.102 
Although the concept of responsibility seems to make sense as one of the 
                                                  
101 G. E. M. Anscombe, ‘War and Murder’ in G. E. M. Anscombe, R. A. Markus, P. T. Geach, Roger 
Smith, and Walter Stein, Nuclear Weapons and Christian Conscience (London: Marlin Press, 1961), pp. 
, pp. 90, 35. 
45–62 at p. 49. 
102 Richard Shelly Hartigan, The Forgotten Victims: A History of the Civilian (Chicago: Precedent 
Publishing, 1982)
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 definitional criteria for civilian status, this concept has a parallel limitation to the 
concept 
necessarily a more useful concept than innocence as harmlessness when attempting to 
of harmlessness, in the sense that both assume that a person in question is 
entitled to protected status as a civilian, even if he is responsible for the conduct of war. 
This implies that by their action in taking a direct part in hostilities, combatants are 
entitled to their combatant status, and by their action in not taking a direct part in 
hostilities, civilians are entitled to their protected status. If so characterised, there is 
little difference in the assumption of civilian status between the concepts of 
responsibility and of harmlessness. If this is the case, then we are still shadowed by the 
same theoretical problem mentioned previously; that is, whether or not the war-abetting 
bishop is immune from attacks. The bishop may be considered not to be responsible for 
military action in the sense that he does not directly participate in any military action – 
such as taking up arms, commanding terror bombing campaigns, or ordering 
extrajudicial executions of prisoners of war – and therefore he may be considered 
entitled to protection, according to the concept of responsibility. However, more 
importantly, the bishop is indeed responsible for military action taken by the combatants, 
if it is committed as a result of their inspiration by his blessing. 
In Section 1. 2. 3, I have argued that the concept of responsibility is not 
 - 77 - 
 define the status of civilians. This is because both concepts assume that civilians do not 
take a di
t 
f rights concerning the distinction between civilians and combatants is Michael Walzer. 
ument, soldiers forfeit their rights to life and liberty in the sense that 
s an issue of concern about its relevance to the borderline cases 
                                                 
rect part in hostilities, and fail to take into account some of the ways in which 
civilians can have influence on a war, without directly participating by bearing arms. In 
Section 1. 2. 4, I will explore the concept of rights, the fourth of the five concepts which 
could potentially help to characterise the status of civilians and justify their protection. 
 
1. 2. 4. Rights 
In ethical terms, one of the staunchest defenders of the moral relevance of the concep
o
In Walzer’s arg
even if they do not or are unwilling to fight, they ‘gain war rights as combatants and 
potential prisoners, but they can now be attacked and killed at will by their enemy. 
Simply by fighting, whatever their private hopes and intentions, they have lost their title 
to life and liberty’.103  
The concept of rights seems neatly to characterise the protected status of 
civilians and justify their protection. However, if this concept may trigger doubt, it is 
probably because there i
 
103 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 136. 
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 which I
tribute 
greatly t
 have already discussed. The concept of rights does not fully cover 
non-combatants who greatly contribute to the war effort while not taking a direct part in 
hostilities. Recall the octogenarian civilian in Murphy’s case discussed earlier, the 
bishop who blesses the indiscriminate use of military force against the enemy 
population, and the ex-trooper who influences public opinion and government policy. 
According to the concept of rights, they are entitled to protected status as civilians in the 
same way as other civilians who do not in any way contribute to the war effort. In other 
words, the concept of rights does not give any just reason to see a difference in 
protection between these war-supporting civilians and other civilians who have no 
direct part in hostilities. If the concept of rights has a limitation when addressing the 
ethical issue concerning civilian protection, it is likely to be found in these cases. 
In Section 1. 2. 4, I have argued that we might find limitations in the concept of 
rights since this concept provides blanket protection to those civilians who do not take a 
direct part in hostilities, despite the fact that some of them nevertheless con
o the war effort. In Section 1. 2. 5, I will consider the concept of personal 
project. 
 
1. 2. 5. Personal Project 
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 Thus far, I have discussed four concepts that might characterise the status of civilians 
nd argued that it cannot be perfectly characterised by any of these four concepts. 
clue that is needed to unlock the complexity concerning the 
 into what he is doing 
s his own death a 
meaning…But death in war of a non-combatant does not have any 
such guaranteed meaning: it may be something better than a 
                                                 
a
However, if there is one 
status of civilians, it might be found in the concept of personal ‘project’,104 which 
primarily flows from the concept of the meanings of life and death in war of combatants 
and non-combatants. Barrie Paskins and Michael Dockrill point out that a 
‘non-combatant is a person who is not a combatant’, while a combatant is a ‘person who 
(i) is engaged in activity which has a military dimension which (ii) is among the 
activities which confer, if anything does, meaning on the person’s life’. They argue that 
the distinction derives from the difference in meaning and implication of their deaths in 
war between a combatant and a non-combatant. In their words: 
 
Because of an internal connection between combatancy and being 
killed, a combatant has the option and opportunity to regard the 
prospect of death in war as meaningful: written
is a connection with being killed that give
 
104 J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1973), p. 116–7. Although Williams does not provide any definition of personal project, 
he uses the concept of personal project for his criticism on utilitarianism by pointing out that ‘the 
distinction between my killing someone, and its coming about because of what I do that someone else 
kills them’ is based ‘on the distinction between my project and someone else’s project’ (p. 117). The 
reason for this is, according to Williams, that a person ‘is identified with his actions as flowing from 
projects and attitudes which in some cases he takes seriously at the deepest level, as what his life is about’ 
(p. 116).   
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 meaningless episode but if this is so then that is for some other 
reason than that the relation of the person's activity to war makes it 
so.105 
ms to indicate that soldiers are more likely to find their death in war meaningful 
spect when going to war. Contrary to the case of 
 
This see
because it is part of their pro
ombatants, civilians are likely to have a much slighter chance of finding their death in 
                                                 
c
war meaningful because they have not been able to give the prospect such due 
consideration.106 If we see a difference in the meanings found in death between soldiers 
and civilians when following the same line of thought, we can also see a clear difference 
in personal project between them. To shed light on this point, let us consider the case of 
the 9/11 aircraft. We can assume that there were two categories of people aboard the 
hijacked commercial aircraft that eventually crashed into the World Trade Centre, the 
Pentagon, and the ground in Pennsylvania on 11th September 2001. One was a group of 
hijackers and possibly sympathisers for their cause, and the other was the bulk of crew 
and passengers. Although this distinction might seem somewhat oversimplified, if there 
is any difference between two groups, part of this is in the difference in their personal 
project. This can be seen when we consider that the first group would be likely to regard 
their act as part of their own personal project, whereas the second group would be 
 
105 Barrie Paskins and Michael Dockrill, The Ethics of War (London: Duckworth, 1979), pp. 222, 225. 
106 Paskins and Dockrill, The Ethics of War, p. 225. 
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 highly unlikely to regard their own tragic death as such. 
The significant role of the concept of personal project is to reinforce the 
justification of the protection of civilians, in that the vast majority of ordinary civilians 
who have no direct part in hostilities do not see the prospect of death in war as part of 
their per
 death in war is part of their personal project 
and then
                                                 
sonal project, but as something that destroys it. Presumably there are civilians 
who regard the prospect of death in war as part of their own personal project. This does 
not mean, however, that they forfeit their right to be protected as civilians, as long as 
they do not take a direct part in hostilities. 
There are two reasons to support blanket immunity of civilians, regardless of 
their personal project: one is that it is technically impossible to confirm whether or not 
each individual civilian holds the view that
 to target only those civilians who hold such a view; and the other reason is, 
more fundamentally, that attacking civilians who are entitled to protection could blur the 
distinction and consequently undermine the foundation of the idea of civilian 
protection.107 When considering the concept of personal project, it is less important that 
there may be civilians who regard the prospect of death in war as part of their own 
 
107 This idea is implied in AP (I) Art. 50(3), which reads: ‘The presence within the civilian population of 
individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its 
civilian character’. 
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 personal project than that the vast majority of ordinary civilians do not see it as such.108 
There is the possibility of a strong objection to this line of argument, however. 
If we recall the pacifist conscript and the war-supporting civilian discussed previously, 
the paci
ustify their protection. This is 
due to th
war-supporter might have. However, we have to bear in mind that a pacifist conscript, 
                     
fist conscript is not ready to fight or die. We may consider that this is mainly 
because he does not regard the prospect of death in war as part of his personal project. 
However, we might consider that the war-thirsty civilian may indeed regard the prospect 
of death in war as part of his own personal project. Although what seems to be the 
definitive answer depends on their own personal state of mind, it seems not necessarily 
incorrect to assume that the pacifist conscript might not regard his own death in war as 
part his personal project. Moreover, it could be concluded that the chance that the 
conscript regards the prospect of death in war as part of his personal project is probably 
smaller than the chance that the professional soldier does. 
From this discussion it has been revealed that the concept of personal project 
does not necessarily characterise the status of civilians or j
e possibility that a pacifist conscript could potentially have a smaller chance of 
regarding the prospect of death in war as part of his personal project than a civilian 
                             
108 Paskins and Dockrill, The Ethics of War. 
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 during the course of his military training and service, could potentially change his 
personal project and envisage that being a soldier and going to war was part of his 
personal project, whereas the prospect of the same change is not likely in the vast 
majority of civilians. 
Despite the fact that the concept of personal project is limited in being able 
independently to determine the status of civilians and justify their protection, it could 
help to explain the reasons that it is sometimes permissible to kill or maim some 
civilians, using military force if necessary. Through this concept we can argue that the 
death of the war-abetting civilian is somewhat different from the deaths of the bulk of 
non-war-supporting civilians, primarily because the war-abetting civilians have a 
greater chance of envisaging the prospect of their injury and death in war, caused by a 
legitimate attack as part of their personal project, and associated with their active 
contribution to the military aspect of the war effort. We can find a fairly direct and 
straightforward connection in the war-abetting civilians and their prospect of death in 
war, whereas we cannot find it in non-war-supporting civilians who have nothing to do 
with the war effort. In other words, the death of the war-abetting civilians is different 
from the death of non-war-supporting civilians in terms of personal project. 
During the course of my discussion, therefore, I have found that the concept of 
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 personal project might not stand by itself as a determining concept that characterises the 
status of civilians, but it certainly aids in the clarification and complements the idea of 
civilian 
ave discussed the status of civilians by examining legal and ethical 
oncepts concerning civilians such as moral innocence, innocence as harmlessness, 
ject. I have shown that although the distinction 
protection. If there is a key advantage in using the concept of personal project, it 
is that this concept explains the reason that harming war-abetting civilians, such as the 
war-supporting civilian and the war-instigating bishop, is less impermissible than 
harming ordinary civilians. This is because, according to the concept of personal project, 
the former group of civilians could have a greater likelihood of envisaging their death in 
war, whereas the latter group could be less likely to see their death in war as part of their 
own personal project. To conclude, the concept of personal project seems to reinforce 
the idea of the protection of civilians who have no connection with the military aspect 
of the war effort. 
 
Concluding Remarks for Chapter 1 
In Chapter 1, I h
c
responsibility, rights, and personal pro
between civilians and combatants is usually held to be the concept of harmlessness, this 
concept is limited in its ability correctly to address the status of civilians, which is very 
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 complex in contemporary armed conflicts. In order to address the issues regarding the 
protected status of civilians in armed conflict, I have explored the legal and ethical 
sources regarding this status. Initially, I examined the legal status of civilians by 
reference to the relevant legal sources, primarily to the Geneva Conventions. Secondly, 
I discussed the status of civilians by referring to the five ethical concepts which could 
differentiate civilians from combatants and justify civilian protection: moral innocence, 
innocence as harmlessness, responsibility, rights, and personal project. During the 
course of this discussion, I established that the concepts often regarded as means for the 
moral distinction of civilians from combatants seem to fail to grasp fundamental issues 
concerning the status of civilians, such as active contributions to the military aspect of 
the war effort. 
Similarly, when considering the ethical dimension, I established that none of 
the five concepts which I examined is an axiomatic, clear-cut concept available to 
characterise the status of civilians and to justify their protection, let alone to 
differentiate morally justifiable or permissible killings of civilians from unjustifiable or 
impermissible ones. Thus, I have discussed the issue that the status of civilians cannot 
fully be explained by existing legal and ethical concepts alone. I have also argued that 
the status of civilians can be more clearly understood through the use of the concept of 
 - 86 - 
 personal project, which explains the reason that civilians in general have to be protected, 
but that some civilians may have a weaker claim to protection, in that ordinary civilians 
are unlikely to see their death in war as part of their own personal project, while 
war-supporting civilians may be more likely to consider death in war as a possible 
outcome of their involvement. The concept of personal project could further strengthen 
the claim of ordinary civilians to their protection, if used together with the previously 
discussed concepts of harmlessness and responsibility. Having explored the status of 
civilians and their protection in the legal and ethical context in Chapter 1, in Chapter 2 I 
will critically examine just war theory, in order to consider how civilian protection is 
considered within this theory. 
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 CHAPTER 2: CIVILIAN PROTECTION IN THE FRAMEWORK OF JUST 
WAR THEORY 
 
Introduction 
Having discussed in Chapter 1 the status of civilians in the legal and ethical contexts, in 
Chapter 2 I will critically examine just war theory in relation to civilian protection, in 
order to consider the scope and limitations of the theory. Specifically, I will investigate 
how civilian protection is envisaged in the framework of just war theory, which is 
currently a dominant framework through which to deliberate on and to contemplate the 
ethical issues concerning civilian protection in armed conflict, in order to assess 
whether or not it provides an adequate ethical framework for considering civilian 
protection. 
Chapter 2 is divided into two sections. Initially, in Section 2. 1, I will outline 
the structure of just war theory in order to demonstrate how civilian protection is 
envisaged in this framework. Secondly, in Section 2. 2, I will examine the problems of 
ambiguity in the principles used to judge the issue of civilian protection in just war 
theory, in order to explore whether it provides an adequate framework to consider these 
ethical issues. Finally, in Section 2. 3, in order further to demonstrate the limitations of 
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 just war theory concerning civilian protection, I will consider the issue of reparation for 
the loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects caused as a 
result of military operations. 
  
2. 1. Civilian Protection in Just War Theory 
Initially, in order to explore the definitions of just war theory, I will survey several 
variations of this theory made by different commentators. I will then outline just war 
theory in relation to civilian protection in order to demonstrate how the framework of 
this theory is related to it. 
The first and foremost question on just war theory is this: what is a just war? 
Answers vary according to different approaches to the morality of war and peace, which 
are roughly divided into three categories: the realist approach, the pacifist approach and 
the just war approach. In the realist approach, justice of war and justice in war are often 
considered to be optional and not of vital importance. Although justice might exist in 
war, it bears little relation to war conduct. In the pacifist approach, just war is an 
oxymoron. In this approach justice is considered to be a concept inherently 
incompatible with the use of military force. A pacifist argues that a just war does not 
exist because war is never justified. The common feature in the realist and pacifist 
 - 89 - 
 approaches is that justice in war is not considered to be of great importance. Conversely, 
in the just war approach justice is considered to be an important moral element in war 
because it is based on the premise that any war must be just. 
There are several answers to the question ‘what is just war theory?’. Oliver 
O’Donovan argues that just war theory is a ‘proposal of practical reason’, which is 
concerned with ‘how we may enact just judgement even in the theatre of war’.109 He 
also argues that just war theory, as a ‘practical proposal for the radical correction of the 
praxis of war’, offers moral guidance ‘for those who wish to learn how to engage in the 
praxis of judgement—to engage in it in these days and these circumstances, where we 
actually find ourselves, here and now’.110 In the same vein, James Turner Johnson 
considers it a ‘mode of reasoning attached to religious, legal military and political 
discourse’.111 From a slightly different perspective, Chris Brown comments that just 
war theory provides the framework of a communication kit, like a common moral 
language, to discuss the moral and ethical aspects of war.112 Jean Bethke Elshtain 
describes just war theory as a ‘complex amalgam of normative principles and pragmatic 
                                                  
109 Oliver O'Donovan, The Just War Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 6–7. 
110 O'Donovan The Just War Revisited , pp. 12–13.  
111 Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare, p. 25. 
112 Chris Brown, ‘Selective Humanitarianism: In Defence of Inconsistency’, in Deen K. Chatterjee and 
Don E. Scheid (eds.), Ethics and Foreign Intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
pp. 31–50 at p. 45. 
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 evaluation’.113 Indeed, according to Terry Nardin, just war theory is a ‘label that 
embraces a diversity of views holding that war is subject to moral constraints’.114 The 
diversity of the just war theory is succinctly described by David Rodin, who comments 
that the tradition ‘includes a large number of diverse yet related positions stretching 
from the theological writings of Augustine and Aquinas, via the legal treatises of 
Grotius and his contemporaries, to modern secular account found in writers such as 
Michael Walzer’.115 
Most just war thinkers generally hold the view that some wars or some parts of 
war (such as war conduct) cannot be morally justified, while others might be. It is a 
means of ethical deliberation aimed at restraining war and the acts associated with it. 
Elshtain argues: 
 
Just war imposes constraint where it might not otherwise occur; and 
it promotes ongoing skepticism and queasiness about the use and 
abuse of power without opting out of political reality altogether in 
favor of utopian fantasies and projections. It requires action and 
judgment in a world of limits, estrangement, and partial justice…116 
 
                                                  
113 Jean Bethke Elshtain, ‘Just War as Politics: What the Gulf War Told Us About Contemporary 
American Life’, in David E. Decosse (ed.), But Was It Just?: Reflections on the Morality of the Persian 
Gulf War (New York: Doubleday, 1992), p. 44n1. 
114 Terry Nardin, 'Introduction', in Terry Nardin (ed.), The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and 
Secular Perspectives (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 9.  
115 Rodin, War and Self-Defense, pp. 103–4. 
116 Elshtain, ‘Just War as Politics’, p. 54. 
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 The purpose of just war ethics is, according to Richard B. Miller, ‘to distinguish some 
forms of killing (war) from murder, and to keep the killing in war from becoming 
murderous’ and ‘to classify some human acts as morally acceptable, and to assign limits 
beyond which those acts become unacceptable’.117 The starting point of just war theory 
may be, in David Fisher’s words, that it ‘presupposes that there is a prima facie moral 
presumption against war: war stands in need of justification’.118 Elshtain points out that 
the ideas of just war are based on the two presumptions: ‘a belief in the existence of 
universal moral dispositions’ and ‘an insistence on the need for moral judgments, for 
being able to figure out who in fact in this situation is more or less just or unjust and 
more or less victim or victimizer’. Thus the upshot of just war theory may be a global 
ethic with a cosmopolitan aspiration. Elshtain argues:  
 
Just war thinking…is a product of Western ethics, but it is also a 
proposal concerning the nature of the international system. If we 
think of just war in this way, we can more readily urge its 
consideration upon those who do not share our own tradition.119 
 
Just war thinking fundamentally ‘sustains a worldview that construes human beings as 
                                                  
117 Richard B. Miller, Interpretations of Conflict: Ethics, Pacifism, and the Just War Tradition (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 13. 
118 Fisher, Morality and Bomb, p. 16. 
119 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Power Trips and Other Journeys; Essay in Feminism as Civic Discourse 
(Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), pp. 157–8. 
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 innately and exquisitely social’, and it ‘follows that all ways of life are laced through 
with moral rules and restrictions that provide a web of social order’ over all human 
beings.120 
Just war theory can be divided into two main parts: the first part is concerned 
with the ethical considerations that need to be taken into account when choosing to go 
to war (jus ad bellum) and the second deals with the ethical considerations of just 
conduct within war (jus in bello).121 Ethical issues concerning civilian protection can be 
examined with reference to the two principles of non-combatant immunity and of 
proportionality in the jus in bello framework.122 In addition to these two criteria, the 
principle of double effect, which will be discussed in greater detail in Section 2. 2. 3, 
can also be used as an ethical framework when considering in the jus in bello 
framework.123 
In Section 2. 1, I have briefly outlined the definition and concepts of just war 
theory in general and its structure as an ethical framework in relation to civilian 
                                                  
120 Elshtain, ‘Just War as Politics’, p. 55. 
121 See Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare, p. 27; Coates, The Ethics of War, p. 98; Regan, 
Just War, p. 18; Dower, World Ethics, p. 122; and Jeff McMahan, ‘The Ethics of Killing in War’, Ethics 
114:4 (2004), pp. 693–733, at p. 693. Recently, the third part of just war, which is concerned with the 
ethical considerations for the post-war situation (jus post bellum), has been discussed by several 
commentators. See for example, Walzer, Arguing about War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004); 
Orend, War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 
2000); and more recently, Orend, The Morality of War. I do not contemplate jus post bellum in this thesis 
because it is not my main purpose to join the debate surrounding this newly proposed third tenet of just 
war theory. It is more important for my argument to point out that civilian protection is primarily 
discussed in the jus in bello framework. 
122 Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare, pp. 18–9; 36–8. 
123 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 151–6. 
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 protection. I have also observed that ethical considerations concerning civilian 
protection are undertaken in the jus in bello framework. 
 
2. 2. Just War Principles in relation to Civilian Protection 
In Section 2. 2, I will examine in detail the principles used for considering civilian 
protection in the jus in bello framework in order to consider how the ethical issues 
concerning civilian protection can be contemplated and judged in just war theory. In 
Sections 2. 2. 1 and 2. 2. 2, I will examine the principles of non-combatant immunity 
and proportionality, in order to demonstrate that the main problem of just war theory in 
relation to civilian protection is in the flexibility of interpretation and application of 
these principles. In Section 2. 2. 3, I will investigate how the principle of double effect 
is applicable when considering ethical issues concerning civilian protection, in order 
further to demonstrate the limitation of just war theory in civilian protection. 
 
2. 2. 1. The Principle of Non-combatant Immunity 
The principle of non-combatant immunity, or discrimination, as it is often known, 
stipulates that non-combatants should not be directly attacked.124 It is worthy of note, 
                                                  
124 See Harries, Christianity and War, p. 76; Dower, World Ethics, p. 123; Johnson, Morality and 
Contemporary Warfare, p. 36; Regan, Just War., p. 87; and Coates, The Ethics of War, p. 239. 
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 however, that this does not prohibit incidentally harming non-combatants in military 
operations. This principle, working in tandem with the principle of proportionality, 
which stipulates that needless harm and destruction should be avoided in order to 
achieve justified ends, implicitly allows that non-combatants may be harmed 
incidentally on condition that the harm inflicted is proportionate to the military 
advantage anticipated. This raises the question: to what extent is the principle of 
non-combatant immunity considered to be independent of the principle of 
proportionality? 
Regarding this question of the principle of non-combatant immunity, some just 
war theorists see it as being only slightly dependent on the principle of proportionality, 
whereas others see the two principles as clearly interlinked.125 The first group of 
commentators may be referred to as ‘rule-oriented just war thinkers’, since they tend to 
emphasise the value of rules and principles over considerations of consequence when 
making judgements on civilian protection in the jus in bello framework. They often 
place greater emphasis on the idea that it is wrong to kill harmless people (i.e. civilians) 
than on the idea that civilian lives may sometimes need to be accepted as collateral 
damage in order to gain military advantage. For example, Harries emphasises the 
                                                  
125 For example, Richard Harries and James Turner Johnson may be included in the first of the two 
groups of commentators, while William O’Brien may be categorised in the second group. 
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 importance of the principle of non-combatant immunity as a rule to be strictly observed 
in war. He argues:  
 
The harmless on the side of the enemy have just as much right to 
protection as the harmless on one’s own side. Killing a harmless 
person on one’s own side without due cause would be a murder. 
Killing a harmless person on the enemy side is no less murder.126 
 
These comments do not necessarily mean that all rule-oriented just war thinkers argue 
for an absolute prohibition on harming civilians. By referring to the principle of 
proportionality, many consider that harming civilians may be permitted under such 
conditions that the harm is incidentally caused as an unintended consequence and is 
considered to be proportionate to the military advantage gained. Johnson justifies this 
position on the grounds of lesser evil: 
 
The horrible events and actions confronted in war must be divided 
between those evil in all aspects and those that can be set into a 
relationship of priorities along with other relative evils. When this is 
done, one may still be outraged at a particular horror of war, yet may 
morally accept it in order to avert or control a worse evil.127 
 
Nevertheless, from this rule-oriented point of view, the principle of non-combatant 
                                                  
126 Harries, Christianity and War, pp. 85–6. 
127 Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare, p. 18. 
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 immunity is considered to be largely independent of the principle of proportionality. 
This point of view is confirmed by supporters who consider that the idea of the 
protection of non-combatants in the jus in bello framework is not primarily aimed at 
justifying a certain war conduct that risks harming non-combatants, but at reining it in. 
For example, Bailey argues that ‘just war ethics is composed of restriction and 
prohibition rather than permission’.128 In the same vein, Harries also argues that the 
‘purpose of just war is to protect the harmless [i.e. non-combatants]’, not primarily to 
justify military operations.129 
Contrary to the rule-oriented just war theorists, there is another group of just 
war thinkers who predominantly emphasise the ethical values of consequence over the 
values of rules and principles, whom we may call ‘consequence-oriented just war 
thinkers’.130 These theorists tend to apply the principle of non-combatant immunity less 
strictly in the light of consequences than the rule-oriented just war thinkers. For 
example, William O’Brien argues that ‘the moral, just-war principle of discrimination is 
not an absolute limitation on belligerent conduct’, because this principle has not been 
‘seriously advanced by the church, and it is implicitly rejected when the church 
                                                  
128 Sydney Dawson Bailey, War and Conscience in the Nuclear Age (Basingstoke, MacMillan, 1987), p. 
3 
129 Harries, Christianity and War, p. 86. 
130 These include William O’Brien and David Fisher, among others. 
 - 97 - 
 acknowledges the continued right of self-defence, a right that has always been 
incomparable with observance of an absolute principle of discrimination’. Following 
this line of argument, O’Brien suggests that ‘discrimination is best understood and most 
effectively applicable in light of the interpretations of the principle in the practice of 
belligerents’.131 This consequence-oriented point of view implies that the principle of 
non-combatant immunity is considered by these just war thinkers not to be independent 
of the principle of proportionality, and thus it is more likely to be subject to it. 
To summarise, the gap between these two views on the principle of 
non-combatant immunity indicates that this principle has the potential to be flexibly 
interpreted and applied. In addition, this flexibility is likely to give rise to ambiguity in 
the jus in bello framework in relation to civilian protection. Therefore, although just war 
theory is supposed to protect civilians, this theory does not do so adequately in practice, 
because the ambiguity of the principle of non-combatant immunity can allow this 
principle to be used for political or military purposes that are not necessarily compatible 
with civilian protection. 
In Section 2. 2. 1, I have considered the principle of non-combatant immunity 
in order to understand the limitations of just war theory on civilian protection. Through 
                                                  
131 William V. O’Brien, The Conduct of Just and Limited War (New York: Praeger, 1981), p.45. The 
stress is mine. 
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 examination of the two different points of view on the principle, I have found that this 
principle can be flexibly interpreted and applied; a key limitation that can lead to 
ambiguity. Ambiguity in the principle can allow too many civilian casualties if and 
when this principle is tempered by the principle of proportionality. In Section 2. 2. 2, I 
will consider the other jus in bello principle, the principle of proportionality. 
 
2. 2. 2. The Principle of Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality stipulates that incidental damage to civilians and 
civilian objects must be proportionate to the military advantages anticipated if and when 
attacks against military targets are considered or actually undertaken.132 The purpose of 
this principle is to incorporate considerations of the values of consequences in relation 
to civilian protection in just war theory. 
The key problem with the principle of proportionality, just as with the principle 
of non-combatant immunity, can be found in the ambiguity arising from its flexible 
interpretation and application, because this principle only stipulates that incidental 
damage to civilians must be proportionate to the military gains. Because of this 
flexibility, the principle can be seen as ambiguous, since it does not indicate any 
                                                  
132 Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare, p. 36. 
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 definitive ideas about the degree and scale of what may be considered proportionate. 
Bailey explains that the judgement of proportionality ‘is inevitably a subjective test’, 
which ‘requires difficult decisions by military commanders’; consequently, ‘a cool 
Cartesian calculation’ is required.133 In this sense, the equilibrium of the cost–benefit 
calculation of proportionality is subject to the users’ interpretations and applications of 
the principle. This characteristic of the principle of proportionality allows a wide range 
of interpretations, and can lead to arbitrary judgements concerning the permissibility of 
the scale and degree of harm inflicted upon civilians. Take the NATO bombing of dual 
installations such as power plants during the Kosovo crisis in 1999.134 According to 
Carl Ceulemans, the bombing caused not only the direct destruction of the installations 
themselves, but also ‘unintended casualties and material damage in the immediate proxy 
of the object’. The destruction of the electricity plants meant that ‘power would be cut 
off in hospitals, babies’ incubators, and water-pumping installations’.135 Whether or not 
such plants are targeted in favour of military advantages ultimately depends on how 
military planners interpret and apply the principle of proportionality when considering 
or directing attacks that could cause collateral damage. 
                                                  
133 Bailey, War and Conscience, pp. 28–9. 
134 This case is borrowed from Carl Ceulemans’s article, ‘The NATO Intervention in the Kosovo Crisis: 
March June 1999’, in Bruno Coppieters and Nick Fotion (eds), Moral Constraints on War: Principles and 
Cases (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), pp. 205–28 at pp. 223–4.  
135 Ceulemans, ‘The NATO Intervention’, p. 225. 
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 In addition to these potential consequences, the ambiguity of the principle in 
interpretation leaves the application of this principle open to manipulation. In fact, the 
ambiguity of the principle of proportionality raises serious concerns about the potential 
for politically motivated use of this principle to justify causing harm to civilians in 
military operations. In practice, the principle of proportionality is often at risk of being 
manipulated by users who intend to exploit it for political and/or military purposes. 
Coates points out that ‘the application of the principle in an exaggerated and uncritical 
way is commonplace’.136 
In order to shed light on the problem of the political or military manipulation of 
the principle of proportionality, let us consider the legal principle of proportionality in 
IHL, whose structure is almost identical to the jus in bello principle, making the 
problems outlined applicable to either. In IHL, the judgment of the principle of 
proportionality – how incidental losses are considered proportionate in relation to the 
military advantage anticipated – is ‘based to some extent on a subjective evaluation’, 
according to the ICRC Commentary.137 The subjective nature of the legal principle of 
proportionality is somewhat problematic, at least in the legal-exegetical context, 
because IHL is based on the presumption that legal provisions are correctly interpreted 
                                                  
136 Coates, The Ethics of War., p. 182. 
137 ICRC, Commentary, p. 683. 
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 and applied on a bona fide basis. 138  This position of IHL is described in the 
Commentary: ‘the interpretation [of the principle of proportionality] must above all be a 
question of common sense and good faith for military commanders’, who ‘must 
carefully weigh up the humanitarian and military interests at stake’.139 
This prescription for the principle of proportionality, however, raises a concern 
about an arbitrary application of the principle in favour of military necessity. Take the 
issue of so-called collateral damage, a euphemism for ‘excusing civilian casualties as an 
unintended but foreseen side effect’140 of legitimate military operations. Apologists in 
the armed forces might argue that the military takes the maximum care over the 
protection of civilians. For instance, commenting on the Iraq War, a spokesman for the 
UK Ministry of Defence was quoted as saying: ‘During the conflict we took great pains 
to minimise casualties among civilians’.141 Contrary to this assertion, it is alleged that 
thousands of Iraqi civilians were killed during the major combat phase (March to May 
2003) and thereafter by the Coalition forces.142 It would be arguable whether that scale 
                                                  
-
138 The principle of bona fide application of the provisions is stated in the commentary to the Fourth 
Geneva Convention of 1949, Jean Pictet (ed.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary 
vol. 4 (Geneva: ICRC, 1952–60), p. 308. 
139 ICRC, Commentary, pp. 683–4. 
140 Norman, Ethics, Killing and War, p. 203. 
141 Quoted in Simon Jeffery, ‘War may have killed 10,000 civilians, researchers say’, Guardian 
(13/6/2003), p. 18. 
142 It is extremely difficult to determine the exact number of civilian casualties during that period. Indeed 
the number is a matter of some dispute. However, according to one report published by the Iraq Body 
Count, 6,616 civilians were killed by the US-led forces between 20th of March and 9th of April 2003. 
Iraq Body Count, A Dossier of Civilian Casualties 
2003–2005. http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/reference/pdf/a_dossier_of_civilian_casualties_2003
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 of civilian victims could be justified on the grounds of the principle of proportionality. 
We might also have to consider whether or not the principle of proportionality was 
indeed undertaken in bona fide, which IHL expects. In fact, there are several allegations 
against the US-led coalition forces in Iraq over the harming of non-combatants, such as 
the killing of Iraqi civilians in Haditha by the US Marines in November 2005.143 This 
example, just one of many, seems to indicate difficulties in bona fide applications of the 
principle of proportionality in military operations. 
In Section 2. 2. 2, I have critically investigated the principle of proportionality 
for civilian protection articulated in the jus in bello framework of just war theory. 
Through this investigation, I have found that the principle of proportionality is 
envisaged as a principle to limit the number and proportion of civilian casualties in 
armed conflicts. However, I have also found that this principle does not set any 
definitive scale or ratio that constitutes being proportionate. I have then argued that the 
judgement of proportionality, therefore, is subject to the interpretation and application 
of the users of this principle. I have also argued that the flexibility of the principle of 
proportionality gives rise to ambiguity in the interpretation and application of this 
                                                                                                                                                  
2005.pdf, accessed on 12/9/2007.  
143 Tim McGirk, ‘One Morning in Haditha’, Time (27/3/2006); and Suzanne Goldberg, ‘Marines may 
face trial over massacre’, Guardian 
(27/5/2006), http://www.guardian.co.uk/frontpage/story/0,,1784387,00.html, accessed on 3/6/2006. 
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 principle, which in turn puts it at risk of being hijacked and manipulated for political 
and/or military purposes. To clarify the problem of the principle of proportionality, the 
issue is not that this principle would not be applicable in practice, but that it is open to 
interpretation and manipulation and can potentially be abused. 
 
2. 2. 3. The Principle of Double Effect 
In Section 2. 2. 3, in order further to demonstrate whether or not just war theory is an 
adequate framework for the protection of civilians, I will consider the principle of 
double effect, which allows a morally adverse effect to be caused by taking a morally 
approvable act, under certain conditions. This principle has often been used in Christian 
ethics, but is also put forward in just war theory when arguing for civilian protection. 
The principle of double effect, also known as the doctrine of double effect, 
was formulated by Thomas Aquinas and incorporated into Catholic ethical thought 
thereafter. In the ethics of war and just war theory, this principle is often used in tandem 
with the two jus in bello criteria to justify war conduct that may involve civilian 
casualties. While there are a number of variations, one of the most frequently cited 
versions of the principle of double effect in relation to civilian protection may be found 
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 in Paul Ramsey’s definition.144 He spells out four conditions of the principle of double 
effect: 
 
(1) the action itself must be good in its nature and object, or at least 
sufficient, (2) a good effect and not an evil effect must be intended, (3) 
the good effect must not be produced by means of the evil effect, but 
both effects must arise simultaneously from the (at least) morally 
indifferent action as cause, and (4) there must be in the good effect a 
proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect. 
 
Ramsey argues that these four conditions of the principle must be met concurrently in 
order that an agent is not ‘to be held accountable’ for ‘the evil consequence of his 
action’.145 In the jus in bello framework, the principle of double effect, together with the 
principles of non-combatant immunity and proportionality, can be used to justify 
harming civilians under certain conditions. Rationalisations for harming civilians are 
divided into three stages. Initially, the principle of non-combatant immunity stipulates 
that civilians should not be unjustly harmed. At this stage, directly harming civilians is 
considered wrong under any circumstances and impermissible. Secondly, the principle 
of double effect stipulates that harming civilians (an evil effect) is permissible under the 
                                                  
144 Variations of the principle of double effect can also be found, for example, in Michael Walzer’s 
‘double intention’, Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 155–6. David Fisher suggests a modified version that 
makes a moral distinction between ‘the consequences which are held to be within the agent’s control and 
consented to by him’ and those which are not. Fisher, Morality and Bomb, p. 37. 
145 Paul Ramsey, War and Christian Conscience: How shall Modern War be conducted justly? (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1961), pp. 47–8. 
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 condition that such harm is unintended when an attack against legitimate military targets 
is undertaken with the intention to neutralise them (a good effect). At this stage, 
indirectly harming civilians can conditionally be permitted if it leads to a good effect 
(i.e. neutralising enemy targets) with a proportionately grave reason – such as the 
incapacitation of a strategic command and control structure – that overrides the evil 
effect. Thirdly, the principle of proportionality gives a further condition for permitting 
harm to civilians: the unintended harm is permissible, provided it is in proportion to 
military advantages. To summarise: the principle of double effect, combined with the 
principles of non-combatant immunity and of proportionality, stipulates that the 
harming of civilians is permissible if and when such harm is an unintended side effect 
of a legitimate military attack and is proportionate to the military gains made by the 
attack. 
The principle of double effect in relation to civilian protection imposes a set of 
strict conditions to be met. Initially, the principle rejects directly harming civilians not 
only as an end but also as a means of military operations. The principle prohibits 
targeting civilians as an end of military operations because direct attacks against 
civilians cannot be considered to be a good action as outlined in condition 1, or a good 
effect outlined in condition 2. Indeed, such attacks may be called acts of terror. The 
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 principle of double effect also prohibits directly targeting civilians as a means to a good 
end in condition 3. Despite the prospect that direct, intentional attacks against civilians 
may lead to victory, for example, the principle prohibits harming civilians as a means of 
winning the war. Thirdly, the principle imposes on attackers a further burden of proof by 
requiring them to provide a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect in 
condition 4. In the case of civilian protection, a reason of such gravity is expounded by 
the principle of proportionality to be one in which the military advantages are 
proportionate to the harm on civilians. Again, take the bombing of power plants in 
Yugoslavia during the NATO 1999 intervention in the Kosovo crisis: NATO intended to 
bomb the power plants in order to affect the capabilities of the Yugoslav Armed Forces, 
but the destruction of the power plants not only incapacitated the Yugoslav military, but 
also caused power shutdowns that affected civilians. Ceulemans argues that this 
bombing can be justified on the grounds of the principle of double effect: 
 
one can interpret NATO’s use of these soft bombs, which create no 
substantial material damage, as an important indication that NATO 
had no real intention of destroying Yugoslavia’s economic potential. 
Furthermore, the satisfaction of the Double Effect Principle’s 
condition of necessity (in order to obtain good, we cannot avoid doing 
the evil) seems obvious in the case of targeting mixed installations 
like power plants.146 
                                                  
146 Ceulemans, ‘The NATO Intervention’, p. 225. 
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The principle of double effect is considered a useful framework for civilian protection 
in the jus in bello framework by several just war thinkers.147 For example, Richard 
Harries argues that the principle of double effect is ‘a crucial tool for moral analysis’ 
when it is used in tandem with the principles of non-combatant immunity and 
proportionality in the jus in bello framework. The reasons for this are, according to 
Harries, as follows: 
 
Certain actions are to be judged intrinsically wrong, for example the 
direct killing of non-combatants. On the other hand, the rightness or 
wrongness of the foreseen but unintended consequences of an action 
which is legitimate itself, e.g. the deaths of civilians brought about 
from the bombing of a munitions factory, is to be judged by the 
principle of proportion.148 
 
The followers of the principle often hold the premise, which is common to the principle 
of non-combatant immunity, that it is ‘a moral certainty that the unjustified taking of 
human life is evil’, and ‘common human characteristics – age, gender, physical 
                                                  
147 Richard Regan is one of the supporters of the principle of double effect in the framework of just war 
theory in his Just War, pp. 95–6. However, not all just war thinkers consider that the principle of double 
effect is indispensable for ethical reasoning within the framework of just war theory. For example, 
Gordon Graham argues that the principle ‘is not an integral part of the theory of the Just War’ in Ethics 
and International Relations, (Oxford: Blackwell, l1997), p. 69. 
148 Harries, Christianity and War, p. 94. 
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 condition, mental capacity – can never be justification for killing’.149 However, war 
almost inevitably causes harm to human beings, and civilians are often killed despite the 
fact they are supposed to be immune from attack. If this is the case, then those 
supporters of the principle of double effect who hold the above view need an ethical 
guideline to consider under what circumstances the taking of human life can be justified. 
They may regard the principle of double effect as one of the most promising ethical 
tools for the justification for harming civilians because this principle allows the harming 
of civilians under certain conditions. Fisher argues: ‘The doctrine of double effect has 
thus enabled modern just war theorists to soften the otherwise unyielding rigour of the 
absolute status accorded non-combatant immunity’.150 By incorporating the principle of 
double effect into the jus in bello framework, those just war thinkers who hold the view 
that the innocent may not be killed can avoid such a possible dilemma between the 
absolute prohibition of killing the innocent and the frequently repeated practice of 
killing them in many armed conflicts. C. A. J. Coady also supports the principle of 
double effect, since if just war theorists ‘speak of the need for the evil foreseen side 
effect not to be disproportionate to the good sought by the action, they clearly have in 
                                                  
149 John N. Noonan Jr., ‘Three Moral Certainties’, in Ficarrotta (ed.), The Leader’s Imperative: Ethics, 
Integrity, and Responsibility, pp. 3–14 at p. 10. 
150 Fisher, Morality and Bomb, p. 30. 
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 mind the matter of likelihood as well as danger of evil’.151 In this context, the principle 
of double effect may be seen to be indispensable to justify harming non-combatants in 
just war theory.  
Contrary to the positive account developed above, however, the problem of the 
principle of double effect in civilian protection arises from the issue of how the 
principle is used in practice. In other words, the problem of this principle also seems to 
be that it is open to manipulation and can be misused and even abused. In particular, 
when the principle of double effect is used to judge the permissibility of harm to 
civilians, the interpretation and application of proportionality are often likely to vary 
according to the users of the principle. What may be considered proportionate is often 
ambiguous, and can be subject to the interpretations and applications of its users 
The problem of ambiguity in the principle of double effect, moreover, may 
amount to an idea contrary to the spirit of just war theory – to limit causing harm to 
civilians – because this principle is excessively user-friendly when being applied by 
people who have a political objective that does not coincide with the idea of civilian 
protection. For this reason, the principle can be used not primarily to protect civilians, 
but to justify harming them. For example, O’Brien argues that the principle of double 
                                                  
151 C. A. J. Coady, ‘Escaping from the Bomb: Immoral Deterrence and the Problem of Extrication’, in 
Henry Shue (ed.), Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint: Critical Choice for American Strategy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 163–225 at p. 176.   
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 effect can effectively be used if the principle of non-combatant immunity is not 
regarded as an absolute prohibition on direct attacks against civilians; he envisages that 
direct, intentional attacks against civilians are permissible within this principle. In 
O’Brien’s words: 
 
But if the principle of discrimination is viewed as a relative principle 
enjoining the maximization of non-combatant protection, it seems 
possible to employ double-effect explanations for actions wherein the 
major intention is to effect counterforce injury on military objectives 
while acknowledging an inescapable intention of injuring 
countervalue [i.e. civilian] targets and thereby predictably violating 
the principle of discrimination to some extent.152 
 
O’Brien’s comments indicate that the principle of double effect can be used to make 
direct, intentional attacks against civilians legitimate, or at least morally acceptable. 
This way of interpreting the principle of double effect seems debatable because the crux 
of the principle is based on the prohibition of causing any intentional harm (i.e. direct 
attacks against civilians) despite the fact that a good outcome may result, or be expected 
to result, from these evil actions. Furthermore, O’Brien’s comments on the principle of 
double effect seem to countermand the crux of just war theory on civilian protection, 
                                                  
152 O’Brien, The Conduct of Just and Limited War, p. 47. Supporting O’Brien’s argument, Regan also 
interprets the principle of non-combatant immunity as a relative one and contends that the ‘difference 
between the traditional formation of the principle of discrimination and O'Brien’s may be largely one of 
terminology’. Regan, Just War, p. 93. 
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 which prohibits direct, intentional attack against civilians. 
To summarise, the principle of double effect raises an issue of concern in 
relation to civilian protection because it raises the question of application; whether or 
not the principle is correctly applied for the purpose of civilian protection is widely 
subject to the intention of the person who uses this framework. As a result, the principle 
of double effect is capable of being flexibly applied, which raises the possibility of its 
misuse and abuse for promoting political or military ends that are not compatible with 
the standard idea of civilian protection envisaged in just war theory. 
In Section 2. 2. 3, I have critically examined how the principle of double effect 
works for civilian protection in the jus in bello framework in order to demonstrate the 
limitations of just war theory. I have argued that the problem with the principle is that 
not only is it likely to be subject to misuse and abuse, but it also risks being manipulated 
for political or military purposes. As a result, I can conclude that the principle of double 
effect is in danger of being politically hijacked and not serving civilian protection in 
practice.  
 
2. 2. 4. Responsibility to Protect: A Modern Version of Just War Theory  
In Section 2. 2. 4, in order further to consider the practical implications of the argument 
for civilian protection in the just war framework, I will examine so-called responsibility 
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 to protect (R2P), a modern version of just war theory for civilian protection and 
humanitarian intervention. 
R2P is a framework for the protection of civilians in humanitarian intervention, 
and this framework originates in a report called Responsibility to Protect: Report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Report),153 which was 
produced in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty under the auspices of the Canadian Government. Its unique proposition is 
that state sovereignty, traditionally recognised as a right of the state, is reconceptualised 
as responsibility of the state. In this framework, responsibility to protect is divided into 
three phases; namely, responsibility to prevent, responsibility to react, and responsibility 
to rebuild. Among these three phases, although all three are interconnected, the phase 
most relevant to my current discussion of civilian protection during armed conflicts is 
that of responsibility to react, because when human rights violations on a large scale 
occur in a state, R2P prescribes the use of military force for the purpose of preventing or 
mitigating such an inhumane situation. In other words, the use of military force by other 
states within the borders of a state that is unable and/or unwilling to protect its civilian 
population is considered to be permissible as an exceptional case, not only because such 
                                                  
153 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Responsibility to Protect: Report of 
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development 
Research Centre, 2001). 
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 a state can be considered not to be discharging its responsibility to protect, but also 
because these intervening states can be considered to be discharging that responsibility 
otherwise exercised by the state conventionally supposed to have sovereign authority 
over its territories and population. 
R2P seems a useful and effective idea for the protection of civilians when 
dealing with the situations in which human rights violations occur. We can consider the 
examples of Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge regime in early 1970s and Rwanda in 
early 90s: in these situations, R2P would not only have justified military intervention 
but also required other states to intervene using military force, if necessary.  
However, since the Iraq War in 2003, a large number of states and individuals 
have been becoming more suspicious of the idea of R2P, as well as military 
humanitarian intervention in general. Bellamy points out that the legacy of the Iraq War 
is that ‘a large majority of the world’s states believe that the coalition abused 
humanitarian justifications to suit their own purposes’, and further argues that this 
situation ‘will set back attempts to galvanize a global consensus on the necessity of 
action when basic rights are violated on a massive scale’.154 
Despite this trend, R2P seems the most promising idea for civilian protection 
                                                  
154 Bellamy, Just Wars, p. 221. 
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 currently available, not only because there are few competing theoretical frameworks 
for civilian protection, but also because R2P’s framework for the phase of responsibility 
to react overlaps greatly with just war theory. In fact, R2P argues: ‘The connections 
between just war thinking and overarching criteria for humanitarian intervention are 
clear’.155 If this is the case, then we might consider that R2P also has similar limitations 
to those which just war theory is faced with. Before concluding so without further 
examination, let us investigate R2P’s properties as a theoretical framework for civilian 
protection. 
If R2P is considered to be a rationale for military intervention for the 
protection of civilians, the scope of protection which R2P envisages needs to be 
clarified. According to the Report, the people who are eligible for protection are 
civilians who ‘are threatened with massacre, genocide or ethnic cleansing on a large 
scale’. When executing military intervention, the Report dictates firstly, that ‘the 
conduct of the operation must guarantee maximum protection of all elements of the 
civilian population’, and secondly, that ‘strict adherence to international humanitarian 
law must be ensured’ as part of the ‘doctrine for human protection operations’.156 
                                                  
155 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Supplementary Volume to the Report 
of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa, International 
Development Research Centre, 2001), p. 140. 
156 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Report, pp. 31, 66, 67. 
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 When military force is used in humanitarian operations, inhumane 
consequences – creating war victims, for example – are almost inevitable, regardless of 
the principles for civilian protection. In these cases, one of the most important questions 
is: who would become the victims as a result of the action? This question presents two 
kinds of dilemma: one is that of risking the lives of the soldiers of the intervening force 
in order to protect civilians in a target country or area, and the other is that of risking the 
lives of some civilians in order to protect other civilians. Let us examine these two 
dilemmas in detail so that R2P’s structure for civilian protection can be clarified. 
The former dilemma – to risk the lives of the soldiers of the intervening force 
in order to protect civilians in a target country or area – is primarily a domestically 
controversial issue for the intervening countries, because the nationals of the 
intervening countries often wonder whether such intervention is worth risking the lives 
of soldiers who are also their fellow nationals. Walzer points out that people in modern 
democratic countries are often inclined to be negative towards the use of military force 
in which the lives of their fellow soldiers are risked, and their perception of threat in the 
conflict is frequently weak. He argues: 
  
There are no ‘lower orders’, no invisible, expendable citizens in 
democratic states today, and in the absence of a clear threat to the 
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 community itself, there is little willingness in even among political 
elites to sacrifice for the sake of global law and order or, more 
particularly, for the sale of Rwandans or Kosovars.157  
 
In the same vein, the Report presents a similar concern about the dilemma: it states that 
‘whether the West were willing to risk the lives of its soldiers in order to stop war 
crimes, human rights abuse, and forced migration’ is ‘the real question’.158 
This dilemma for the intervening force – accepting casualties among the 
soldiers for the sake of the protection of civilians of another country – can be 
reconstructed in a morally acute way. That is, whether the combat force of intervening 
countries should be permitted to victimise (kill or allow to die) civilians who are 
supposed (originally designated in an initial planning stage, to be more precise) to be 
protected, for the sake of the force’s own protection. In many armed conflicts, this 
might be a mode of military operations. Compromising a combat force for the sake of 
civilian protection might not be considered a military priority in ordinary combat 
situations. Although force protection may be considered to be a legitimate military 
activity for the intervening countries, this may raise a serious moral concern in 
humanitarian operations by military means because it reveals a fundamental 
contradiction of humanitarian intervention if force protection is prioritised over civilian 
                                                  
157 Walzer Arguing about War, pp. 28–9. 
158 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Report, p. 63. 
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 protection. This tendency of the intervening countries, and thus our concern about 
civilian protection, may be amplified if and when the intervening countries feel more 
negative about risking the lives of their soldiers on the field for the purpose of civilian 
protection. 
In fact, when ground troops are deployed, the intervening force is often 
required to impose dangers on its soldiers, and we can imagine a situation in which the 
intervening force is militarily overwhelmed by local hostile powers. The issues thus 
arising may be presented in the following way: whether or not the government of the 
intervening force will have the political will to protect the local civilian population in 
the target region or country by risking their fellow combatants; and if they have, then to 
what extent they can tolerate this risk. Srebrenica in 1995 is one of the most famous 
cases in which the intervening force gave up the protection of the local civilian 
population for the sake of force protection, by handing over the control of the town to 
the Bosnian-Serb Armed Forces. 
The Report is prepared for this potential problem of force protection; it admits 
an ‘acceptance that force protection cannot become the principal objective’ as one of the 
operational principles for military intervention.159 A similar wording can be found in 
                                                  
159 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Report, p. xiii. 
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 another part of the Report, which states that ‘force protection for the intervening force 
must never have priority over the resolve to accomplish the mission’ as one of the 
principles for the ‘doctrine for human protection operations’. This does not mean that 
force protection is not seriously taken into account in the Report, which suggests a 
drastic measure – withdrawal of the intervening force – in a carefully constructed 
section: 
 
Force protection of the intervening force is important, but should 
never be allowed to become the principal objective. Where force 
protection become the prime concern, withdrawal—perhaps followed 
by a new and more robust initiative—may be the best course.160 
 
This is a sound policy recommendation. However, given that military operations are 
inevitably influenced by domestic and international politics of the government of the 
intervening force, and that the political decision to protect the civilian population by 
risking the lives of soldiers is affected by these variables, then the recommendation 
quoted above does not seem to be a very practical one. 
The second dilemma is whether to victimise some civilians in order to save 
others; in other words, to protect some civilians by killing (or more often allowing to 
                                                  
160 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Report, pp. 67, 63. 
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 die) others. Military humanitarian intervention is almost always faced with this dilemma. 
When force is used, regardless of mission objectives, harming civilians is almost always 
unavoidable, directly or indirectly. Human protection operations are not exceptions. In 
fact, it is not very difficult to envisage a situation in which the intervening force causes 
collateral damage to the local civilian population, as the interveners use military force 
against civilians due to their misunderstanding, ignorance and/or errors – indeed similar 
events have occurred in many military humanitarian operations. It is probable that such 
an attack against local militant groups would also bring adverse results to the protection 
of civilians by further escalating the persecution of the local civilian population. 
Conversely, it is also fair to assume that the persecution of civilians by local militant 
groups would be left uncontrolled or even promoted if the intervening force were not 
deployed for the purpose of protecting civilians. From the viewpoint of civilian victims, 
any attacks that cause harm to them are unacceptable, whereas any military operations 
almost always cause civilian casualties. These contradicting points are not addressed in 
the Report. Indeed, the shortcoming of the Report is that it fails to address a solution for 
the second dilemma of military humanitarian intervention. 
This shortcoming raises two important questions: can this dilemma be 
resolved? And if it cannot, then how can we address it to mitigate the inevitable harm 
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 done? The answer to the first question is, sadly, ‘no’. In armed conflict some civilians 
are protected while others are not, and there are invariably some civilians who cannot 
enjoy the protection they deserve. The answer to the second question, however, allows 
some hope of mitigating the problem. The fact that the dilemma cannot be solved 
completely does not indicate that there is no way to deal with it to ameliorate the 
situation, and the best solution available is to introduce the idea of restorative justice to 
the discourse of the ethics of civilian protection. In Section 2. 3, in order to substantiate 
this idea, I will examine restorative justice in detail.  
 
2. 3. Lack of Reparation to Civilian Victims in the Just War Framework 
In Section 2. 3 I will now consider the issue of reparation for the loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects caused as a result of military 
operations, in order further to demonstrate the limitations of just war theory in civilian 
protection. Section 2. 3 is divided into three parts. In Section 2. 3. 1, I will consider the 
issue of reparation in order to demonstrate that the just war theory is not adequate as an 
ethical framework for civilian protection. In Section 2. 3. 2, I will explore the provisions 
of IHL in order to consider whether or not the lack of provision for restorative justice to 
civilian victims in just war theory can be amended by incorporating an idea of 
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 reparation into the just war framework. In Section 2. 3. 3, I will critically assess the 
possible outcome of incorporating the idea of reparation into the just war framework in 
order to consider whether or not such a recommendation can solve the problem of 
injustice to civilian victims. 
 
2. 3. 1. Just War Theory and Reparation to Civilian Victims 
As discussed in Section 2. 2, civilian protection is addressed in the jus in bello 
framework in just war theory. If properly applied, the jus in bello principles would 
safeguard the civilian population against the risk of being harmed in military operations 
by prohibiting attacks against military targets if harm to civilians is disproportionate to 
the military advantage achieved by these attacks. In this context, we can observe that 
just war theory shows why civilians should be protected and, to a certain extent, who 
should receive this protection and how. 
However, one point worthy of note is that a fundamental limitation of just war 
theory is that it does not envisage any restorative or reparatory measures for the 
remaining civilians who are harmed in military attacks justified by the jus in bello 
principles. The lack of accountability for the civilian victims is exemplified by the fact 
that just war theory does not make any general or specific recommendations for a 
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 post-attack situation in which the loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and/or damage 
to civilian objects are caused as a result of the attacks. The lack of accountability for 
harm caused to civilian victims gives rise to an issue of concern, which is that the 
principle can be interpreted in such a way that just war theory denies the rights of 
civilian victims to reparatory justice. In this respect, it seems correct to assume that just 
war theory has a limitation as an adequate framework for civilian protection because it 
does not take into consideration civilian victims harmed in attacks justified by the jus in 
bello principles. 
If this is the case, then the issue to be explored here is the idea of restorative 
justice to civilian victims of military operations. Margaret Walker argues that 
‘restorative justice keeps the victim’s plight central, orienting the process and outcome 
toward genuine repairs of harm victims have suffered’. The purpose and method of 
restorative justice are, according to Walker, ‘repairing relations through acknowledging 
the needs of victims and requiring accountability of those responsible for harm, through 
truth-telling, apology, and restitution or compensation’.161 The concept of restorative 
justice obliges attackers responsible for causing harm to civilians to take restorative 
measures.  
                                                  
161 Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Repairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 217, 15. 
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 In Section 2. 3. 1, I have considered the issue of reparation for civilian victims 
in relation to just war theory, and revealed that it is not taken into account in the jus in 
bello framework. 
 
2. 3. 2. Reparation to Civilian Victims in IHL 
In Section 2. 3. 2 I move on to explore the provisions of IHL for reparation to civilian 
victims in order to consider whether or not these provisions can be used to ameliorate 
the limitation in the jus in bello framework. 
IHL seems useful as a source for retrieving the idea of reparatory justice 
concerning civilian protection because it codifies state responsibility for unlawful acts, 
and sets out that a state is obliged to take reparatory or compensatory measures for the 
loss or damage caused. The responsibility of warring parties for reparation to the 
victims is codified in Article 91 of Additional Protocol I, which reads: ‘A Party to the 
conflict which violates the provisions of the Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the 
case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts 
committed by persons forming part of its armed forces’.162 In terms of customary IHL, 
this rule is generally observed in the practice of those states which adhere to IHL, and 
                                                  
162 AP (I), Art. 91. 
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 establishes that a state responsible for violations of IHL is required to make full 
reparation for the loss or injury caused ‘as a norm of customary international law 
applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts’. 163  State 
responsibility for reparation to the victims of armed conflicts who are injured or killed 
by an unlawful act is also confirmed in national by-law; for example, in The Manual of 
the Law of Armed Conflict, the issue of compensation is stated in the following way: 
 
It is a principle of international law that a state responsible for an 
internationally wrongful act is obliged to make full reparation for the 
injury caused by that act. This principle extends to the law of armed 
conflict in that a state is responsible for violations of the law 
committed by persons forming part of its armed forces and, if the 
case demands, is liable to pay compensation.164 
 
One example of this principle being applied in practice occurred when the British Army 
reportedly offered financial compensation to the families of Iraqi civilian victims who 
were unlawfully killed by its servicemen and women in Iraq. In the case of Baha Mousa, 
who died while in the British Army’s custody, the army allegedly offered a cash payout 
to his family for his death.165 On another occasion, when the British Army stormed into 
                                                  
163 ICRC, Customary IHL, p. 537. 
164 UK Ministry of Defence, Manual, p. 418. 
165 Quoted in Andrew Johnson, Francis Elliott and Severin Carrell, ‘Iraq Abuse Scandal: Ministry of 
Defence Accused of Buying Silence of Families’ over Civilian Deaths’, Independent on Sunday 
(20/6/2004), p. 13. 
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 a local police station in order to rescue fellow soldiers in Basra in 2005, both the British 
Consulate in Iraq and the local congress in Basra issued statements saying that the UK 
Government would pay compensation to the Iraqi civilian victims of the military 
operation.166 These cases, in which compensation was offered to civilian victims for 
unlawful killings by the army, can be interpreted as examples in which the idea of 
reparation codified in IHL is usually, if not always, practised in the field. 
IHL might seem to offer an incentive for improving the framework of just war 
theory by suggesting a blueprint for the principle of reparation as the third principle in 
the jus in bello framework. However, the limitation of IHL per se is that no provision is 
made for reparation for loss of civilian life or damage to civilian property incidentally 
caused as a result of legitimate attacks against military targets. This indicates that 
parties to the conflict do not legally have to take responsibility for civilian loss or 
damage in these circumstances. In other words, in the framework of IHL, parties to the 
conflict are exempt from reparation to civilian victims for their loss or damage as long 
as such loss or damage is incidentally caused and proportionate to the concrete and 
specific military advantage anticipated in such attacks. This line of reasoning, by 
extension, can lead to the conclusion that a relatively small degree of loss and damage 
                                                  
166 Ben Russell, ‘UK offers payout for victims of Basra raid’, Independent (12/10/2005), p. 23. 
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 to civilians is legally permissible and that parties are thus exempt from legal obligations 
for reparation for this. Extending this argument further, we find that the civilian victims 
in these attacks do not have the opportunity to claim to justice, with some exceptions in 
cases of occasional official apologies and condolence. 
In Section 2. 3. 2, I have examined the provisions of IHL, and revealed that the 
provisions do not envisage reparation to the civilian victims who are harmed in attacks 
justified by the principles of non-combatant immunity and proportionality.  
 
2. 3. 3. The Principle of Reparation in the Jus in Bello Framework 
In Section 2. 3. 3 I will now explore how this idea works in the jus in bello framework 
in order to consider whether it compensates for the limitations of just war theory in 
regard to civilian protection. 
One promising way to solve the problem of providing justice for civilian 
victims who are killed or maimed in lawful attacks is to introduce the idea of restorative 
justice within the jus in bello framework in order to eliminate, or at least to mitigate, 
any injustice which the interveners inflict upon civilians during military operations. 
Walker suggests four potential means to achieve restorative justice; namely, 1) 
restitution, 2) compensation, 3) rehabilitation, and 4) satisfaction and guarantees of 
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 non-repetition. These four elements are interrelated, and all four are necessary 
conditions to restore justice. Walker cites the Committee for Truth and Reconciliation in 
post-Apartheid South Africa and the National Commission for Reception, Truth and 
Reconciliation in East Timor as two successful examples of restorative justice using 
these methods.167  
When considering these four restorative measures as potential means to 
eliminate or mitigate injustice which civilian victims have suffered, it must be noted that 
the implementation of restorative measures is usually assumed to be undertaken in a 
post-conflict phase when the conflict has already ended and the recovery process has 
begun to function.168 In the same vein, in the just war tradition, restorative measures are 
envisaged in the framework of jus post bellum.169 However, it must also be noted that 
reparatory measures or, more importantly perhaps, immediate measures to help and 
support civilian victims, are often more urgently required during the armed conflict. In 
this regard, restorative measures need somehow to be incorporated within the jus in 
bello framework, despite the possibility that they can at best work as ad hoc measures 
while an armed conflict is still in progress. 
                                                  
167 Walker, Moral Repairs, pp. 14–5. 
168 See Rama Mani, Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), p. 173–8; Christopher Kutz, ‘Justice and Reparations: The Cost of Memory and 
the Value of Talk’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 32:3, pp. 277–312; and Asa Kasher and A. Yudlin, 
‘Military Ethics of Fighting Terror: An Israeli Perspective’, Journal of Military Ethics 4:1, pp. 3–32.  
169 Orend, The Morality of War; and Walzer, Arguing about War. 
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 If and when reparatory measures are undertaken during an armed conflict, 
such measures may be restricted, in terms of practicality, to reparation and limited 
satisfaction. The reason for this is that two of the other measures which Walker lists – 
restitution and rehabilitation – would face many difficulties for implementation in terms 
of opportunity, cost and resources available in a combat zone. Take the restoration of a 
house destroyed by an airstrike: rebuilding a house while hostilities continue does not 
seem a very promising prospect (there is a likelihood that the house may be damaged 
again by future airstrikes, and the means and methods of procuring human and material 
resources for construction also raise a number of issues and problems). Take 
rehabilitation, then: medical rehabilitation for civilian victims needs constant and 
continuous treatment and care, as well as appropriate facilities, which require a large 
amount of human and material resources not always available while military operations 
continue. The most realistic and customarily practised measures seem to be financial 
reparation or compensation and an official apology from the intervening government for 
damages which the intervening force has caused to civilians. Walker argues that when 
exercised in combination, apology and compensation ‘enhance significantly the 
perceived fairness’,170 and this combination seems a useful way to achieve ad hoc 
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 restorative justice during the conflict. 
Taking the above elements into consideration, a new operational principle for 
just military conduct, which I propose may be called the principle of reparation (or 
compensation), might stipulate that reparatory measures must be taken for civilian 
victims who are harmed in attacks justified by the principle of proportionality. On the 
principle of compensation, Kasher and Yadlin argue that the ‘democratic state has…the 
moral obligation to eventually appropriately compensate people when reversible 
damages have been caused to them’.171 The principle of reparation to civilian victims 
appears to play a crucial role in the jus in bello framework when we recognise the fact 
that wars seldom perfectly satisfy the just war criteria, and that a state or group of states 
is sometimes forced to resort to the use of military force on humanitarian grounds, 
which almost inevitably causes civilian casualties. This act of injustice – causing harm 
to civilians – frequently occurs in military operations, as has been documented in many 
armed conflicts. Within the jus in bello framework, such an act of injustice against 
civilians might not automatically negate the overall justice of military operations. In this 
regard, Fernando Tesón is correct to argue that ‘humanitarian intervention understood as 
a morally constrained form of help to others accepts that sometimes causing harm to 
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 innocent persons is justified’.172 However, harm to civilian victims caused in legitimate 
attacks remains unresolved unless and until it is redressed and somehow compensated. 
From the viewpoint of civilian victims, it matters very little whether they are harmed in 
direct or indirect attacks, although there is a crucial difference between the two types of 
attack in terms of the law of armed conflict as well as in the just war tradition. The most 
important issue for civilian victims is that they are victims of military intervention and 
therefore entitled to claim justice, which they deserve. In this sense, some measure to 
compensate civilian victims for loss and damage inflicted in military operations is not 
only desirable but also essential, so that the attackers can claim that they have upheld 
just conduct in war. Indeed, such measures seem necessary, not only to strengthen the 
claim to justice in military operations and the justification for the use of military force 
within the jus in bello framework, but also, perhaps more importantly, for the sake of 
civilian victims and their families, relatives and friends who suffer from unjust acts 
being inflicted upon them. 
There may be several problems and difficulties when exercising reparation: we 
have to consider, for example, what criteria are applied to determine eligibility for and 
the amount of compensation. One of the most troublesome problems is how to value 
                                                  
172 Fernando R. Tesón, ‘Eight Principles for Humanitarian Intervention’, Journal of Military Ethics 5:2, 
pp. 93–113, at pp. 103–4.  
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 civilian loss or damage. Christopher Kutz seems correct to argue that ‘compensating 
victims at a generally devalued rate for the particular loss they suffered is ethically 
awkward’.173 However, these difficulties and problems do not remove the obligation of 
the interveners to take reparatory measures to civilian victims. Indeed, these 
considerations have to be taken into account regardless of difficulties in terms of theory 
and practice, so that the principle cannot be used as an excuse for conducting military 
operations that are likely to cause a number of civilian casualties. When reparatory 
measures are undertaken, what must be avoided is the possibility that reparation could 
be abused as a mere excuse for harming civilians, and that unprincipled leaders of 
armed forces could exploit it for political and military purposes. To offer a comparison, 
parking tickets are taken by some offenders to be a type of fee for an allowable 
behaviour, rather than a fine imposed upon illegal activity. Political and military leaders, 
therefore, must be reminded that the exercise of reparation does not automatically 
justify harming civilians, while it nevertheless gives them the opportunity to claim 
justification for the use of military force, by showing their respect for justice for civilian 
victims. 
We should also consider the converse argument that from the viewpoint of the 
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 attackers: the principle of reparation might raise a serious concern about its practical 
impact on military conduct. Once introduced, would this principle inhibit the attackers 
from carrying out lawful attacks or prevent them from executing their necessary duties 
and unduly damage military effectiveness? An extreme difficulty in answering this kind 
of question is that the principle has not been established as having a formal status in the 
law of armed conflict or the jus in bello framework, let alone exercised, so we cannot 
pre-judge its implications for military conduct in the operational theatre. Nevertheless, it 
must be remembered that the principle of reparation is not primarily envisaged as a 
restrictive principle such as those of distinction or of proportionality, but as a remedial 
one, which would be expected to complement the shortcomings of the existing jus in 
bello framework as a guideline for just conduct. In other words, the principle of 
reparation would act not only as a last safety net for civilian victims to reclaim justice, 
but also as a measure to reinforce a claim to legitimacy of attacks and to exemplify 
responsible conduct by the attacking forces. If so understood and implemented, the 
principle would be unlikely to prevent the attacking forces from carrying out legitimate 
attacks necessary from a military point of view. Indeed, it would potentially act as a 
morale-booster for armed forces as responsible attackers. 
In fact, the principle of reparation, if properly applied, could potentially be 
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 beneficial not only to civilian victims but also to policy-makers and military 
practitioners who want the use of force to be considered justifiable. The principle 
contributes to states’ claims to justice in military operations in such a way that an 
ethically controversial act could at least be mitigated by reparatory measures, if not 
completely vindicated. Furthermore, state practice on reparation to civilian victims 
could mitigate charges against soldiers who had caused harm to civilians. 
In Section 2. 3, I have examined whether and how the issue of reparation to 
civilian victims could ameliorate the limitations of just war theory in relation to civilian 
protection. I have argued that just war theory is limited in that the reparatory element of 
justice to civilian victims is not sufficiently emphasised in this theory. I have considered 
how the provisions of IHL could reduce this limitation by incorporating the idea of 
reparation to civilian victims in the jus in bello framework. However, I have also argued 
that this measure for improvement does not entirely solve the problem of just war theory, 
mainly because the incorporation of the concept of reparation still allows the possibility 
of problems arising such as those I have already considered: manipulation and abuse of 
this principle for political or military ends. 
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 Concluding Remarks for Chapter 2 
In Chapter 2, I have critically discussed the scope and limitations of just war theory in 
civilian protection, by focusing on how the prohibition on, as well as justifications for, 
harming civilians are examined in the jus in bello framework. Initially, in Section 2. 1, I 
have set out general observations of just war theory and how this theory is related to 
civilian protection. I have observed that just war theory is an ethical framework for 
considering whether war is just or not and that ethical considerations concerning 
civilian protection are undertaken in the jus in bello framework. Secondly, in Section 2. 
2, I have critically examined how civilian protection is undertaken in the jus in bello 
framework, by considering the principles in this framework. During the course of my 
discussion, I have shown that the key problem of just war theory in relation to civilian 
protection can be found in the ambiguity of the principles used, and that such ambiguity 
arises from the flexibility of interpretation and application of these principles. I have 
also argued that the ambiguity of the principle of proportionality can be problematic 
because this characteristic can potentially lead to manipulation of the principle for 
political or military ends. Furthermore, by examining R2P, I have clarified the dilemmas 
about civilian protection which just war theory is faced with. Finally, in Section 2. 3, I 
have considered the issue of reparation to civilian victims in order to demonstrate the 
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 limitations of just war theory in relation to civilian protection. I have argued that a key 
limitation is that the reparatory element of justice to civilian victims is not sufficiently 
emphasised in this theory. I have also argued that this measure for improving the jus in 
bello framework does not entirely solve the problem of just war theory, because the 
incorporation of the concept of reparation still leaves available the problems which I 
have previously considered: manipulation and abuse of this principle for political or 
military ends. In Chapter 3, in order to demonstrate how civilian protection is or is not 
undertaken in practice in armed conflicts, I will examine the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict 
as a case study. 
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 CHAPTER 3: CIVILIAN PROTECTION AS POLITICAL RHETORIC? 
 
Introduction 
Having assessed in Chapter 2 the limitations of just war theory as an ethical framework 
for civilian protection, in Chapter 3, in order to consider whether and how civilian 
protection is undertaken in practice in an armed conflict, I will examine the 
Israeli–Palestinian Conflict as a case study. Specifically, I will focus on one of the 
bloodiest phases (2002–3) during the Second Intifada period (2001–5) because this is 
one of the most militarily active periods of the conflict, during which the norm of 
civilian protection was frequently breached by both sides. 
The reason that I focus on this conflict, as briefly explained in the introductory 
chapter, is not only because the conflict was a kind of asymmetrical war in which the 
fighting took place between the IDF (the national armed forces of Israel) on the one side 
and members of various Palestinian militant groups (non-regular national armed forces) 
on the other side, but also because the stakes of national security and survival were high 
for both parties. Neither the IDF as an occupying force of the Palestinian territories nor 
the Palestinian militant groups committed themselves to the protection of civilians 
deemed to be enemy civilians, despite the fact that civilian protection is a requirement 
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 of the laws, customs and ethics of armed conflict. In fact, the practice of civilian 
protection was almost entirely ignored during the given period: civilians were directly 
and indirectly harmed in tit-for-tat attacks by both the IDF – one of the most advanced 
armies in the world in terms of its professional code of military ethics – and the various 
Palestinian militant groups. This characteristic of the conflict validates my choice of the 
Israeli–Palestinian Conflict as a case study in order to show that the protection of 
civilians in the operational theatre is a particularly fragile rule in an armed conflict over 
the highest of stakes – national survival for both sides. If I can show this characteristic 
of military conduct regarding civilian protection through the case study, then this may 
carry profound implications for the ethics of civilian protection when we consider the 
ethics and conduct of the UK and US Armed Forces in Chapter 5. The reason for this is, 
according to David Rodin, that with regards to human rights and fairness, the stronger 
side is required to ‘take exceptionally rigorous steps to ensure that they do not harm 
non-combatants or expose them to risk of incidental harm in the course of military 
operations’.174 In the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, the category the stronger side may be 
applicable to the State of Israel, which possessed conventional armed forces, whereas 
the weaker may be the Palestinian militant groups that did not. 
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 Chapter 3 is divided into two sections. In Section 3. 1, I will explore the overall 
pattern of military operations between warring parties in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict 
during this Second Intifada period, in order to examine whether or not civilian 
protection was properly practised and how civilians were harmed in the conflict. In 
Section 3. 2, in order to consider how civilian protection is used not only as a rhetorical 
method for justifying military operations but also as a means of excuse for harming 
civilians, I will investigate four different occurrences of these practices. 
 
3. 1. An Overview of Civilian Protection in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict 
In Section 3. 1, I will explore how civilians were, directly or indirectly, harmed by both 
the IDF and the Palestinian militant groups in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict in order to 
examine critically whether and how civilian protection was practised. 
In the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, a general pattern of failing to undertake 
civilian protection can be observed, within which civilians on both sides have been 
frequently and repeatedly harmed to such a degree that it appears that the distinction 
between civilians and combatants has completely disappeared. This observation is 
supported by the ICRC report, which argues that the ‘normative and behavioural 
barriers that are supposed to protect civilians’ have broken down, and as a consequence, 
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 the conflict ‘has engaged entire societies and left the distinction between combatants 
and civilians in tatters’. The report goes on to say that this collapse of the norm of 
civilian protection is caused by the fact that many of the people involved in this conflict 
have a ‘perception of this conflict as a total one [i.e. total war]’.175 In such situations, 
the distinction between civilians and combatants and the idea of civilian protection 
might seem to have little meaning, particularly in the eyes of those Palestinians and 
Israelis who accept the distinction between the fellow and enemy foremost. 
The collapse of the norm of civilian protection in the Israeli–Palestinian 
Conflict is also described in a UN report concerning the combat between the IDF and 
Palestinian militants in the Jenin camp in the West Bank in April 2002. According to the 
report, both sides put civilians in danger during the course of military operations: 
 
Of particular concern is the use, by combatants on both sides, of 
violence that placed civilians in harm’s way. Much of the fighting 
during the Operation Defensive Shield occurred in areas heavily 
populated by civilians, in large part because the armed Palestinian 
groups sought by IDF placed their combatants and installations 
among civilians. Palestinian groups are alleged to have widely 
booby-trapped civilian homes, acts targeted at IDF personnel but 
also putting civilians in danger. IDF is reported to have used 
bulldozers, tank shelling and rocket firing, at times from helicopters 
in populated areas.176 
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The main point to note in the UN report is that combatants on both sides ignored, and 
indeed actively violated, the measures necessary to ensure civilian protection. The IDF 
allegedly used means and methods of fighting in populated areas of the refugee camp 
that were not considered compatible with the idea of civilian protection, whereas the 
Palestinian militant groups allegedly used their fellow civilians as a means of fighting 
by putting them in danger and at risk of being harmed. 
The fact that the parties to the conflict did not fully respect the protection of 
civilians is further confirmed by Amnesty International’s report, which claims that there 
were constant allegations of the ‘unlawful killings’ of civilians and that those 
perpetrators were allowed to remain ‘with impunity’.177 In the Amnesty report, the IDF 
is accused of several ‘unlawful killings’ of Palestinian civilians, one of which took place 
during the IDF’s military operation in Jenin on 21 June 2002, which left two children 
dead and two wounded. The report reads: 
 
Following an IDF announcement that the curfew was lifted, 
six-year-old Ahmed Ghazawi took a shekel from his father to buy 
candy. He went with his brothers, Jamil, aged 12, and Tareq, aged 11. 
                                                                                                                                                  
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/499/57/IMG/N0249957.pdf?OpenElement, accessed on 
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 The area where the family lives is a residential area on the edge of 
Jenin city, in Area C (under full Israeli control). Part of the incident 
was caught on video by a neighbour on a rooftop. The film showed Dr. 
Samer al-Ahmed’s car and seven children (aged between six and 12) 
four of them riding about on bicycles. There was no sound of firing, 
but suddenly there was a red flash and a blast. Ahmed was dead with 
one leg severed and the other almost severed. Jamil was covered in 
cuts and blood and Tareq lay near an electricity pole with a hole in 
his side and stomach. 
 
The Amnesty report goes on to conclude that the IDF’s use of military force ‘did not 
meet two primary obligations – to protect the civilian population and to use force that is 
proportional to perceived threat’.178 
The report does not suggest that the IDF was actively engaged in direct or 
indiscriminate killings of Palestinian civilians in a systematic way. However, it does 
suggest that the IDF was insensitive to the treatment of civilians in the operational 
theatre, despite the fact that the attacks were claimed to be indirect or discriminate. This 
tendency toward insensitive treatment regarding civilian protection can also be 
identified earlier in the report, where it is alleged that the IDF ‘frequently used 
explosive to open doors of homes and buildings’ without taking precautionary measures 
to protect potential civilian inhabitants inside. It states: 
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 On 5 April ’Afaf al-Desuqi, 59, was killed when an explosive was used 
on the door of her home as she went to open it. She had been called to 
open the door by her neighbour, Ismahan Abu Murad, who was used 
as a ‘human shield’ by the IDF to lead the way to the house. Ismahan 
Abu Murad confirmed the account given by ’Afaf's sister, ’Aisha ’Ali 
Hassan al-Desuqi, who told Amnesty International: 
 
‘My family was at home on Friday 5 April. It was about 3 or 3.15 in 
the afternoon. We heard the knocking and calling for us to open the 
door. My sister, ’Afaf said, “Just a moment”. She said this right away. 
At that time, we were in the salon, which faces the street. ’Afaf left to 
answer the door; we were following her. When she reached the door, 
she had just put her hand out to touch the handle of the door and it 
exploded. The door exploded in on her and the right side of her face 
was blown off. Her left hand was injured as well as left part of her 
chest. I think she must have died instantly. We started shouting. The 
soldiers were just outside that door. The IDF began to shoot at the 
walls as if to try and scare us…’ 
 
Amnesty International visited the site and was able to examine the 
door, as well as the explosive device, which the family kept. The 
impression on the door clearly indicates that the door had been blown 
in from an explosion outside; this evidence is consistent with the 
testimony cited above.179 
 
This Amnesty report cites several examples which show that the IDF was not always 
sensitive enough to take appropriate precautionary measures to ensure civilian 
protection in its military operations. 
In Section 3. 1, I have developed an overview of how civilians were, directly or 
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 indirectly, harmed by both the IDF and the Palestinian militant groups in the 
Israeli–Palestinian Conflict. Through my investigation, I have found not only that the 
protection of civilians was not always respected, but also that civilians were directly or 
indiscriminately targeted by combatants, partly because the distinction between civilians 
and combatants had virtually collapsed in this conflict. In Section 3. 2, I will shed light 
on how civilian protection was used as a cause for military operations. 
 
3. 2. Civilian Protection: Cause, Justification, and Excuse 
Having observed several instances that demonstrate examples of civilian protection 
being breached or violated by the warring parties in Section 3. 1, in Section 3. 2, I will 
investigate several different forms of rhetorical justification and excuses for harming 
civilians in order to assess how civilian protection was used as a rationale for military 
operations. The forms of rhetorical justification and/or excuses for harming civilians can 
mainly be categorised, according to the patterns of military operations and of rhetoric 
observed in the conflict, under four headings: namely, self-defence; pre-emption and 
prevention; punishment, reprisal and means of resistance; and human shields. 
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 3. 2. 1. Self-defence 
Self-defence is widely recognised as a legitimate rationale for the use of military force 
and is guaranteed as an ‘inherent right’ in Article 51 of the UN Charter, which reads: 
‘Nothing in this present Chapter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security’.180 A senior Israeli official, commenting on the Israeli 
State’s use of military aggression in response to the Palestinian attacks, stated that: ‘If 
attacked, Israel reserves the right to self-defense’.181 In practice, states consider civilian 
protection to be an integral part of self-defence, because states and other political 
communities often regard the protection of their own people as one of their primary 
raisons d’être and responsibilities. This pattern is not only observed in international 
customs and practice but also outlined in public statements made by the Israeli 
Government. For example, as a response to the comments by British Chief Rabbi 
Jonathan Sacks, who criticised the practice of the State of Israel against Palestinians in 
the Occupied Territories, the Israeli Embassy in London published a statement to justify 
its military operations, arguing that the State of Israel has been ‘forced to fight for its 
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 existence as a Jewish state and to protect its citizens’.182 This argument seeks to justify 
the military operation on the grounds that that the State of Israel was engaged in a war 
of self-defence against the Palestinian militant groups that allegedly and publicly claim 
that their aim is the ‘destruction of the Jewish State’.183 To provide another example, 
when defending its military operations in the Occupied Territories in March 2002, the 
IDF justified the military operation as a ‘defensive campaign to protect the citizens, the 
cities and the State of Israel’.184 These comments indicate that the State of Israel 
considers civilian protection to be a part of self-defence. However, these comments also 
imply that the scope of such protection is limited to its fellow Israeli civilians. 
In a second line of argument, self-defence is often considered to be a means to 
maintain national security, and civilian protection is likewise often considered to be a 
part of national security. National security is frequently used as a motive for military 
operations by political communities, mainly because states often consider the protection 
of their subjects or fellow citizens to be an integral part of national security. In this case, 
the Israeli Government claimed its right to security against the attacks upon civilians by 
the Palestinian militant groups. Referring to its military operations as a security measure 
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 against suicide bombings, an IDF spokesman described the protection of Israelis as a 
duty of the State of Israel, and confirmed that the IDF would ‘continue to operate 
everywhere and every time to ensure the security of Israeli civilians and soldiers’.185 
This view that a state has a right to security is widely supported. For example, the then 
UK Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, pronounced at the Labour party conference that 
‘Israel has every right to its security’, which it cannot enjoy ‘as long as the 
unimaginable daily threat of suicide bombings against innocent civilians continues’.186 
On another occasion, regarding the Palestinian attacks against Israeli settlers, Dore Gold, 
an Israeli Government spokesman, made this position clear: ‘Israel will do what is 
necessary to defend its civilian population from these attacks’.187  
The concerning characteristic of military operations undertaken in the name of 
self-defence or national security is that these operations do not necessarily ensure the 
protection of civilians as a global category in the operational theatre. This concern 
becomes more serious if and when the use of force causes unnecessary harm to civilians 
to a disproportionate degree and/or by prohibited means and methods. Although civilian 
protection as part of self-defence is frequently used as a rationale for the use of military 
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 force, as explained above, what matters here is the target population for protection. 
Indeed in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, what the warring parties meant by the 
protection of civilians was not, in fact, the protection of civilians as a global category, 
but that of citizen (or fellow) civilians with whom they stand. The interpretation of 
civilians only as fellow civilians is also observed in the words of Yasser Arafat, the then 
President of the Palestinian Authority, who was reported to have argued that attacks 
against ‘armed Jewish settlers’ in the Occupied Territories was an ‘act of self-defense’ 
on the part of Palestinians.188 Indeed this statement seems a further step forward from 
the self-defence justification of military operations that cause civilian casualties among 
the civilian population on the enemy side: it indicates that the Palestinian side officially 
justified attacks against enemy (i.e. Israeli, in this context) civilians as a means of 
self-defence. 
In Section 3. 2. 1, I have examined self-defence in order to consider how 
civilian protection is used not only as a motive for military operations but also as a way 
of justifying such military operations. I have found that parties use civilian protection as 
a justifiable cause to activate military operations mainly because they usually consider 
civilian protection to be part of the self-defence of a state as well as an issue of national 
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 security. I have also argued that military operations undertaken for the purpose of 
civilian protection do not always lead to civilian protection; parties to the conflict 
usually limit the scope of civilian protection to their fellow civilians, excluding civilians 
from the enemy side. My discussion in this section has confirmed that the practice and 
the rhetoric of warring parties indicate that military operations conducted in the name of 
civilian protection as self-defence or national security have often not, in fact, served the 
protection of civilians on the other side, because the definition of civilians envisaged by 
the warring parties was primarily limited to fellow civilians. As a result, enemy civilians 
were not primarily considered to be an object of protection. In sum, self-defence may 
not be considered to be a plausible rationale for military operations, because these 
operations did not envisage the protection of civilians on the enemy side, and thus 
violated the idea of the protection of civilians as a global category. In Section 3. 2. 2, I 
will consider pre-emption and prevention as another category of excuse used to justify 
harming civilians. 
 
3. 2. 2. Pre-emption and Prevention 
Having assessed self-defence in Section 3. 2. 1, in Section 3. 2. 2, I will consider the 
pre-emptive and preventive use of military force in order further to explore how civilian 
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 protection has been used as a justification for military operations and how, nevertheless, 
civilians were harmed in such operations. 
Pre-emption and/or prevention has often been used as a rationale to justify 
military operations. For example, the Israeli air strike on July 22, 2002 is a case in point, 
which left a dozen civilians dead and more than a hundred wounded, as well as 
assassinating Hamas senior leader Salah Shehadeh. This air strike was reportedly aimed 
at Shehadeh, who was allegedly behind ‘hundreds of terror attacks in the last two years 
against Israeli soldiers and civilians’, according to a statement by the IDF.189 
This military strike might have been justified on the grounds that the attack 
was a pre-emptive measure to prevent possible future attacks by neutralising Shehadeh. 
From a military point of view, the assassination of Shehadeh was considered to be 
‘purely pre-emptive’, according to an anonymous IDF general.190 This way of justifying 
the military operation was confirmed in the comments made by an anonymous senior 
Israeli military official: ‘We did not target him simply to retaliate or as punishment. We 
did it as a pre-emptive operation’.191 The justification on the basis of pre-emption 
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191 Quoted in John Ward Anderson and Molly Moore, ‘Palestinians vow revenge after Gaza missile 
strike: Militants said to be poised for truce before Hamas figure, 14 others died’, Washington Post 
(24/7/2002), p. A13.  
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 further indicates that the attack to neutralise Shehadeh was aimed at preventing future 
Israeli civilian casualties which might otherwise have been caused under his command 
or authority. This was said to be because Shehadeh had allegedly been ‘planning a terror 
attack, perhaps the biggest ever against Israel’, which was a ‘mega-terror attack’, in the 
words of then Israeli Defence Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, such as a ‘truck loaded 
with one ton of explosives, the aim of which was to jolt the nation and kill hundreds of 
people’.192 
This method of justification might be approved on the consequentialist grounds 
that the rightness or wrongness of an act is judged by reference to the consequences of 
action taken, by comparison with the consequences of action not taken.193 Following 
this line of thought, Jonathan Glover raises a hypothetical question, which is 
nevertheless similar enough to shed light on the core issue in the case currently being 
discussed. The key question is whether or not a pre-emptive/preventive military 
operation that certainly involves civilian casualties can be justifiable. Glover asks 
whether or not it could be justifiable to bomb a hospital that Hitler was visiting in order 
to assassinate him, if it was the only means to stop future atrocities otherwise being 
                                                  
192 Quoted in David Rudge, ‘Shehadeh was planning mega-attack’, Jerusalem Post (26/7/2002), p. 2A 
193 Stephen Darwall, Consequentialism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), p. 1. 
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 committed by the Nazis.194 If such an attack had been undertaken, it is possible that 
dozens of civilians might have been killed or injured, regardless of the mission success 
or failure of the attack. However, from this point of view, this concern might seem to be 
secondary, because the expected consequence brought by the success of the attack to 
assassinate Hitler in order to end the hostilities is often considered to be more valuable 
than the consequence of not bombing the hospital and allowing the Nazi war effort to 
continue. This method of reasoning to justify the harming of civilians can be accounted 
for on the grounds that such an assassination might consequently have resulted in 
sparing more lives and destruction, not only on the side of the Allies but also on the side 
of the Axis, if such an attack had succeeded in assassinating Hitler and resulted in a 
ceasefire. 
If we accept this method of reasoning to justify a military strike that involves 
unnecessary civilian casualties on the grounds of pre-emption, we have to consider 
carefully how we can be so certain about the resultant future events. To raise one 
potential problem regarding this consequentialist reasoning, we might have to take into 
account the complex nature of the consequentialist argument in terms of the calculation 
                                                  
194 Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, p. 279. A similar example is also found in Glover, 
Humanity, pp. 83–5. 
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 of the future.195 The point here is that in the argument illustrated above, both the success 
of the mission (the assassination of Hitler) and its immediate causal consequence (the 
termination of further atrocities) are merely premises of argument. We might agree that 
military operations involving potential civilian casualties can be justified on the grounds 
that a pre-emptive attack could prevent further civilian casualties otherwise caused if 
future events were certain. The key issue to be taken into account is, however, the 
uncertainty of the future. As I will examine in detail in the following section, the 
assassination of Shehadeh did not stop further attacks against Israeli civilians by Hamas. 
In addition, in the discourse of the Hamas leadership, it seems to have triggered, or at 
least provoked, an intensification of retaliatory attacks against Israeli interests. The fact 
that the military strike against Shehadeh, which caused a large number of civilian 
casualties, did not succeed in preventing future attacks against Israeli civilians seems to 
discount the claim made by the Israeli officials, who attempted to justify the military 
strike on the grounds of pre-emption. In the Shehadeh case, the anticipated pre-emption 
did not succeeded in preventing future Hamas attacks, and so the civilians incidentally 
harmed in the strike could be seen to have been killed or injured under a false 
assumption, and therefore unjustifiably.  
                                                  
195 For details, see, for example, Oderberg, Applied Ethics, pp. 67–8. 
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 In Section 3. 2. 2, I have considered how pre-emption and prevention have 
been used as rationales to initiate military operations and that these operations were 
justified on the grounds of civilian protection. I have found that such military operations 
in the case of Shehadeh, as one example, resulted in harming civilians in the operational 
theatre. I have also argued that pre-emption and prevention do not necessarily justify 
military operations, not only because an estimation of the future consequence involves a 
risk of miscalculation, but also because such military operations do not prevent future 
civilian casualties. In Section 3. 2. 3, I will examine punishment, reprisal, and means of 
resistance. 
 
3. 2. 3. Punishment, Reprisal, and Means of Resistance 
In Section 3. 2. 3, in order further to explore how civilian protection is used as a means 
to justify or an excuse for harming civilians, I will examine punishment, reprisal, and 
means of resistance. 
On the Israeli side, punishment of, and reprisals against, enemy violations of 
civilian protection were used as reasons for military operations, and these operations 
were undertaken and justified on the grounds of civilian protection. The Israeli 
authorities supported the use of force as a means of punishment in order to protect 
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 Israeli citizens from attacks by the Palestinian militant groups. For example, Effi Eitham, 
a leader of the National Religious Party and member of the security cabinet of the 
Israeli Government argued: ‘We shall punish the Palestinian Authority for every attack 
by taking some territory that Israel will hold for a very long time’.196 Reprisals by Israel 
against Palestinian militant groups were also one of the grounds for military operations. 
David Baker, an official in the Israeli Prime Minister’s office, hinted at the Israeli 
Government’s future reprisals against the Palestinian militants if they were to attack 
Israelis in retaliation to the military operation by the IDF in Gaza: ‘No people can be 
expected to tolerate this terror and Israel will certainly not do so’.197 
The Israeli attack to assassinate Shehadeh might have been justified on the 
grounds of punishment and/or reprisal in that he had masterminded several direct or 
indiscriminate attacks against Israeli civilians. David Rudge claimed that Shehadeh was 
such a terrorist that ‘there was nobody bigger, stronger, or more brutal than him’.198 If 
this allegation is correct, then such a military operation might be justified on the 
grounds of reprisal and punishment. The issue we have to consider here is, however, 
that the military operation that killed Shehadeh also caused a dozen deaths and injury to 
                                                  
196 Quoted in John Ward Anderson and Molly Moore, ‘Jerusalem hit again by blast: In response, Israel 
expands seizures of Palestinian areas’, Washington Past (20/7/2002), p. A1. 
197 Quoted in Graham Usher, ‘Gunmen kill four settlers in road attacks: Hebron shootings claim three 
family members, including a child, as fury rages over Gaza raid’, Guardian (27/7/2002), p. 15. 
198 Rudge, ‘Shehadeh was planning mega-attack’, p. 2A. 
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 more than one hundred, most of them assumed to be civilians. The key issue is that 
those civilians who were harmed in the military operation were not legitimate targets for 
punishment. It might be a matter of discussion whether or not the State of Israel 
conducted collective punishment against the Palestinian population on that occasion. 
However, it is certain that if Israel accepts this premise, then its acceptance means that it 
must also accept the arguments of the Palestinian militant groups; that is, that there is no 
difference between civilians and combatants, and that civilians are legitimate targets in 
military operations. 
From the viewpoint of the Palestinian militant groups, reprisal was considered 
to be a means of resistance against the Israeli occupation. In particular, reprisals were 
used by the militant groups orchestrating indiscriminate or direct attacks against Israeli 
civilians, not only as a cause for undertaking military action but also as a way of 
justifying the harming of Israeli civilians. This justification for harming civilians was 
the official policy of one of the Palestinian militant groups (at least), and supported and 
blessed by the leaders of many of these organisations. For example, Sheikh Ahmed 
Yassin, then leader of Hamas, commented that the Palestinian attacks against Israeli 
civilians were undertaken as a reciprocal retaliatory measure: ‘When they harm and hurt 
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 Palestinian civilians their civilians will be harmed’.199 In the same vein, Ismail Abu 
Shanab, a Hamas spokesman in the Gaza Strip, contextualised the Hamas military 
strategy as a war of attrition in terms of lives of civilians, claiming that Palestinians ‘are 
willing to pay the price so that we reach the point where fatigue in Israeli society will 
eventually too great’. Shanab also emphasised that the attack against Israeli civilians 
was a reprisal: ‘We have told Israelis that if they kill our civilians, they have set the 
rules for this game. It is a tooth for a tooth, an eye for an eye. That is the equation’.200 
Such a view that harming civilians is justified on the grounds of reprisal is also shared 
by other Palestinian militant groups. For example, as a response to the IDF air strike 
against Shehadeh, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades made the following comment: ‘We 
will hit everywhere, even their children, to make them understand how our children 
suffer’.201 This remark clearly indicates that the Palestinian militant group held the view 
that harming civilians was justifiable on the grounds of reprisal. 
The question to be asked here is whether or not targeting civilians can be 
justified on the grounds of reprisal. In IHL, as discussed in Chapter 1, direct and 
indiscriminate attacks against civilians, as well as reprisals against them, are prohibited. 
                                                  
199 Quoted in Lamia Lahoud, ‘Arafat orders forces to fight terror’, Jerusalem Post, (9/5/2002), p. 2  
200 Quoted in Phil Reeves, ‘Hamas waits defiantly as Israel plots its revenge’, Independent (25/7/2002), 
p. 11. 
201 Quoted in Anderson and Moore, ‘Palestinians vow revenge after Gaza missile strike’. 
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 In this respect, it might be seen as remarkable that Hamas issued a statement on the 
bombing at the university campus: ‘We are so sorry for every innocent killed in that 
operation’, said then senior Hamas member Abdel Aziz Rantisi. This indiscriminate 
attack was, in Rantisi’s words, aimed at Israeli occupation as the ‘bomb was clearly 
against occupation’.202 However, this justification for attacking civilians by Rantisi is 
questionable in the sense that many of those casualties were university staff or students, 
who were presumably not actively involved in making the government’s policy of 
occupation. 
In order further to clarify the issues surrounding reprisals, let us now consider 
how such retaliatory attacks against civilians were undertaken in the chronological 
context. In a pair of tit-for-tat attacks between the IDF and the Palestinian militant 
groups, the assassination of Shehadeh triggered (or at least the Palestinian militant 
group claimed that it did so) a reprisal by Hamas against Israeli civilians. As a response 
to the attack against Shehadeh, Hamas immediately made a statement in which the 
group declared that it would conduct a series of retaliatory attacks indiscriminately or 
directly targeting Israeli civilians and civilian objects in the territory of Israel. Rantizi 
stated: ‘Hamas’s retaliation will come very soon, and there won’t be only one attack’, 
                                                  
202 Quoted in John Kifner, ‘Death on the Campus: The Bombers; Hamas says it regrets American toll in 
attack, but hails bombing as success’, New York Times (2/8/2002), p. A10. 
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 and continued; ‘After this crime, even Israelis in their homes will be the target of our 
operations’.203 His words soon became realised in a bombing at the campus of the 
Hebrew University on July 31, which left seven dead and dozens wounded. Referring to 
the Israeli air strike against Shehadeh and the bombing at the university, Hamas leader 
Yassin said: ‘When Israel bombs a civilian building full of women and children, and 
kills 15 people, this is the response they should expect’.204 Echoing Yassin’s comments, 
Hamas issued a statement, which reportedly read: ‘It’s a part of a series of responses 
that will take a long time and teach all Israelis’.205 This kind of events from the 
assassination of Shehadeh to the suicide attack against Israeli civilians by Hamas 
showed that retaliatory attacks were used as a rationale for harming civilians by the 
Palestinian militant group. 
Having clarified that punishment and reprisals have been used as means to 
justify harming civilians, let us move on to assess the justification for harming civilians 
on the grounds that attacks against civilians are a means of resistance against occupation. 
In the discourse of the Palestinian militant groups, indiscriminate or direct attacks 
against Israeli civilians by suicide bombing are considered to be just and legitimate 
                                                  
203 Quoted in Margot Dudkevitch, ‘Hamas vows to avenge killing of top terrorist’, Jerusalem Post 
(24/7/2002), p. 1. 
204 Suzanne Goldenberg, ‘Bomb kills seven at university: three US citizens among dead after Hamas 
attack’, Guardian (1/8/2002), p. 2. 
205 Quoted in Justin Huggler, ‘Murder in campus: Bombing of university dining hall leaves 7 dead and 70 
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 means of resistance against the illegitimate Israeli occupation. Rantisi justified a Hamas 
sponsored suicide bombing on the grounds that Palestinians are militarily inferior to the 
IDF: ‘Hamas uses these tactics and means of struggle because it lacks F-16s, Apaches, 
tanks and missiles, and so we use any means that we have’, and for justifying suicide 
attacks against civilians he gave the following reason: ‘we are under occupation and are 
weak’.206 The issue we have to consider here is whether or not indiscriminate or direct 
attacks can be justified on the grounds of resistance. At face value, the words of the 
Palestinian militant group might simply imply the need for the protection of civilians 
under the Israeli occupation. However, in this case, Hamas’s definition of civilians as 
protected people was again limited to their fellow Palestinian civilians only, and the 
Palestinian group was little concerned about the protection of civilians in the Israeli 
territory, just as the State of Israel implied that civilian protection meant Israeli civilians 
only. 
In Section 3. 2. 3, I have considered that punishment, reprisal and a means of 
resistance were used as ways of justifying military operations, despite the fact that these 
operations often caused civilian casualties to a degree that breached the principle of 
proportionality normally envisaged and used in moral judgment of war conduct. I have 
                                                  
206 Quoted in Suzanne Goldenberg, ‘The man behind the suicide bombs: Every death is the product of a 
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 argued that such military operations could not be justified on any of these grounds if the 
military operations based on these justifications either directly or indiscriminately 
targeted civilians or caused unnecessary harm to civilians to a disproportionate degree. 
 
3. 2. 4. Human Shields 
Having considered in Section 3. 2. 3 how civilians were harmed in the name of 
punishment, reprisal or a means of resistance by the warring parties, in Section 3. 2. 4, 
in order to examine further whether or not the use of human shields could justify 
harming civilians, I will consider the ethical issues surrounding human shields. 
Human shields are defined in general as ‘non-combatants whose presence 
protects certain objects or areas from attack’. Human shields are categorised into 
‘voluntary human shields’, ‘involuntary human shields’, and ‘proximity human shields’, 
according to Daniel Schoenekase.207 In order to assess whether or not the use of human 
shields can justify and/or excuse harming civilians, I will now consider how human 
shields are used as an excuse for, as well as a justification for, harming civilians. 
Specifically, I will consider the three categories of human shields and how they are an 
issue of concern, in order to clarify the complex nature of the ethical issues surrounding 
                                                  
207 Daniel P. Schoenekase, ‘Targeting Decisions Regarding Human Shields’, Military Review 
(September-October, 2004), pp. 26–31 at p. 26. 
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 human shields. 
The first category I will examine is voluntary human shields. This consists of 
individual civilians who voluntarily use themselves as human shields in order to protect 
other civilians. Cases of this type of human shield are found in the activities of so-called 
peace activists in the Occupied Territories. There are several instances in which peace 
activists were killed or injured by the IDF, and in this discussion I will consider two 
cases in order to explore the concept of voluntary human shields fully. The first case 
involves American activist Rachel Corrie, who was crushed to death by an Israeli 
bulldozer in Gaza on March 2003 while she knelt down in front of it in order to prevent 
the destruction of a Palestinian village by the IDF.208 To justify its action, the IDF 
published a report in which it denied any responsibility for her death and called her 
behaviour ‘illegal, irresponsible and dangerous’.209 The other case in which a peace 
activist acted as a human shield and was killed as a consequence was that of Tom 
Hurndall, who was directly targeted and shot by an IDF soldier on April 2003 when he 
tried to move Palestinian children out of the line of fire.210 In this case, the IDF soldier 
                                                  
208 Chris McGreal and Duncan Campbell, ‘Israeli army bulldozer crushes US peace activist in Gaza 
Strip’, Guardian (17/3/2003), http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,915711,00.html, accessed 
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209 Quoted in Conal Urquhart, ‘Israeli report clears troops over US death: Peace activist killed by 
bulldozer acted “illegally and dangerously”’, Guardian (14/4/2003), p. 12. 
210 Audrey Gillan, ‘UK activist returns from Israel in coma’, Guardian (20/5/2003), 
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 who allegedly shot Hurndall was convicted of manslaughter by an Israeli military court 
in 2005.211 
In these two cases, voluntary human shields were killed by the IDF, either 
indirectly or directly. However, more importantly, these cases in which peace activists 
were harmed are different from other cases in which civilians were harmed due to being 
used as human shields by combatants. The difference is in that the peace activists acted 
voluntarily as human shields to help civilians, whereas other civilians might have been 
used involuntarily, or indeed forced to act, as human shields. These incidents of peace 
activism might be seen tragic, and their courage and solidarity with Palestinian civilians 
might be praiseworthy. However, the point is that those activists acted on their volition 
as autonomous agents who were responsible for their actions. Presumably they knew 
well the danger and risk of behaving in such a way and the possibility of lethal 
consequences. In this sense, these cases of voluntary human shields seem less 
problematic than the cases which I will consider later in this section because the peace 
activists who acted as human shields were at least partly responsible for the harm 
inflicted upon them, whereas other civilians are often used as human shields 
involuntarily or by force and thus have little or no influence over their actions and the 
                                                  
211 Coral Urquhart, ‘Eight year jail term for Israeli who shot Briton’, Guardian (12/8/2005), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,1547443,00.html, accessed on 12/7/2006.  
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 consequences following their use as human shields. 
The second of the three categories of human shields which I will explore is 
involuntary human shields. An example of this is the coercive use of civilians for 
military purposes, as presented in the earlier example when the IDF allegedly used 
Palestinian civilians as human shields in order to protect their soldiers. This type of 
human shield is clearly prohibited by Article 51(7) of Additional Protocol I of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, which reads: 
 
The presence or movement of the civilian population or individual 
civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune 
from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military 
objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede military 
operations. The parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement 
of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to 
shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military 
operations.212 
 
In the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, the State of Israel appeared to be aware of 
unlawfulness of the use of civilians as a human shield.213 For example, on the 24th of 
April, 2004, a photograph of a Palestinian boy on the bonnet of an Israeli police jeep 
                                                  
212 AP(I), Art. 51(7). 
213 On 6th of October 2005, The Israeli High Court of Justice ruled that it was illegal for the IDF to use 
Palestinian civilians during military operations. Donald MacIntyre, ‘Israeli Use of “Human Shield” is 
judged Illegal’, Independent (7/10/2005), p. 31. 
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 was published in the Independent, the caption to which reads: ‘Mohammed Bedwan was 
tied to a jeep to serve as human shield’.214 In response to this incident, Gil Kleiman, a 
police spokesman was quoted as saying: 
 
As a general rule we do not willingly expose civilians to physical 
damage. In this case there was prima facie evidence that procedures 
were carried out which were incorrect, and this has been passed to 
the Justice Ministry.215 
 
This incident seems to show that the State of Israel did not tolerate the use of civilians 
as human shields, presumably accepting the legal prohibition of this conduct. However, 
as I will examine in due course, the IDF, contrary to the above quotation and court 
ruling, did use Palestinian civilians as human shields in combat situations. 
Despite its claim of compliance with the prohibition on the use of civilians as 
human shields for military purposes, the IDF is alleged to have used Palestinian 
civilians in this way in military operations. According to an Amnesty International 
report, a typical use of human shields by the Israeli military would involve the soldiers 
‘compel[ling] an adult male in their military operation to search property in each area of 
                                                  
214 Donald MacIntyre, ‘Inquiry after Israeli Forces caught using Boy as shield’, Independent (24/4/2004), 
p. 31. 
215 Ibid. 
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 the refugee camp’.216 The Israeli soldiers allegedly forced Palestinian civilians to ‘enter 
buildings to check whether they are booby-trapped or to expel their occupants’, ‘remove 
suspicious objects from the road’, ‘stand inside houses that the IDF has turned into 
military positions, so that Palestinians will not fire at soldiers’, and ‘walk in front of 
soldiers to shield them from gunfire’. 217  One example of this occurred when a 
Palestinian civilian, who had reportedly been given a flak jacket and been sent into a 
building occupied by Hamas militants, was shot dead when he approached the 
compound.218 The report prepared by Amnesty International gives another example in 
the testimony of Faisal Abu Sariya, a Palestinian civilian who was used as a human 
shield by the IDF: 
 
I was then taken from this house and told to go to another house 
alone, and to knock on the door. I did this but no one answered. They 
told me to come back. I saw that they had a type of metal box that 
they were carrying and they brought it to the door. I then heard an 
explosion. I was then told to go back to the house and to go in and if 
there were any people in the house to tell them to go to one room. 
When I went back, I found another door. Again, I knocked but no one 
replied. The soldiers exploded this door. At this time, they sent in a 
dog and then told me to go in and if I was to find any closed door, to 
open them. The soldiers then came in after me. 
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…The soldiers were searching the house and then we went to the 
bottom floor of the house where they put a hole in the wall between 
this house and next. I was taken by the soldiers and told to go 
through the hole first. There were six or seven soldiers that followed 
behind me. From there, I was taken to another house…When we 
leaving this house, Eitan [an Israeli officer] grabbed me by the neck 
and put his machine gun against my right hip. I walked about 20 
meters like this. 
 
According to the report, Abu Sariya was later ordered by the unit accompanying him to 
check another building and was consequently shot in the leg by a soldier from another 
IDF unit when he crossed a road to approach it.219 
Although it is not the same as a human shield in the strictest sense, the IDF 
soldiers often resorted to the ‘neighbour procedure’, which involves the ‘use of 
Palestinians to arrest other Palestinians or to order them to leave their house’.220 From a 
military point of view, this act might be justified on the grounds that local civilians as 
emissaries are more likely to persuade Palestinian combatants to surrender or to let 
other civilians evacuate before combat starts, and therefore this procedure could give 
both Israelis and Palestinians a chance to prevent military confrontation and/or avoid 
unnecessary casualties.221 However, the issue we have to take into account here is that 
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 the IDF used Palestinian civilians for military purposes in the name of neighbour 
procedures, which, according to a B’Tselem report, are ‘not significantly different from 
other ways in which the IDF used civilians as human shields’ in terms of danger to 
civilians.222 
Having considered the second of the three categories of human shield, I will 
consider the third type of human shield; namely, proximity human shields. The use of 
this type of human shield is exemplified by Palestinian militants allegedly used their 
fellow civilians as human shields against an Israeli attack, by mingling themselves 
among the civilian population for the purpose of self-protection. Again, let us consider 
the case of the assassination of Shehadeh. The Israeli authorities accused Shehadeh of 
using the civilian population in a refugee camp as human shields by placing himself 
within it: ‘Regretfully, this is what can happen when a terrorist uses civilians as a human 
shield and their homes as places of refuge’.223 
If the allegation that the Palestinian militants used their fellow civilians as 
human shields to deter Israeli attacks were true, the culpability of the Israeli authorities 
for harming civilians could have been diminished on the grounds that the Palestinian 
                                                  
222 Yael Stein, Human Shield: Use of Palestinian Civilians as Human Shields in Violation of High Court 
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 militants abandoned their obligation to protect fellow civilians by breaching 
international laws and customs on the protection of civilians. Article 28 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention of 1949 reads: ‘The presence of a protected person may not be used 
to render certain points or areas immune from military operation’.224 An editorial in the 
Jerusalem Post encouraged the Israeli Government not to be reluctant to pursue 
Palestinian militants despite the civilian casualties that might be caused by their 
illegitimate use of human shields. It reads: 
 
Israel should obviously attempt to kill or capture these men [i.e. 
Palestinian militants] as surgically as possible, without unduly 
risking the lives of our soldiers. But we should not be deterred by 
their deliberate use of civilians as human shields.225 
 
If the Palestinian militants used their fellow civilians as human shields, then the 
militants might be blamed for their unlawful act and the Palestinian Authority might 
also be blamed for its failure to stop the militants using Palestinian civilians as human 
shields. However, as we have seen so far, it is clear that military action against the 
Palestinian militants did not automatically justify harming Palestinian civilians, despite 
the fact that these civilians were deliberately used as human shields and/or such harm 
                                                  
224 See also AP(I), Art. 51(7). 
225 Editorial, ‘Annihilate Hamas’, Jerusalem Post (5/8/2002), p. 6. 
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 was incidentally caused. 
In Section 3. 2. 4, I have considered how human shields become a matter of 
concern regarding civilian protection by examining three different types of human 
shields. I have argued that the last two types – involuntary and proximity human shields 
– raise concerns about whether or not these uses of human shields which result in 
harming civilians might be justified. I have also revealed that the IDF used Palestinian 
civilians as human shields for the purpose of protecting combatants, which resulted in 
casualties among Palestinian civilians, and found that Palestinian militants used their 
fellow civilians as proximity human shields against the Israeli attack, by mingling 
themselves among the civilian population for the purpose of self-protection. These 
examples of human shields seem to confirm that civilian protection has been breached 
on many occasions by both sides, to the degree that the legal and ethical principles of 
non-combatant immunity and proportionality were absent from war conduct in the 
Israeli–Palestinian Conflict. 
 
Concluding Remarks for Chapter 3 
In Chapter 3, I have analysed how civilian protection was considered and how civilians 
were harmed in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict. In Section 3. 1, I have investigated the 
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 overview of how civilians were, directly or indirectly, harmed by both the IDF and the 
Palestinian militant groups in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict. Through my discussion, I 
have found that there was a pattern of attacks in which civilians were harmed to a 
disproportionate degree and/or by prohibited means and methods of using military force 
against them. I have also revealed that the distinction between civilians and combatants 
virtually collapsed in this conflict. I have found not only that the protection of civilians 
was not always respected, but also that civilians were often directly targeted by 
combatants. In Section 3. 2, I have considered the main causes for military action 
undertaken in the name of civilian protection, in order to consider how civilian 
protection was used as a way of justifying and/or excusing military operations. I have 
also revealed that these causes for military action did not necessarily justify such 
military operations in which civilians were harmed disproportionately or directly. My 
observations from discussing the case of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict have led to four 
conclusions: firstly, that civilians were frequently targeted in indiscriminate or direct 
attacks by both the IDF and the Palestinian militant groups; secondly, that civilian 
protection had little meaning in this armed conflict; thirdly, that neither the Palestinian 
militant groups nor the IDF complied with civilian protection; and finally, that although 
the IDF did not take an official strategy to target civilians in military operations, it 
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 nevertheless does not seem to have been sensitive enough to take measures to ensure the 
commitment of its units and members to civilian protection in the operational theatre. 
The Israeli–Palestinian Conflict may therefore draw our attention to the need for 
measures to ensure civilian protection at the level of individual combatants, which I will 
examine in greater detail in Chapter 5. Before that, however, moving away from this 
specific conflict and back to a theoretical analysis for the protection of civilians, in 
Chapter 4 I will explore how a Hume-inspired conception of justice can reconceptualise 
civilian protection in armed conflict. 
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 CHAPTER 4: JUSTICE, UTILITY AND CIVILIAN PROTECTION 
 
Introduction 
Having considered in Chapter 3 how civilians were not well protected in the 
Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, in Chapter 4 I will explore one of the two potentially 
promising ways to supplement just war theory in civilian protection – namely, a 
Hume-inspired conception of justice – in order to propose a global utility-based 
understanding of civilian protection as part of just conduct in armed conflict. 
This chapter is divided into six parts. Initially, I will discuss a Hume-inspired 
conception of justice as an artificial virtue, and its relevance regarding civilian 
protection, in order to explore a possible explanation for justifying civilian protection as 
part of just conduct in armed conflicts. Secondly, I will examine utility as a moral case 
for civilian protection as part of just conduct in times of war, in order to consider 
whether or not this concept contributes to civilian protection. Thirdly, I will examine the 
first of the two interpretations of the utility of civilian protection; utility as a mutual 
benefit between warring parties, in order to consider whether or not this interpretation 
of utility contributes to civilian protection. Fourthly, I will critically examine the issues 
presented by the first interpretation of reciprocity-based utility for the parties to the 
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 conflict, in order to consider whether or not this interpretation of utility leads to the 
protection of civilians. Fifthly, I will examine the concept of non-reciprocity-based 
utility between the warring parties in order to consider whether or not this interpretation 
of the utility of civilian protection can be appropriate. Finally, I will examine the second 
interpretation of utility as the ethical foundation for civilian protection; namely the 
utility of civilian protection at the global level, in order to consider whether or not this 
interpretation of utility contributes to civilian protection. Through the discussion in 
Chapter 4, I will consider these six issues in turn, in order to portray how the concept of 
utility as a way of justifying civilian protection may play a role not only to justify 
civilian protection but also to ensure that civilians are better protected in armed conflict. 
 
4. 1. A Hume-Inspired Conception of Justice: Justice as an Artificial Virtue 
In Section 4. 1, I will explore a Hume-inspired conception of justice as an artificial 
virtue, and its relevance to civilian protection, in order to explore a possible explanation 
to justify civilian protection as part of just conduct in armed conflict. 
The reason I will consider civilian protection as justice in war from a Humean 
point of view is that the Hume-inspired conception of justice as an artificial virtue 
provides a way to conceptualise civilian protection as utility at the global level. 
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 Although the Hume-inspired conception of justice may not be the only viable approach 
to justify civilian protection as part of just conduct in war, my attempt to consider 
civilian protection from a Humean perspective may be sufficient if I can demonstrate 
that the Hume-inspired conception of justice works viably when attempting to 
understand civilian protection as part of just conduct in war, and that this understanding 
leads to the better protection of civilians. 
From a Humean point of view, as outlined in his Treatise of Human Nature, 
justice, or to act justly, can be considered to be an artificial virtue in the sense that it is a 
socially constructed and contextualised human artifice for moral approval and 
disapproval.226 This conception of justice indicates that the system to achieve and 
maintain justice has developed in the process of living with others, and consequently 
varies in accordance with specific ‘circumstances and necessities’, in Hume’s terms. In 
this vein, Hume defines justice as one of the artificial ‘virtues, that produce pleasure and 
approbation by means of an artifice or contrivance, which arises from the circumstances 
and necessities of mankind’. Justice was invented as, in Hume’s words, ‘a remedy to 
this inconvenience’ of instability and scarcity of goods. 227  This Hume-inspired 
understanding of justice as an artificial virtue directs our attention to the notion that 
                                                  
226 David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, (ed.) L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), pp. 
478–96. 
227 Ibid., pp. 478, 488. 
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 there is no internal force in human nature to motivate people to act justly or to approve 
of justice; only such diverse motives as narrow self-interest, a ‘regard to public interest’ 
and ‘private benevolence’ motivate people to act justly. In Hume’s words: 
 
From all this it follows, that we have naturally no real or universal 
motive for observing the laws of equity, but the very equity and the 
merit of that observance; and as no action can be equitable or 
meritorious, where it cannot arise from some separate motive, there 
is here an evident sophistry and reasoning in a circle. Unless, 
therefore, we will allow, that nature has establish’d a sophistry, and 
render’d it necessary and unavoidable, we must allow, that the sense 
of justice and injustice is not derived from nature, but arises 
artificially, tho’ necessarily from education and human convention.228 
 
This position regarding justice as an artificial virtue implies that the original motive to 
establish the system of justice flows from the self-interest of people to secure and 
protect their own possessions as well as limited generosity to their nearest and dearest. 
As he continued, ‘’tis only from the selfishness and confine’d generosity of man, along 
with the scarce provision nature has made for his wants, that justice derives its 
origin’.229 In the Hume-inspired conception of justice, therefore, people need a moral 
motivational force other than self-interest and limited generosity; for example, extended 
sympathy to all human beings, through convention and education, so that they can act 
                                                  
228 Hume, Treatise, p. 483. 
229 Ibid., p. 495. 
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 justly. 
 
4. 2. Utility as an Ethical Foundation for Civilian Protection 
Having introduced in Section 4. 1 the Hume-inspired conception of justice as an 
artificial virtue, in Section 4. 2 I will consider utility as a possible explanation for the 
value of acting justly – in this case, protecting civilians in war – in order to explore how 
the concept of utility contributes to civilian protection. 
Drawing on Hume, if we take the position that there is no natural motive to 
approve of the system of justice in human nature, as discussed in the previous section, 
we might wonder what sort of motivational force makes people approve of justice as an 
artificial virtue. From a Hume-inspired point of view on justice, utility can be 
understood as the values attached to justice for the following reason: members of 
society approve of justice that serves not only themselves individually but also society 
as a whole.230 According to Hume, people find values of justice in utility in the 
socio-psychological way that people seek the system of justice out of necessity and for 
convenience, because such a system is advantageous to society as well as its members. 
People thus approve of justice as a virtue because it serves ‘public utility’ and ‘is useful 
                                                  
230 David Miller, Philosophy and Ideology in Hume’s Political thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 
p. 72. 
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 to society’. In his later work, Enquiries concerning the Human Understanding and 
concerning the Principle of Morals, Hume writes that: 
 
The necessity of justice to the support of society is the sole foundation 
of that virtue; and since no moral excellence is more highly esteemed, 
we may conclude that this circumstance of usefulness has, in general, 
the strongest energy, and most entire command over our 
sentiments.231 
 
This characteristic of justice as a human contrivance implies that people in society learn 
to have a concern for public interest by recognising and understanding that the rules of 
justice serve utility for both society as a whole and its individual members. For this 
reason, Hume argues that people obtain ‘an idea of justice and injustice’ only after the 
system of justice is established.232 
Following the same line of argument, civilian protection can be considered to be 
one of the rules of justice in war in the sense that it can be recognised and understood as 
a feature of just conduct in armed conflict. This leads me to infer that the values of 
civilian protection are connected to utility since civilian protection delivers utility for 
the individual members of society as well as society as a whole. This line of thought 
                                                  
231 David Hume, Enquiries concerning the Human Understanding and concerning the Principle of 
Morals, 2nd ed. (ed.) L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892), pp. 183, 203–4. 
232 Hume, Treatise, pp. 486– 490. 
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 further implies that civilian protection could be justified if it were considered to be 
serving utility.  
If utility can be understood as a value for justifying civilian protection, then 
one of the most important issues to consider is the scope of utility which the rule of 
civilian protection is expected to serve. In other words, who are the stakeholders 
concerned with the utility of civilian protection? We may have at least two possible 
answers to this question: one is the inter-warring parties of a specific conflict, and the 
other is all parties at a global level. The former interpretation is often closely associated 
with the conventional discussion of the ethics of war which may be found in the works 
of Richard Brandt and George Mavrodes.233 These works have a fundamental limitation 
in that they understand utility at a national level, and thus fail to grasp another 
possibility of understanding utility at the global level, as envisaged by contemporary 
utilitarians such as Peter Singer.234 As will be discussed in detail in a later section of 
Chapter 4, the reason for this is that in the former interpretation of stakeholders, the 
scope of utility of civilian protection is limited, and its value is therefore underestimated. 
In other words, this interpretation suggests that the value of civilian protection cannot 
be recognised by non-parties to a conflict. 
                                                  
233 Brandt, ‘Utilitarianism and the Rules of War’, pp. 145–65; Mavrodes, ‘Conventions and Morality of 
War’. 
234 Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalisation (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002). 
 - 179 - 
 In the following four sections (Sections 4. 3 to 4. 6), I will examine both 
different scopes of utility as a framework for civilian protection. 
 
4. 3. The First Scope of Utility: Utility as a Mutual Benefit between Warring 
Parties 
Having discussed in Section 4. 2 utility as the moral value of civilian protection, in 
Section 4. 3 I will examine an interpretation of the scope of utility of civilian protection 
– namely utility as a mutual benefit between warring parties – in order to consider 
whether or not this interpretation of utility contributes to civilian protection. 
The understanding of utility at the level of inter-warring parties is often 
considered to be the basis of utility of the rules of war, in which the idea and ideal of 
civilian protection are embodied. For example, Brandt argues that morally justifiable 
rules of war are ones that ‘maximize expectable long-range utility for nations at war’. In 
his argument, it is apparent that Brandt refers to utility as inter-belligerent by limiting its 
scope of application ‘in the circumstance that two nations are at war’.235 In other words, 
in the Brandtian context, the utility of the laws of war is considered to be the utility for 
the warring parties. 
                                                  
235 Brandt, ‘Utilitarianism and the Rules of War’, pp. 150, 152. 
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 Following this line of argument in which the stakeholders of utility are limited to 
the warring parties, the utility of civilian protection is considered to be justified on the 
grounds of mutual advantage. If this is the case, then the government would not protect 
enemy civilians except in circumstances where so doing leads to the protection of its 
fellow civilians to its own benefit.236 In this sense, the motive of the government to 
protect enemy civilians can be considered to originate from the expectation and 
calculation of reciprocal benefits. Suppose that governments A and B are at war and 
government A implements the protection of government B’s civilians and government B 
acts similarly. By directly protecting government B’s civilians, government A could 
indirectly protect its fellow civilians and vice versa. This equilibrium can be achieved as 
long as both parties to the conflict hold a commonly shared view that the utility of 
civilian protection is based on their mutual benefit. Part of the reason that the utility of 
civilian protection can also be understood in terms of mutual benefit between warring 
parties is explained from the Hume-inspired conception of the origin of justice, which 
considered it to be established for the reciprocal benefits of individual members of 
society.237 Hume argues that people accept and approve of the rules that achieve and 
maintain justice as a result of their concern for themselves as well as for society, 
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 because such rules are ‘absolutely requisite to the well-being of mankind and existence 
of society’.238  
This Hume-inspired conception of the utility of the rules of justice may be found 
in Hume’s idea concerning the laws of war between warring parties. Hume argues that 
the laws of war are broken when a party to the conflict does not see them as useful or 
advantageous for its execution of a war because these rules are a product ‘calculated for 
the advantage and utility of that particular state’. In Hume’s words: 
    
The rage and violence of public war; what is it but a suspension of 
justice among the warring parties, who perceive, that this virtue is 
now no longer of any use or advantage to them? The laws of war, 
which then succeed to those of equity and justice, are rules calculated 
for the advantage and utility of that particular state, in which men 
are now placed.239 
 
This line of argument suggests that one way to understand that the laws of war can be 
justified is on the grounds of mutual benefit between the parties to the conflict. 
In order further to consider how the utility between warring parties works as a 
rationale for civilian protection, my argument will benefit from further consideration of 
Hume’s argument on the laws of war. In Mackie’s interpretation, Hume expects the laws 
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 of war to provide ‘the function only of mitigating conflicts and making it easier to 
maintain intervals of non-fighting within the lasting state of war, not that of establishing 
justice and genuine peace between nations’.240 If Mackie’s interpretation is correct, this 
feature of the laws of war as a remedy to mitigate the misery and plight of victims in 
war might be considered similar to the purpose of IHL, in that both avoid the utopian 
views that war can be totally abandoned, that total disarmament can occur, or that 
perpetual peace is achievable, but hold the realistic view that war does occur, but that 
unnecessary harm must be avoided. 
If this understanding of Hume’s conception of the laws of war is correct, 
however, we notice immediately the divergence between IHL and the Humean 
conception of the laws of war. Whereas Hume’s conception of utility of the rules of war 
is simply based on mutual benefits between warring parties in a particular war, IHL 
does not rest on this premise. IHL is more concerned with the long-term utility of the 
laws of war at a global level. In other words, the utility of the laws of war envisaged in 
IHL cannot substantially be undermined by a breach of a set of rules in war. The 
difference between Hume’s conception of the scope of utility in the laws of war and 
IHL’s is evident in Hume’s writings that civilised nations must abandon the laws of war 
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 when ‘barbarians’ who do not observe these rules wage war against them. In Hume’s 
words: 
 
And were a civilized nation engaged with barbarians, who observed 
no rules even of war, the former must also suspend their observance 
of them, where they no longer serve to any purpose; and must render 
every action or encounter as bloody and pernicious as possible to the 
first aggressors.241 
 
These comments confirm Hume’s theory that the utility of the laws of war is 
sustained by reciprocity between warring parties because, this line of argument goes, if 
no reciprocal benefits between warring parties are expected in observing the laws of war, 
neither party would see the utility in so doing. This line of argument indicates the 
limitation of Hume’s original conception of the laws of war because it suggests that a 
lack of reciprocal benefits between warring parties would make them abandon the code 
of civilian protection. This conclusion seems to go against the spirit of the Geneva 
Conventions that may be described by the phrase ‘of virtually universal application’, 
according to The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict.242  
In Section 4. 3, I have examined the first interpretation of the scope of utility of 
civilian protection from a Humean point of view, and found that utility of the laws of 
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 war can be justified on the grounds of reciprocal benefits between parties to the conflict. 
I have found that civilian protection can be understood through the same line of thought. 
However, I have also argued that the conclusion derived from Hume’s original 
conception of the laws of war raises a concern. In Section 4. 4, in order to revise 
Hume’s original conception of the law of war, I will critically examine the implications 
of this first interpretation of utility for civilian protection. 
 
4. 4. A Critical Examination of Reciprocity-based Utility 
To restate the first interpretation of the scope of utility discussed in the previous section, 
if the utility of the laws of war is justifiable solely on the grounds of reciprocal benefits 
between warring parties, the imperatives and incentives to sustain civilian protection as 
a rule of war may be considered solely based on the mutual benefits of the parties 
concerned. In this utility-as-reciprocal-benefits framework, civilian protection can be 
justified as part of just conduct in war on the condition that warring parties protect the 
civilian population in enemy territories on the understanding that the other party will act 
in the same way. However, there are two points worthy of critical examination in order 
to consider whether or not the first interpretation of utility actually serves the protection 
of civilians. The first point to consider is the characteristic of civilian protection as a 
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 rule of war, and the other is the possibility that the concept of the utility of civilian 
protection is not subscribed to, and that civilian protection is no longer observed by 
warring parties.  
Firstly, let us consider the characteristic of civilian protection as a rule of war. If 
we follow the idea that the utility of the laws of war is justified solely by reciprocal 
benefits, we find that it diminishes when reciprocal benefits are not expected. This line 
of argument seems something of an oversimplification of the whole set of issues 
regarding the laws of war, because some sets of codes might rather be considered 
directly based on reciprocal benefits whereas others might not be. According to Mackie, 
Hume assumes that diplomatic immunity, the declaration of war, and the prohibition of 
the use of poisoned weapons are among the laws of war.243 These rules might be seen as 
directly based on reciprocity, mainly because these rules are aimed at mutual benefits in 
force protection. Contrary to these rules, in IHL, civilian protection can be seen less 
directly based on reciprocity. This idea is codified in Article 51(8) of Additional 
Protocol I, which reads: ‘Any violation of these prohibitions [i.e. direct attacks against 
civilians, indiscriminate attacks, reprisals against civilians, and human shields] shall not 
release the Parties to the conflicts from their legal obligations with respect to the 
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 civilian population and civilians’.244 
In certain situations, civilian protection might bring rather a negative impact on 
force protection. To shed light on this point, we have to recognise that some military 
operations are undertaken in the form of expeditions on foreign soil, and in such 
situations where civilians on the side of expeditionary forces are not normally present in 
the operational theatre. In other words, the expeditionary force often does not have any 
obligation to protect its own nationals in the operation unless it is an exceptional rescue 
mission of its nationals. Furthermore, military capabilities and mission objectives of 
deployed force are two issues to be taken into account when we consider whether or not 
armed forces have the capability, and their political masters have the political will, for 
the protection of civilians. Indeed, civilian protection can be significantly impeded by a 
lack of capability and/or political will, especially in the case of the UN-mandated 
expeditionary forces – their forces are often small and under-equipped – even though in 
some cases the protection of civilians itself becomes part of the mission for military 
operations. One case that might help to illustrate the issues set out above is found in 
Srebrenica in July 1995. At this time, 400 lightly armed Dutch forces under the auspices 
of the UN were stationed to secure the city, which was declared to be a UN-sanctioned 
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 safe area. The Dutch forces, for the sake of the protection of their own soldiers, had to 
allow the Bosnian Serb forces to enter the city, where they massacred thousands of 
Bosnian Muslim civilians. This case shows that Hume’s original, reciprocity-based 
conception of the laws of war is not only inapplicable to civilian protection as a rule of 
war in some current conflicts, but also contradicts the principle of IHL and practice of 
warring parties. 
Let us move on to consider the other of the two points: that is, what are the 
consequences if the utility of ensuring civilian protection collapses? In the 
reciprocity-based framework, if civilian protection does not serve mutual benefits 
between the warring parties, parties to the conflict might choose to disregard it for 
military and/or political purposes. The loss of the utility of civilian protection gives one 
party to the conflict a reason to abandon its commitment to civilian protection, with the 
rationale that the enemy no longer abides by it. The collapse of the utility of civilian 
protection also means that one party to the conflict is enabled to opt for reprisals once 
the other violates the rule of civilian protection. Instances in which the rule of civilian 
protection has totally collapsed are readily found in the history of warfare. Indeed, 
civilian protection has been violated numerous times in many contemporary armed 
conflicts. During the Second World War, for example, there are many episodes of 
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 violations of civilian protection; such as the Rape of Nang King and other atrocities 
committed in China by the Japanese Imperial Army, the Allied bombings of German and 
Japanese cities, and the use of atomic bombs, to name but a few. One of the most 
serious problems potentially arising from the total abandonment of the rule of civilian 
protection in war may be called ‘reversion to barbarism’245 in F. J. P. Veale’s words: that 
is, self-denial of civility by civilised nations. Up to this point of the argument, it is clear 
that the reciprocity-based conception of the utility of civilian protection is limited, since 
within this conception the rule of civilian protection is destined to collapse if and when 
one party to the conflict ceases to observe the rule. This limitation may well draw our 
attention to another, more global, conception of utility, which I will consider in Section 
4. 6. 
In Section 4. 4 I have critically examined the implications of the first 
interpretation of the scope of utility of civilian protection: utility between warring 
parties. I have examined two key points concerning this interpretation of utility in order 
to consider whether or not the interpretation actually contributes to civilian protection. 
Through the examination of these two issues, I have found that civilian protection 
would eventually fail if the utility of civilian protection were solely assumed in a 
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 reciprocity-based conception of utility between warring parties. In Section 4. 5, I will 
consider non-reciprocal factors that force parties to the conflict to sustain the utility of 
the laws of war.  
 
4. 5. Non-reciprocal Factors for the Utility of Civilian Protection 
To summarise the argument developed in the previous section, it is assumed in the first 
interpretation of the scope of utility of civilian protection that if a government abided by 
the rule of civilian protection for the reason of reciprocity only, it would abandon 
complying with the rule once the enemy ceased to observe it. This line of thought raises 
the question of whether the utility of civilian protection should be considered solely to 
be based on a reciprocity-based conception of utility. The view that civilian protection is 
undertaken solely on the basis of reciprocity between the parties concerned seems very 
different from the fundamental assumption and practice of contemporary IHL. In 
contrast with the Humean idea of the laws of war discussed earlier, proposing that a 
civilised nation (a defender) may violate the laws of war in order to punish a barbaric 
nation (aggressor) for its act of aggression, IHL forbids the warring parties to abandon 
civilian protection as part of their legal obligations under any circumstances, even 
though another party to the conflict may not follow such a rule. The non-reciprocity 
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 legal principle of civilian protection also seems to be practised by civilised states, at 
least if their governments claim to be, and want to be regarded as, civilised by other 
states and political communities. 
The issue that a government often undertakes the protection of an enemy civilian 
population beyond reciprocity seems to indicate the limitations of the system of justice 
as proposed by Hume. In practice, any system of justice sometimes brings injustice to 
some individuals and/or societies. Examples of this include the forcible acquisition of 
private property by authorities and, arguably, the death penalty.246 However, the key 
point is that these miscarriages of justice, if they occur, do not necessarily lead to the 
total collapse of the system of justice. From a Humean point of view, the overall system 
of justice serves utility for individuals as well as society in the long term.247 In the same 
context, the overall, long-term utility for society as well as its individual members is the 
grounds for the rules of justice because the overall scheme of justice would generally 
contribute to maintaining society and make its members better-off in the long term. In 
Hume’s words: 
 
But however single acts of injustice may be contrary, either to public 
or private interest, ’tis certain, that the whole plan or scheme is 
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 highly conductive, or indeed absolutely requisite, both to the support 
of society, and the well-being of every individual.248 
 
This argument appears to be based on the idea of utility, which accepts that the presence 
of the system of justice is still better for members of society than its total absence, and 
that people do come to recognise and understand the advantage of the system of justice. 
Hume writes: 
 
And every individual person must find himself a gainer, or balancing 
the account; since, without justice, society must immediately dissolve, 
and every one must fall into that savage and solitary condition, 
which is infinitely worse than the worst situation that can possibly in 
suppos’d in society. When therefore men have had experience enough 
to observe, that whatever may be the consequence of any single act of 
justice, perform’d by a single person, yet the whole system of actions, 
concurr’d in by the whole society, is infinitely advantageous to the 
whole, and to every part; it is not long before justice and property 
take place. Every member of society is sensible of this interest: Every 
one expresses this sense to his fellows, along with the resolution he 
has taken of squaring his account by it, on condition that others will 
do the same…This becomes an example to others. And thus justice 
establishes itself by a kind of convention or agreement; that is, by a 
sense of interest, suppos’d common to all, and where every single act 
is perform’d in expectation that others are to perform the like.249 
 
This Humean explanation of utility brought by the system of justice seems to imply that 
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 civilian protection is not primarily based on reciprocity-based utility between parties to 
the conflict, but on utility at the global level, taking other stakeholders into account. 
This understanding of justice also implies that in the case of civilian protection, the 
scope of utility might not necessarily be limited to the parties to the conflict only. I will 
consider this issue in detail in Section 4. 6. 
If state practice does not support the idea that the utility of civilian protection is 
solely justified by reciprocity between warring parties, one possible explanation for this 
is that the principle of reciprocity may only give the warring parties an option to comply 
with civilian protection but does not determine their decision by itself alone. There are 
several factors that a warring party may consider when it decides whether or not to 
comply with civilian protection. The warring party might conduct a cost–benefit 
calculation to sustain the credibility of civilian protection as a rule in war and the 
credibility and political legitimacy deriving from its commitment to civilian protection. 
It could be beneficial to the warring party and its members in the long run to sustain the 
credibility of civilian immunity as a rule in war, and the warring party might also come 
to find civilian protection beneficial. 
Suppose that one government continues its commitment to civilian protection 
although the enemy does not. Civilian protection might impose certain restraints on war 
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 conduct, and possibly obstruct the optimal use of military force, bringing tactical, 
operational and even strategic disadvantages in the short term or in a particular 
campaign. However, the trade-off is that the government could obtain moral and legal 
leverage, in addition to its moral high ground against the enemy, in a broader context, 
usually in the longer term. The government may thus claim political legitimacy by being 
a governing authority, as well as by being a party to the conflict, by abiding by IHL. The 
observance of civilian protection may also appeal to international public opinion and 
mobilise various international pressures by illustrating this party’s military as a moral 
army fighting against illegitimate armed groups that do not comply with international 
law. It may eventually depend on each particular situation whether or not the opposing 
force opts unilaterally to abandon its commitment to civilian protection or reciprocally 
to continue to abide by it, but the point to be clarified is that the decision does not solely 
derive from the principle of reciprocity.  
In addition to this argument, the unilateral practice of restraint in war can also 
provide an additional explanation that the utility of civilian protection cannot solely be 
based on reciprocity for the warring parties. Mavrodes argues that unilateral restraint on 
the side of one party might work as a constructive way to forge and reinforce the rules 
and customs of war because it might ‘signal his willingness to abide by such a 
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 convention. He continues: ‘If the opponent does not reciprocate, then the offer has 
failed and it goes no further. If the opponent does reciprocate, then the area of restraint 
may be broadened, and a kind of mutual respect and confidence may grow up between 
the belligerents’.250 This line of thought appears to be envisaged in IHL. For example, 
Article 96, Paragraph 3 of Additional Protocol I, stipulates that a non-state party may 
unilaterally declare the application and compliance of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
and Additional Protocol I so that it benefits from the restraints and prohibitions codified 
in these laws of war. It reads:  
 
The authority representing a people engaged against a High 
Contracting party in an armed conflict of the type referred in Article 
1, Paragraph 4, may undertake to apply the Conventions and this 
Protocol in relation to that conflict by means of a unilateral 
declaration addressed to the depositary. Such declaration shall, upon 
its receipt by the depositary, have in relation to that conflict the 
following effects: 
 
(a) the Conventions and this Protocol are brought into force for the 
said authority as a Party to the conflict with immediate effect;  
 
(b) the said authority assumes the same rights and obligations as 
those which have been assumed by a High Contracting Party to the 
Conventions and this Protocol; and  
 
(c) the Conventions and this Protocol are equally binding upon all 
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 Parties to the conflict.251 
 
The unilateral declaration codified in this provision has been practised by non-state 
parties to various conflicts. Examples may be found in African non-state parties to 
conflicts such as the rebel Biafran authorities in 1968, the African National Congress 
and the Zimbabwean African People’s Union (ANC-ZAPU) in 1977, the União National 
para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) in 1980, the African National Congress 
(ANC, South Africa) in 1980, South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) in 
1981 and 1988, and the Rwandese Patriotic Front in 1992.252 
In Asia, another example can be found in the declaration by the National 
Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP), undertaking to apply the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol.253 This example does not necessarily 
mean that NDFP has actually committed itself to IHL as a whole. However, these are 
examples that demonstrate that parties to conflicts may on occasion find it beneficial to 
commit themselves to the provisions of IHL, in order to claim political legitimacy, for 
example. 
In Section 4. 5, I have considered whether or not a non-reciprocity-driven 
                                                  
251 AP (I), Art. 96(3). 
252 Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, ‘Respect for International Humanitarian Law by Armed Non-State 
Actors in Africa’, International Review of Red Cross 88:864 (2006), pp. 905–24 at pp. 907–8. 
253 http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/54a/036.html, accessed on 24/11/2006. 
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 conception of utility serves the protection of civilians. During the course of my 
discussion I have found that one party to a conflict does not always abandon civilian 
protection even in the situation that the other ceases to observe it, contrary to a 
reciprocity-based assumption of utility. I have also found that the parties to a conflict 
sometimes find it beneficial unilaterally to observe the rules of war, again contrary to a 
reciprocity-based assumption of utility. These two findings appear to indicate that the 
first interpretation of utility of civilian protection – reciprocity-based utility between 
warring parties – does not necessarily contribute to civilian protection. However, I have 
also demonstrated that non-reciprocity-based utility can contribute to civilian protection. 
In Section 4. 6, I will explore the second interpretation of the scope of utility of civilian 
protection; the utility of civilian protection at the global level. 
  
4. 6. The Second Scope of Utility: Utility at the Global Level  
Having discussed in Section 4. 5 the non-reciprocity-based conception of utility of 
civilian protection by reference to state practice, in Section 4. 6 I will examine the other 
less discussed yet constructive interpretation of the scope of utility of civilian 
protection; namely at the global level, as proposed by commentators such as Singer, for 
example, in order to consider whether or not this interpretation of utility contributes to 
 - 197 - 
 civilian protection. 
In this interpretation of the utility of civilian protection, utility can be defined as 
‘a belief in the common good’, which ‘means that one subscribes to a given norm, even 
if it is likely that observing it will not always be in any short term or narrowly defined 
(in other words, selfish) interest and even if it may happen that other actors will not 
observe it, because one believes that this norm is right or that it is essential for the 
common welfare and happiness of international society’, according to Stanley 
Hoffman.254 If we follow Hoffman’s definition of utility as a global common good, 
civilian protection can be understood as part of the global common good because 
civilian protection serves utility at the global level. This understanding of utility as a 
global common good indicates that the utility of civilian protection is determined not 
only by the parties concerned in a particular armed conflict but also by other 
stakeholders such as other states and non-state parties, inter- and trans-national 
organisations and non-governmental organisations. In fact, there could be a vast 
majority of other states that are not directly involved in conflict but remain signatories 
to the Geneva Conventions. 
In order to consider the scope of utility, we have to examine a key question: to 
                                                  
254 Stanley Hoffmann, ‘Ethics and Rules of the Game between the Superpowers’, in Henkin, Louis, et al, 
Right V. Might: International Law and the Use of Force (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1989), 
pp. 71–93 at p. 73. 
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 whom is civilian protection useful and advantageous? Civilian protection is obviously 
useful and advantageous to the civilians affected by war. Civilian protection can also be 
seen as useful and advantageous to warring parties for political, economic and military 
reasons. By following the rule of civilian protection and thus sparing the lives of 
civilians, warring parties could save military force and resources necessary for the 
continuation of the war. In addition, by following the rule of civilian protection, warring 
parties could earn trust from other states as well as members of the public, which could 
be used as a political currency for claiming the legitimacy of their use of force. These 
military resources and political currency are often necessary for the continuation of the 
ongoing conflict and the preparation for possible future ones, as well as for effective 
post-war reconstruction and sustainable peace.  
Some commentators might, however, argue against this argument for the second 
interpretation of the scope of utility of civilian protection – utility at the global level. 
There is almost always a segment of society which does not observe rules. In this 
current discussion, those perpetrators may be called ‘barbarians’ in Hume’s terms. As I 
have already mentioned, in Hume’s original point of view on the laws of war, the rules 
are supposed to collapse if one party to the conflict does not observe them because they 
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 ‘no longer serve to any purpose’.255 However, the central question we must consider is 
whether or not civilian protection becomes useless or disadvantageous to all of us in any 
sense once it is breached by one side. 
 In order to understand the problem of barbarians who do not observe the rules 
of war, Hume’s argument of the ‘sensible knave’ seems to be helpful. Suppose that a 
party to the conflict who violates the code of civilian protection is a ‘sensible knave’, 
who in Hume’s words is someone who ‘cheat[s] with moderation and secrecy’ for his 
own gains.256 In this framework, despite the fact that there are some such malefactors, 
people in general still follow the rule of justice, because reciprocal self-interest is not 
the only reason that people follow the rules of justice. There are other moral motivations 
such as sympathy for society, concerns about reputation, personal commitment, the 
sense of moral approval of acting justly and disapproval of acting unjustly. If these 
moral motivational forces influence political/military leaders to act justly, then civilian 
protection can be complied with as part of just conduct in war, despite the fact that the 
enemy violates the rule of civilian protection. 
The most important issue regarding the second interpretation of the scope of 
utility – utility at the global level – is whether or not the warring parties subscribe to an 
                                                  
255 Hume, Enquiries, p. 187. 
256 Hume, Enquiries, pp. 283–4. 
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 idea and ideal of the long-range utility of civilian protection at a global level. This 
question becomes most acute if and when significant losses and damage are inflicted 
upon warring parties in the ongoing armed conflict, despite the fact that they commit 
themselves to civilian protection in the prospect of expected long-range utility at the 
global level. Furthermore, the question is seriously challenged if and when their 
enemies benefit from their non-compliance with civilian protection. The worst case 
scenario in this line of argument is that committing to civilian protection could lead to 
the annihilation of a state/nation. As a safety valve against such a national disaster, 
Brandt argues that ‘it is conceivable that ideal rules of war would include one rule to the 
effect that anything is allowable, if necessary to prevent absolute catastrophe’; in other 
words, ‘if basic values of society are threatened nations are possibly released from all 
restrictions’.257 If the abandonment of civilian protection is considered to be part of ‘all 
restrictions’, then Brandt’s argument is a serious challenge to the interpretation of the 
utility of civilian protection at the global level, in that a government can be allowed to 
resort to any means to survive, and if so determined, civilian protection could be seen as 
a peripheral issue. 
In order to defend my argument for the utility of civilian protection at the global 
                                                  
257 Brandt, ‘Utilitarianism and the Rule of War’, p. 147n3. 
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 level, I will bring to the discussion six critical responses to Brandt’s challenge. The first 
response is to what Brandt calls the ‘basic values of society’: we have to ask ourselves 
whether or not civilian protection can be considered to be one of these values. If the 
protection of civilians is considered to be one such value, then we should not abandon 
civilian protection. I have posited reasons in my discussion so far that civilian 
protection can be considered to be one of these basic values which it is in everyone’s 
interest universally to endorse: civilian protection is beneficial to the vast majority of 
stakeholders, both individual and collective, and it is our last stand for the sake of our 
civilisation and its moral values against the reversion to barbarism. 
The second response is concerned with how probable it is that we will be faced 
with national annihilation. In other words, we have to check the actual situation 
carefully by considering whether or not the threat of national annihilation is so serious 
and imminent that civilian protection has to be abandoned. There have been few wars 
since the Second World War which have escalated to the degree that a civilisation or 
basic values of community are at peril, whereas there have been a number of wars that 
have led to the overthrow of a regime/government.258 
The third response considers the moral values of the government under whose 
                                                  
258 One notable exception might be the genocide in Rwanda, which seems to have broken the basic 
values of society, if not civilisation as a whole. 
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 jurisdiction we live. This issue can be rephrased as the question of whether or not it is 
worth keeping allegiance to a government that abandons its responsibility to protect 
civilians. This is the point that Michael Donelan considers the raison d’être of a state. 
Donelan argues: ‘A state that defends itself by intentionally killing the innocent is 
defending nothing’.259 The key issue here is to what extent we have a moral obligation 
to keep political allegiance to a government that is not responsible for the protection of 
its citizens and residents. Although the answer may depend on individuals and 
circumstances, the question at issue here appears to be a matter of the moral values of 
the government.  
 The fourth response states that international intervention to stop the violations 
of human rights has been customarily practised, most notably since the 1990s. Adam 
Roberts argues:  
 
In crises and conflicts since the end of the Cold War considerations 
specifically identified as “humanitarian” have been repeatedly 
designated by States and international bodies as ground for 
threatening, and embarking on, international military action. Such 
considerations have been given greater prominence in international 
decision-making than in previous eras.260 
                                                  
259 Michael Donelan, Elements of International Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 
168–9. 
260 Adam Roberts, ‘Humanitarian Issues and Agencies as triggers for International Military Action’, 
International Review of Red Cross 839 (2000), pp. 673–98, at p. 637. 
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Let us suppose that a nation faces the brink of annihilation, despite the fact that its 
government and armed forces comply with civilian protection when in armed conflict, 
while its counterpart does not observe civilian protection. If this were the case, then it is 
arguable that the international community would somehow intervene, if not militarily 
then often more likely economically and/or diplomatically, in order to stop the 
annihilation of the nation at risk as well as the collapse of the fundamental norm in 
armed conflicts. This stance is, for example, explicitly mentioned as a foreign policy in 
The Responsibility to Protect, which reads: 
 
While the state whose people are directly affected has the default 
responsibility to protect, a residual responsibility also lies with the 
broader community of states. This fallback responsibility is activated 
when a particular state is clearly either unwilling or unable to fulfil 
its responsibility to protect or is itself the actual perpetrator of 
crimes or atrocities; or where people living outside a particular state 
are directly threatened by actions taking place there. This 
responsibility also requires that in some circumstances action must 
be taken by the broader community of states to support populations 
that are in jeopardy or under serious threat. 261 
 
This trend seems to confirm that armed humanitarian intervention has been more widely 
                                                  
261 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Report, p. 13. 
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 accepted in contemporary international relations than ever. 
 The fifth response states that agents’ motives for civilian protection are not 
solely based on utility at the global level, but may also be affected by the existence of a 
reciprocity-fuelled motive. To clarify this point, the motive for reciprocal benefits in a 
particular armed conflict may coexist with the prospect and conviction of long-range 
utility at the global level. Indeed, if parties to the conflict have motives to protect 
civilians on the enemy side in order to receive the same benefit on their own side, then 
their motives do not deny the practice of utility at a global level but support the system 
of justice at a global level, because they come to understand that the system is useful to 
support and sustain their interest in reciprocal benefits of civilian protection. In other 
words, the sense and actual result of mutual benefits serve further to reinforce the 
warring parties’ convictions of the utility of civilian protection at the global level. 
The sixth response concerns international non-governmental organisations that 
have been acting as driving forces to disseminate the concept of civilian protection as 
utility at the global level. An example of such a force is the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC), which disseminates the idea of the need for civilian protection as 
part of IHL so that the idea and ideal of civilian protection can be better recognised and 
 - 205 - 
 understood by military professionals as well as civilians.262 The multi-layered activities 
of ICRC on civilian protection can be found operating at different levels. At the field 
level, ICRC acts as a silent witness for civilian protection in many armed conflicts, and 
at the international and diplomatic level, ICRC works as a mediator/facilitator for 
legislating a series of humanitarian laws so that civilians can gain further protection in 
armed conflicts. Furthermore, ICRC also often discreetly urges warring parties to 
comply with civilian protection.263 
In Section 4. 6, I have considered the concept of the utility of civilian protection 
at the global level. I have argued that this interpretation of utility actually contributes to 
civilian protection. I have also critically considered the argument that parties to the 
conflict do not have to protect civilians when they perceive that so doing may lead to a 
catastrophe (i.e. the destruction of the basic values of society and/or national 
annihilation). In order to demonstrate that this argument against the utility of civilian 
protection at the global level cannot be substantiated, and to defend my position, I have 
raised six points that have supported my argument for the utility of civilian protection at 
the global level. 
                                                  
262 ICRC’s stance on dissemination is clearly stated in the Commentary, which reads: ‘dissemination will 
contribute to the promotion of humanitarian ideals and a spirit of peace among nations’. ICRC, 
Commentary, p. 960. 
263 Nicholas O. Berry, War and the Red Cross: The Unspoken Mission (Basingstoke, MacMillan, 1997), 
pp. 68, p. 32. 
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Concluding Remarks for Chapter 4 
In Chapter 4, I have critically examined civilian protection as part of just conduct in 
armed conflict in order to consider what sort of scope of conception may better serve 
civilian protection. Initially, from a Hume-inspired perspective, I have examined justice 
as an artificial virtue in order to conceptualise civilian protection as part of just conduct 
in war. I have argued that there is no moral motivational force in human nature to follow 
or approve the system of justice. This position appears to indicate that there must be 
some motivational force by which we are still convinced of appreciating and following 
justice, and that such a moral motivational force flows from the moral values of justice. 
Secondly, I have considered utility as a moral value regarding civilian protection from a 
Humean perspective. I have argued that the moral value regarding civilian protection as 
just conduct in war can be found in utility. I have also raised the question of the scope of 
the utility of civilian protection, and pointed out that there are at least two different 
answers to the question. Thirdly, I have examined the first interpretation of the scope of 
the utility of civilian protection from a Humean point of view; in this first interpretation, 
I have found that the utility of the laws of war can be justified on the grounds of 
reciprocal benefits between parties to the conflict. I have also revealed that civilian 
 - 207 - 
 protection can be understood along the same line of thought as the laws of war. Fourthly, 
I have critically examined the implications of the first interpretation of the scope of the 
utility of civilian protection; utility between warring parties. I have discussed two key 
points concerning this interpretation of utility in order to consider whether or not the 
interpretation actually contributes to civilian protection. Through the examination of 
these two issues, I have found that civilian protection would eventually fail if the utility 
of civilian protection were solely assumed in a reciprocity-based conception of utility 
between warring parties. Fifthly, I have considered whether or not the 
non-reciprocity-driven conception of utility serves the protection of civilians. During 
the course of this discussion I have found that one party to the conflict does not always 
abandon civilian protection even in a situation where the other ceases to observe it, 
contrary to the reciprocity-based assumption of utility. I have also discovered that 
parties to a conflict sometimes find it beneficial unilaterally to observe the rules of war, 
again contrary to the reciprocity-based assumption of utility. These two findings seem to 
indicate that the first interpretation of the utility of civilian protection – 
reciprocity-based utility between warring parties – does not necessarily contribute to 
civilian protection. Finally, I have considered the conception of the utility of civilian 
protection at the global level. I have argued that this interpretation of utility actually 
 - 208 - 
 contributes to civilian protection. I have also critically considered the argument of 
whether or not parties to the conflict do not have to protect civilians when they perceive 
that so doing may lead to a catastrophe (i.e. the destruction of the basic values of society 
and/or national annihilation). In order to demonstrate that this argument against the 
utility of civilian protection at the global level cannot be substantiated and to defend my 
position, I have raised six points that support my argument for the utility of civilian 
protection at the global level. 
In Chapter 4, having made a case for the utility of civilian protection at the 
global level, the question to be considered is: how can civilian protection be undertaken 
in practice? In order to explore this question, in Chapter 5, I will examine the role of the 
government and the tasks of the military in ensuring civilian protection in order to 
consider how civilian protection can be ensured by both bodies. I will therefore consider 
civilian protection from the perspective of the typical professional ethics of military 
personnel in Western industrial democracies, primarily by drawing examples from the 
UK Armed Forces and its coalition partner, the US Armed forces. 
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 CHAPTER 5: CIVILIAN PROTECTION AND PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 
 
Introduction 
Having argued in Chapter 4 that to recognise and understand civilian protection as 
utility at the global level is a promising way to ensure the better protection of civilians, 
in Chapter 5 I will examine one example of the professional ethics of armed forces in 
Western industrial democracies with regard to civilian protection, in order to consider 
one possible way that civilians could be better protected within this framework. This is 
because although I defend my position that civilian protection should be understood, 
recognised and exercised as utility at the global level by using the macro level approach 
of Hume’s conception of justice in Chapter 4, I have not yet discussed concrete ideas or 
specific prescriptions to implement civilian protection. Indeed, this is the reason that I 
primarily draw examples from the UK and US Armed Forces’ professional ethics when 
considering ways to improve civilian protection; these are forces which could act as 
agents who commit to and promote civilian protection as utility at the global level, not 
only because they have been deployed in many different conflict areas, but also because 
they are supposed to act as guardians of the code of civilian protection.  
In order to conduct my research on civilian protection from the viewpoint of 
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 military ethics, I will draw on theoretical and empirical discussions and materials, 
primarily from the examples of the UK Armed Forces and its coalition partner, the US 
Armed Forces, which are usually considered to be two of the most modern militaries in 
contemporary international relations, and are thus expected to commit to and promote 
the code of civilian protection. Furthermore, in order to construct my argument for the 
further promotion of civilian protection at the global level, I will primarily focus on the 
professional ethics of the UK and US Armed Forces as examples, among many, of 
agents who commit to and promote civilian protection as utility at the global level. 
Chapter 5 is divided into three sections. Initially, in order to consider why 
civilians are not always protected, I will explore four main reasons that combatants fail 
to protect civilians from a moral-psychological point of view. Secondly, I will proceed 
to examine the professional ethics of the UK and US Armed Forces with regard to 
civilian protection, in order to consider whether or not it is possible to incorporate 
civilian protection into a professional code of military ethics. Finally, in order to explore 
possible ways that civilian protection could be promoted within the framework of 
military ethics, I will consider the role of the government and the tasks of the military 
when incorporating civilian protection as part of a professional code of military ethics. 
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 5. 1. Four Reasons that Civilians are not Always Protected in War 
In Section 5. 1, in order to consider why civilians are not always protected by 
combatants in armed conflict, I will examine the main reasons that combatants often fail 
to protect civilians from a moral-psychological point of view. These reasons can be 
summarised under four headings, which are: lack of respect, incompatible emotional 
responses, the consequence-oriented military mindset, and the psychological effects and 
impacts of combat. 
The first of the four main reasons that civilian protection has often failed is due 
to the combatants’ lack of respect for civilians, because a lack of respect for other 
people often creates a mindset that has the potential to commit atrocities. In Glover’s 
words: ‘Atrocities are easier to commit if respect for the victims can be neutralized’.264 
If respect for civilians is not recognised, or at least not seriously considered, by 
members of the armed forces, then they are likely to be more disposed to commit 
atrocities upon civilians. 
It might be arguable, therefore, that the respect of soldiers for civilians not only 
needs to be considered seriously, but also to be recognised as part of the professional 
code of military ethics by the armed forces. Take the British Army as an example. In an 
                                                  
264 Glover, Humanity, pp. 35–6. 
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 official statement by the British Army on military ethics and professional codes of 
conduct, soldiers’ respect for civilians is enshrined in one of its ‘Core Values’: ‘Respect 
for Others’.265 This ‘Core Value’ is emphasised in the Military Covenant, which states 
that respect for others ‘must remain a hallmark of the Army’. This document, 
Soldiering: The Military Covenant, reads: 
 
It [i.e. respect] also extends to the treatment of all human beings, 
especially the victims of conflict, the dead, the wounded, prisoners 
and refugees. The responsibility of bearing arms and using lethal 
force makes it vital that all soldiers act properly under the law and 
maintain the highest standards of decency and a sense of justice at 
all times, and to all people, even in the most difficult of conditions.266 
 
This statement implies that the protection of civilians is recognised as part of the 
professional code of military ethics among military professionals in the UK. 
Even granted that civilian protection has been recognised as part of the 
professional code of military ethics, however, there is still a question as to how this 
respect for civilians is exhibited and practised by combatants at the operational level. 
One puzzling question about the practical implementation of this idea can be found in 
                                                  
265 UK Army, The Values and Standards if the British Army: Commanders’ Edition, (Army Code No 
63812, D/DPS(A)/3/290/PS2(A), 2000), p. 11. 
266 UK Army, Soldiering: The Military Covenant (Army Doctrine Publication Vol. 5: GD&D/18/34/71 
Army Code No. 71642, February 2000), obtained through the Army website; 
http://www.army.mod.uk/servingsoldier/usefulinfo/valuesgeneral/adp5milcov/ss_hrpers_values_adp_5_0
_w.html, accessed on 13/1/2007, ch. 3, para. 12. 
 - 213 - 
 the British Army’s different stance on respect for others as described in the alternative 
material provided for soldiers of different ranks on the subject. Specifically, the clause 
that states that respect extends to ‘all people’ is not found in The Values and Standards 
of the British Army - Soldiers’ Edition, a booklet ‘issued to every soldier’267 in the 
British Army. In this booklet, the nuance of the explanation of ‘Respect for Others’ is 
somewhat different from that in the Military Covenant and in The Values and Standards 
of the British Army – Commanders’ Edition. The Soldiers’ Edition reads: 
 
As a soldier you have the exceptional responsibility of bearing arms, 
and when necessary of using controlled lethal force. In addition, you 
will sometimes have to live and work under extremely difficult 
conditions. In such circumstances, it is particularly important that 
you show the greatest respect, tolerance, and compassion for others 
because comradeship and leadership depend on it.268 
 
This statement seems to imply that the object of soldiers’ respect is assumed to be their 
fellows in the chain of command. Although this text does not necessarily prohibit 
soldiers from having respect for civilians, the omission of the clause outlining the idea 
that respect extends to the victims of conflict could potentially blur the message that 
                                                  
267 UK Army webpage; 
http://www.army.mod.uk/servingsoldier/usefulinfo/values_and_standards/index.htm, accessed on 
13/1/2007. 
268 UK Army, The Values and Standards of the British Army: Soldiers’ Edition, p. 3. 
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 soldiers are expected and required to have respect for civilians. It therefore seems that 
respect for civilians, which may well lead to the protection of civilians, is not 
sufficiently explicitly manifested as part of the professional code of military ethics in 
the British Army among the lower ranks. If this is the case, then there is a concern that 
the idea of respect for civilians might not sufficiently be understood among the rank and 
file. 
The idea of respect for civilians as part of the professional code of ethics might 
further be undermined by a less restrictive interpretation and application of the principle 
of proportionality. The principle of proportionality, which I examined in Chapter 2, 
dictates that military force should be used proportionately to achieve military goals so 
that any unnecessary suffering of non-combatants can be avoided, and so that harm to 
them must be minimised as much as possible. The underlying idea of the less restrictive 
interpretation of the principle is such that a prima facie obligation to avoid unnecessary 
suffering by civilians loses its imperative when the military advantage significantly 
outweighs the cost (damage to civilians). Furthermore, the principle of proportionality is 
not a principle that gives definitive answers for every single decision-making process, 
nor does it function as a clear guideline for the selection of the means and methods of 
the use of force. Rather, at the operational level, the interpretation and scope of 
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 application of the principle are almost always subject to the role and capacity of 
individual combatants on the field.  
The second of the four main reasons that civilian protection fails in armed 
conflict is concerned with emotional responses that are incompatible with respect for 
civilians. Soldiers are likely to be tempted to attack unarmed civilians by non-respectful 
emotional responses, such as hatred, lust for power, and aggressiveness. John Keegan 
argues that arms-bearers often have a desire to subjugate non arms-bearers. In his 
words: ‘The possession of superior force is a perpetual temptation to behave badly… 
The strong kills the weak as if by a rule of human nature and can actually be stimulated 
to kill by the victim’s weakness’.269 Michael Walzer also points out an aspect of 
soldiers’ mentality by arguing that some soldiers can get rid of the psychological 
restraints on committing atrocities and other unlawful acts in war under the influence of 
emotional responses which are in conflict with the idea of respect for others.270 These 
emotional responses may well be considered to be an additional force that further 
prevents soldiers from having respect for civilians and thus more easily tempts them to 
commit atrocities upon civilians. 
                                                  
269 John Keegan, War and Our World: Reith Lecture 1998 (London: Pimlico, 1999), p. 50. 
270 Michael Walzer, ‘World War II: Why Was This War Different?’, in Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nigel 
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 The third main reason that the protection of civilians is not always ensured on 
the battlefield is found in the military mindset that characterises soldiers’ ‘the ends 
justify the means’ mentality. Thomas Nagel argues that the attitude of public office 
holders tends to be consequentialist in that agents are expected and required to provide 
outcome-oriented performances. Nagel further argues: 
 
the impersonal morality of public institutions, and the moral 
specializations that inevitably arise given the complexity of public 
actions, lead naturally to the establishment of many roles whose 
terms of reference are primarily consequentialist.271 
 
The consequentialist-oriented attitude is also found among military personnel who 
execute public policy with military nature. Jacques van Doorn describes the 
transformation process of a soldier’s mentality towards the consequence-oriented way 
of thinking as that of the ‘erosion of his own professional code’. He continues: 
 
the professional military man feels compelled, or permits himself to 
be compelled, to counter this violence with similar measures. His 
wish to succeed leads him to use force against civilians, to torture of 
prisoners, and to deploy organised terror methods…272 
                                                  
271 Thomas Nagel, ‘Ruthlessness in Public Life’, in Stuart Hampshire (ed.), Public and Private Morality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 75–91 at pp. 84, 90. 
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If soldiers were overzealous or reckless in the pursuit of military success, which is 
determined by ‘military effectiveness in terms of fighting power’273 and achieved 
through effective ‘management’ concerning ‘the allocation and control of recourses 
(human, material and financial) to achieve objectives’, 274  then the possibility of 
breaching civilian protection could be high. Thus we may well consider the tendency of 
soldiers to be preoccupied by the consequence-oriented military mindset as another 
main reason that civilian protection cannot always be respected by soldiers. 
The fourth main reason that civilians are killed or harmed in armed conflict is 
related to the psychological conditions of soldiers in combat situations. Thomas Weiss 
and Cindy Collins observe a likelihood of behavioural disorder among combatants who 
are under the pressure of combat for a long period. They argue: 
 
The longer a combatant and others touched by a conflict are exposed 
to horrible images of war and unbearable living conditions, the 
greater the chances of developing combat stress disorder - a 
syndrome that renders its victims unable to maintain 
self-discipline.275 
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275 Thomas G. Weiss and Cindy Collins, Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention (Boulder: Westview 
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 According to Weiss and Collins, combat stress disorder is one of the ‘new factors’ that 
may trigger ‘preventing some combatants from adhering to international norms 
protecting the life and livelihood of non-combatants’. 276  Soldiers’ psychological 
conditions may thus be considered to be an additional imperative that prompts 
violations of civilian protection. 
 
5. 2. Incorporating Civilian Protection into Military Ethics 
Having discussed in Section 5. 1 four main reasons that civilians are not always 
protected by combatants, in Section 5. 2, in order to consider how civilians could be 
better protected, I will explore a potential solution by considering substantially 
incorporating civilian protection into the professional code of military ethics. Section 5. 
2 is divided into three parts. Initially, I will examine the responsibility of soldiers as 
arms-bearers and the current trend of military missions in order to clarify the reason that 
the military needs to include civilian protection in its professional code of ethics. 
Secondly, in order to consider how civilian protection can be included into military 
ethics, I will examine two possible vehicles; namely, military education and training, 
which could potentially contribute to this inclusion. Finally, I will examine one possible 
                                                  
276 Weiss and Collins, Humanitarian Challenges, p. 123. 
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 problem that may be caused by the inclusion of civilian protection into a professional 
code of military ethics in order to discover whether or not the potential problem is in 
fact plausible. 
 
5. 2. 1. Reason to Include Civilian Protection in Military Ethics 
In Section 5. 2. 1, I will examine the responsibility of soldiers as arms-bearers and the 
current trend of military missions in order to discover the reason that the military needs 
to include civilian protection in its professional code of ethics. 
Although it has long been a matter of debate whether or not soldiering is a 
profession, strictly speaking, the officer corps in some national armed forces, including 
the British Army, may be regarded as a professional group.277 Being considered to be a 
profession in some contemporary Western industrial democracies, members of armed 
forces are expected and required to have a professional code of ethics.278 John Keegan 
describes this as a ‘particular ethic, a readiness by the individual to risk his – or her – 
life not simply for any of the traditional values by which warriors fought but for the 
cause of peace itself’.279 Continuing this line of argument, Fotion and Elfstrom argue 
that codes of ethics are useful for the military and its members in that they play a role as 
                                                  
277 Patrick Mileham, ‘Military Ethics’, in Mileham (ed.), War and Morality, pp. 157–64, at p. 162. 
278 Cook, The Moral Soldiers, p. 56. 
279 Keegan, War and Our World, p. 59. 
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 ‘practical devices for controlling people’s behavior in recurring situations’. 280  By 
analogy, just as a single act of misconduct by a physician could affect the reputation of 
the medical profession as a whole, a single act of misconduct by an individual soldier 
could not only damage the reputation of the military but also undermine its legitimacy 
and public trust. 
A particular profession is bound by its professional codes of conduct.281 The 
British Army seems no exception to this rule. From the viewpoint of professional ethics, 
however, one of the most salient differences between military professionals and 
members of traditional professional groups such as physicians and lawyers is that the 
soldiers have such privileges as the knowledge, skills, means, right and duty to use 
lethal force against enemy combatants.282 In addition to this difference, it can also be 
counted as a fundamental difference between military professionals and the traditional 
professional groups that the former group routinely deals with matters of life and death 
concerning their fellows as well as their enemies. In fact, soldiers are armed and trained 
to use weapons in order to exercise controlled violence that could be lethal to others. 
This characteristic of the profession of arms is manifested, for example, in the British 
                                                  
280 Fotion and Elfstrom, Military Ethics, p. 75. 
281 See, for example, the handbook of legal guidelines for physicians: British Medical Association, Rights 
and Responsibilities of Doctors (London: BMJ Publishing, 1992).  
282 Obviously, there are also other differences; in terms of the degree of autonomy, for example. 
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 Army’s Military Covenant, which states that soldiers have ‘the legal right and duty to 
fight and if necessary, kill, according to their orders’. According to this Covenant, 
soldiers’ ‘grave responsibilities’ derive from the fact that they are ‘weapon bearer[s]’ 
and ‘must be prepared personally to make the decision to engage an enemy or to place 
themselves in harm’s way’.283 These privileges as professionals in the armed forces, in 
turn, seem to predicate soldiers’ responsibility for civilian protection as part of the 
professional code of military ethics. This further indicates that soldiers have a duty of 
care toward civilians as part their core professional duties. 
Despite the fact that soldiers are expected and required to exercise 
responsibilities and obligations as arms-bearers to protect civilians from the perspective 
of military ethics, some Western industrial democracies’ armed forces have often failed 
to regarded civilian protection as part of the professional code of ethics in the history of 
warfare. For more than a hundred years until the early twentieth century, civilian 
protection used to be part of the professional code of military ethics, according to Best, 
mainly because the distance between soldiers and civilians was generally wide and their 
differences were distinct. In his own words: 
 
The ‘regular’ armies for whom and indeed, until our contemporary 
                                                  
283 UK Army, Soldiering, ch. 1, para. 1. 
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 epoch, by whose representatives exclusively the law of war was made, 
were conscious of the distinction between themselves and civilian 
populations and sought to maintain it; their professional ethic taught 
them to spare civilians, they liked their appearance and behaviour to 
differ as much as possible from that of civilians, and they preferred to 
get their fighting done, though not necessarily their campaigning, in 
places where there were no civilians to get in their way.284 
 
Best’s comments imply that some of today’s combatants do not subscribe to civilian 
protection as part of the professional code of military ethics, unlike their predecessors 
who apparently used to do so, because the distance between combatants and civilians 
has become smaller than ever in the battlefield. This tendency could be explained by the 
fact that the number and proportion of non-members of national armed forces involved 
in warfare – such as guerrillas, members of terror organisations and private military 
contractors – has been growing, and their roles and activities have expanded in many 
contemporary armed conflicts. These irregular combatants do not always consider 
civilian protection to be ethical conduct because the harming of civilians has often 
become a military objective in conflicts. Furthermore, in many contemporary intrastate 
armed conflicts, the parties to the conflict, that may consist of members of armed forces 
as well as irregulars, actually target civilians.285 
In the contemporary milieu of global security, however, civilian protection has 
                                                  
284 Best, War and Law Since 1945, p. 335. 
285 Weiss and Collins, Humanitarian Challenges, p. 34. 
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 gained momentum towards being considered to be part of the professional code of 
military ethics because it has increasingly been one of the mission objectives of 
multilateral, UN-led or -authorised humanitarian military operations. 286  In these 
humanitarian operations, military personnel are required to recognise, understand and 
exercise civilian protection as an operational principle in order that they can accomplish 
their mission objectives. In the current strategic climate, members of armed forces 
backed by the political will and military capability for expeditionary military operations 
are required not only to prepare for fighting a full-scale war and conducting major 
combat operations, but also to prepare for ever-growing, post-Cold War era military and 
non-military humanitarian operations, such as relief supply delivery, policing, 
peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and the protection of the civilian population.287 In 
these humanitarian operations undertaken by third-party military forces or intervening 
expeditionary forces, civilian protection is frequently emphasised as one of the mission 
objectives and sometimes practised as part of a de facto professional code of ethics. 
In Section 5. 2. 1, I have examined soldiers’ responsibility as arms bearers and 
the current trend of military missions as two reasons that justify incorporating civilian 
protection as part of the professional code of military ethics of Western industrial 
                                                  
286 Weiss and Collins, Humanitarian Challenges, p. 33. 
287 Ibid., p. 123. 
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 democracies’ armed forces. Through the discussion I have argued that the bearing of 
arms necessitates soldiers’ responsibility for the protection of civilians, although 
combatants do not always exercise this responsibility for civilian protection. I have also 
found that it is advantageous for the military as well as civilians to incorporate civilian 
protection into the professional code of military ethics because civilian protection has 
increasingly been considered to be a mission objective and soldiers have been required 
to comply in many military operations with humanitarian purposes. Having concluded 
that it is advantageous and indeed necessary for the armed forces to incorporate civilian 
protection as part of their professional code of ethics, in Section 5. 2. 2 I will consider 
how this could be achieved. 
 
5. 2. 2. Military Education and Training 
Having considered in Section 5. 2. 1 the reasons for incorporating civilian protection 
into the professional code of military ethics, in Section 5. 2. 2, in order to consider how 
this could be done, I will examine two possible vehicles that could contribute; namely, 
military education and training. 
If it is advantageous to the military to incorporate civilian protection into its 
professional code of ethics, as I have argued in Section 5. 2. 1, then the vehicles to 
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 achieve this objective can be found in the education and training provided for military 
personnel. Thus, through military education and training, civilian protection could be 
recognised and understood as part of just conduct in armed conflict, which the military 
is expected and required to comply with and enforce. In this sense, military education 
and training may be expected to function as leverage to avoid or minimise the mental 
and physical breakdown of soldiers even in the most demanding situations and to enable 
them to uphold the values and standards of the armed forces. 
Education for military personnel is potentially a promising way to incorporate 
civilian protection into the professional code of military ethics, because it is through 
education that military personnel can learn to recognise and understand the 
requirements of civilian protection in the context of professional ethics. Fotion and 
Elfstrom argue that the most important part of education in the military is to make its 
members understand and acquire this code of ethics.288 The need for and importance of 
education among military professionals are also endorsed by George Lee Butler, who 
points out that the failure of soldiers’ integrity occurs ‘because they lack education and a 
personal code’ and ‘because they fail to keep their minds on what education and moral 
code require’.289 To assure civilian protection, the armed forces therefore need to make 
                                                  
288 Fotion and Elfstrom, Military Ethics, p. 66.  
289 George Lee Butler, ‘Some Personal Reflections on Integrity’, in Ficarrotta (ed.), The Leader's 
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 their members understand and adhere to civilian protection as part of the professional 
code of ethics which they are expected and required to implement. 
Military education is provided at two different levels. One is at the level of 
career officer corps and the other is at the level of non-commissioned officers and 
soldiers. Education in the military, according to Fotion and Elfstrom, starts with drills of 
military codes of ethics, which represent intuitive moral thinking, especially among the 
lower military echelons, and then proceeds to supplementary exercises of critical 
thinking, especially among the upper military echelons, which is aimed at helping to 
‘fill whatever the moral gaps are left open by the codes’.290 In the case of officer corps 
education in the British Army, for example, Mileham argues that professional education 
as a career officer is as ‘lengthy and rigorous’ as that in the traditional professions such 
as medicine and law, pointing to the Advanced Command and Staff Course (ACSC), 
which is considered to be the ‘full professional qualification’ for a member of the 
profession of the management of violence.291 Civilian protection is incorporated into the 
officer education programme in ACSC for senior officers (for Majors and Lt. Cols), who 
are about to take up staff appointments and have ‘the potential for Col and above’.292 
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 Military education is also aimed at ordinary soldiers. Education for soldiers is 
particula
Being less trained in the military traditions than the professionals, 
and less educated generally than their leaders, they will have more of 
 
 this is the case, then it seems correct to assume that the armed forces need to educate 
suring that military personnel understand that 
civilian 
rly important because they are generally more disposed than career officers to 
deviate from ethically and legally acceptable behaviour in combat, which can be of 
significant concern, since they exercise lethal force in the battlefields. As Fotion and 
Elfstrom argue: 
 
a tendency either not to know what to do when faced with an ethical 
problem or to do the wrong thing intuitively.293 
If
their members so that they can recognise, understand and exercise civilian protection as 
part of their professional code of ethics. 
If education holds the key to en
protection should be part of their professional code of ethics, then the next 
question to be addressed is whether or not such education may effectively be undertaken 
through military training. On the one hand, there are some commentators who argue that 
education about civilian protection should not be included as part of military training. 
                                                  
293 Fotion and Elfstrom, Military Ethics, p. 73. 
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 Richard Holmes, for example, argues that the instructions concerning restraint towards 
civilians in combat given to the soldiers are ‘both confusing and impracticable’. He 
characterises the main function of military training as a process to remove moral 
restraint on killing so that soldiers do not hesitate to kill the enemy on the battle field. In 
his words: ‘The legitimate need to de-fuse deep-seated cultural and psychological 
taboos against killing is an inseparable part of military training’. He also argues that the 
‘almost obligatory dehumanisation of the enemy’ is involved in the process to remove 
taboos against killing. For these reasons, Holmes might be correct to argue that ‘to train 
soldiers in the exercise of deliberate restraint’ in the use of force is incompatible with 
the need ‘to imbue them with combative zeal’.294 On the other hand, however, it is not 
necessarily impossible, although it might be a long process, to train military personnel 
to recognise, understand and exercise civilian protection as part of their professional 
code of ethics. This is because the possibility of military training working as a vehicle to 
incorporate civilian protection into the professional code of ethics depends on the 
content of this training. If civilian protection was included in the content of their 
training, soldiers would be required to recognise, understand and exercise it as part of 
their professional code of ethics. 
                                                  
294 Richard Holmes, Firing Line (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985) p. 366, 367. 
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 When military personnel are educated and trained to recognise, understand and 
exercise
omising ways to make military personnel recognise, 
understa
                                                 
 civilian protection as part of their professional code of ethics, one question to 
be addressed is what level of education is needed to achieve the desired outcome. Fotion 
and Elfstrom answer that the codes ‘would have to be so ingrained into the consciences 
of military personnel as to be unforgettable’ or ‘into their general memory with the 
added thought that violations would be met by sanctions from those above them in rank’. 
Minimum standards of the codes in the military are, according to Fotion and Elfstrom, 
such that they ‘help military avoid committing gross moral errors such as those at My 
Lai in Vietnam’.295 In the same vein, Sydney Axinn also argues that the laws and 
customs of armed conflict need to be thoroughly thought out to ensure that soldiers 
cannot commit war crimes.296 
One of the most pr
nd and exercise civilian protection – not only as part of their professional code 
of ethics, but also as operational guideline in combat situations – is education and 
training of rules of engagement (ROE). In the US Department of Defense’s Dictionary 
of Military and Associated Terms, the ROE are defined as ‘directives issued by 
competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under 
 
295 Fotion and Elfstrom, Military Ethics, p. 73. 
296 Axinn, A Moral Military, p. 169. 
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 which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other 
forces encountered’.297 In a similar way, Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff define the 
ROE as ‘the specific instructions issued by armed forces regarding the conduct of 
particular military operations’, arguing that the ROE ‘can be among the closest links 
between the laws of war and belligerent armed forces in the field’.298 
The ROE provide military personnel with a standard of how force should and 
should n
gagement are meant to be brief directives which inter alia 
mphasize critical aspects of the laws of war relevant to a specific 
                                                 
ot be used. As Roberts and Guelff argue, the ROE ‘contain evidence of what 
states consider to be basic rules of lawful conduct’.299 However, the ROE are not fixed 
as a static set of rules or independent of policy and missions. Indeed, the specific rules 
are determined by reference to the nature, mode and mission objectives of military 
operations as well as military policy and national and international political situations. 
Roberts and Guelff explain the functions of the ROE: 
 
Rules of en
e
mission rather than being a general restatement of the law. They 
also reflect operational concerns (e.g. where, for operational reasons, 
commanders do not wish to destroy roads, bridges, railway lines, 
communication centres, and other potential targets and wish to 
 
297 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,  
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/r/6783.html, accessed on 3/12/2010. 
298 Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff (eds.), Documents on the Laws of War 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). P. 561. 
299 Ibid., p. 14 
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 ensure that subordinates are aware of this), international concerns 
(e.g. to limit the use of certain weapons or targeting certain areas in 
view of international public opinion and diplomatic pressure), and 
domestic policy and political concerns (e.g. to attempt to prevent 
casualties due to ‘friendly fire’).300  
 
lthough Roberts and Guelff point out that the ROE are often not made publicly 
 B. Avoid harming civilians unless necessary to save US lives. 
Do not fire into civilian populated areas or buildings which are not 
                                                 
A
available, some are publicly available. Given this situation, let us examine the US 
Army’s Rules of Engagement for Operation Desert Storm in the 1991 Gulf War as an 
example. My justification for this is twofold: the ROE are categorised as classified 
documents by the British Army and I cannot therefore gain access to the British Army’s 
ROE publicly; while the US Army’s ROE for Operation Desert Storm are publicly 
available and ‘prepared by an international organization such as the UN or NATO’, 
according to Roberts and Guelff.301 Below are the relevant points concerning the 
protection of civilians in the Pocket Card of the US ROE for Operations Desert Storm: 
 
defended or being used for military purposes. 
 G. Avoid harming civilian property unless necessary to save 
US lives… 
 H. Treat all civilians and their property with respect and 
dignity… 
 
300 Roberts and Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War, p. 561. 
301 Ibid., p. 14. 
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 REMEMBER 
 1. FIGHT ONLY COMBATANTS. 
CK ONLY MILITARY TARGETS. 
ND OBJECTS. 
 YOUR MISSION 
 
 the Pocket Card, the protection of civilians is explicitly stated, although the 
flect the principle of civilian protection, some 
comment
                                                 
 2. ATTA
 3. SPARE CIVILIAN PERSONS A
 4. RESTRICT DESTRUCTION TO WHAT
REQUIRES.302  
In
instructions are far from detailed. 
Although the ROE re
ators argue against further reinforcement of civilian protection. Eric Pattison 
argues ‘in cases of military humanitarian intervention that onerous rules of engagement 
so restrain peacekeepers as to actually incite the belligerents to greater bloodshed’ and 
then proposes to introduce ‘robust rules of engagement’.303 Thomas Smith also argues 
that the ROE are expected to be flexible, balancing military demands and civilian 
risks.304 In this line of thought, the ROE seem to be considered to be a simple version of 
the jus in bello framework, in which the general prohibition on harming civilians is 
codified in the principle of distinction and the exception is in the principle of 
 
302 Reprinted in Roberts and Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War, pp. 562–3. 
303 Eric Pattison, Just War Thinking: Morality and Pragmatism in the Struggle against Contemporary 
Threats (Lexington Books: Lanham, MD2007), pp. 28, 114. 
304 Thomas W. Smith, ‘Protecting Civilians…or Soldiers? Humanitarian Law and the Economy of Risk in 
Iraq’. International Studies Perspectives 9 (2008):pp. 144–164 at p. 148. 
 
 - 233 - 
 proportionality. Hence, even if relatively high standards of care could be maintained, 
civilian casualties cannot be eliminated, and harm suffered in attacks meeting the 
standards cannot be addressed under the ROE scheme. 
Against these pessimistic opinions about the protection of civilians, I can argue 
that if ci
ional code of 
ethics a
vilian protection is considered to be the mission objective of military operations 
as well as part of professional ethics of military personnel, then those arguments cannot 
be considered to be persuasive as they stand. Indeed, if members of the armed forces 
subscribe to this idea, then the idea of civilian protection is firmly sustained. If this is 
the case, then military personnel can provide protection for civilians at a maximum 
level in the operational theatre, and civilians can hugely benefit from this. 
In summary, typical Western industrial democracies have a profess
nd their members are expected and required to comply with it. Once the 
recognition of a need for civilian protection is acquired through military education and 
training, it can be promoted and reinforced by virtue of acting justly in accordance with 
military professionalism. Contrary to this, violations of civilian protection may be 
considered to be deviations from the professional code, and therefore not only 
considered to be blameworthy, but also subject to punishment, which as a measure of 
deterrence could contribute to preventing or lessening the degree or scale of misconduct. 
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 For this reason, if military professionals acquire a recognition of the need for civilian 
protection as part of their military professionalism, then the degree, scale, and frequency 
of harming civilians are more likely to be minimised, if not completely eliminated. The 
upshot of the incorporation of civilian protection into the professional code of military 
ethics is that an act of civilian harm would thereby be subject to scrutiny, checks and 
balances by reference to this professionalism. If this process of education succeeds, then 
civilian protection would eventually be incorporated into the professional ethos of the 
military. Indeed, the ROE would play an important role further to generate this process. 
In Section 5. 2. 2, I have considered military training and education as two 
possible vehicles for incorporating civilian protection into military ethics. I have argued 
that military training and education could enable members of the armed forces to 
recognise, understand and exercise civilian protection as part of their professional code 
of ethics. I have also argued that education and training are imperative because once 
civilian protection is incorporated in military ethics, it can be seen as a virtuous act to be 
promoted and reinforced as an aspect of professionalism. I have also argued for the 
promising role of the ROE. In Section 5. 2. 3, I will examine one possible problem 
caused by the incorporation of civilian protection into military education and training. 
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 5. 2. 3. One Possible Problem with Incorporation 
rofessional code of military ethics, 
we seem to be playing by rules but the other side does 
not…Sometimes this happens, as in Somalia, because the other side 
 
 such a situation, the question that needs to be answered is whether or not the military 
                                                 
If civilian protection were to be incorporated into a p
a problem might arise; namely, what soldiers who subscribe to civilian protection as part 
of military ethics should do when faced with enemy combatants who do not subscribe to 
it. Ignatieff points out that in many contemporary armed conflicts, the intervening forces 
(implying those of the US, the UK and other NATO members) fought following the 
rules of armed conflict, whereas local armed forces and groups did not necessarily 
respect the rules and customs of war: 
 
consists of the tribesmen, ultimate paramilitaries, and of non-regular 
units, teenage thugs, kids, bandits - the Mogadishu scenario. 
Sometimes - and this is where ethical decisions get tough - the other 
side knows that we play by the Geneva Convention rules and exploits 
the fact that we do…They put their tanks and command posts near 
the civilians. This happened in Kosovo; the Serbs were exploiting our 
observance of the Geneva Convention rules.305 
In
should comply with civilian protection despite the fact that the enemy does not. 
 
305 Michael Ignatieff, ‘Handcuffing the military? Military judgment, rules of engagement and public 
scrutiny’, in Patrick Mileham and Lee Willett (eds.), Military Ethics for the Expediency Era (London: 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001), pp. 25–32 at p. 31. 
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 The answer is that the cycle of violations of civilian protection might be less 
likely to
mined civilian protection from the perspective of 
professio
                                                 
 occur if civilian protection becomes an aspect of military professionalism, 
because military ethics require military personnel to keep high moral standards even in 
the most difficult of situations. This idea is, for example, confirmed as a normative 
imperative – the way it ought to be – in the Military Covenant of the British Army, 
which states that military success ‘depends on moral strength – in war moral dominance 
over an enemy – not just to overcome the adversary, but to establish the conditions for 
the lasting peace’.306 This normative imperative means that soldiers ought to comply 
with the laws and customs of armed conflict even when enemy forces do not. Once it 
becomes a normative imperative, through the military education and training described 
in Section 5. 2. 2, civilian protection is less likely to be abandoned in war, even against 
an enemy who does not respect it.  
In Section 5. 2, I have exa
nal military ethics in order to consider how civilian protection could be assured 
by the military. Initially, I have argued that military professionals need to recognise and 
understand the value of civilian protection as part of the professional code of military 
ethics which they are expected and required to comply with and enforce. Secondly, in 
 
306 UK Army, Soldiering.ch. 1, para. 8. 
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 order to examine a way to incorporate civilian protection into a code of military ethics, I 
have examined military education and training as two possible vehicles. I have found 
that military education and training could work effectively as vehicles to enable military 
personnel to recognise, understand and exercise civilian protection as part of their 
professional code of ethics. Finally, I have considered the potential dilemma that could 
occur when armed forces that subscribe to civilian protection as part of their 
professional code of ethics are faced with an enemy which does not so subscribe. I have 
argued that the enemy’s violation of civilian protection should not make the military 
abandon civilian protection if and when it is incorporated into their code of military 
ethics. In Section 5. 3, I will examine the role of the government and tasks of the 
military in ensuring civilian protection. 
 
5. 3. Role of the Government, Tasks of the Military for Assuring Civilian 
idered, in Section 5. 2, that military training and education could help the 
Protection 
Having cons
military incorporate civilian protection into a professional code of military ethics, in 
Section 5. 3, I will examine the role of the government in Western industrial 
democracies and the tasks of their armed forces in order to consider how civilian 
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 protection could be better assured in future armed conflicts in which those armed forces 
are deployed. 
 
5. 3. 1. Role of the Government 
sider how civilian protection could be assured, I will 
The first function of the government in Western industrial democracies 
regardin
In Section 5. 3. 1, in order to con
examine the role of the government in Western industrial democracies when addressing 
civilian protection. This is an important point to consider because governments of 
Western industrial democracies represent the ultimate authorities responsible for any 
violations of the laws and customs of war committed by members of their military 
forces. 
g civilian protection must be to make civilian protection a political objective in 
military operations. In many of the states commonly referred to as Western, developed, 
and democratic, it is assumed that the military is subordinate to the government, and 
hence the role of the military is to deliver military means for political ends. This 
command structure predicates the authority of the government over the military. Indeed, 
it is the government that makes military policy and commissions the military to execute 
it. If this is the case, the primary function of the government should be to set civilian 
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 protection as one of the political-military objectives in military operations which it 
commissions so that civilian protection can be assured at operational as well as policy 
levels. 
The second function of the government in Western industrial democracies 
regardin
The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time 
of armed conflict, to disseminate the [Geneva] Conventions and this 
 
he second role of the government in Western industrial democracies is thus to create 
                                                 
g civilian protection must be to help the military recognise, understand and 
exercise civilian protection within their code of professional ethics. Part of the reason 
that governments should be expected and required to take this initiative is that they are 
ultimately responsible for the protection of civilians. This responsibility predicates an 
obligation to ensure that the military understands and exercises civilian protection as 
part of its code of professional ethics. State responsibility to ensure that the military 
understands civilian protection is confirmed in IHL. Paragraph 1, Article 83 of the 
Additional Protocol I to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 reads: 
 
Protocol as widely as possible in their respective countries and, in 
particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of 
military instruction…307 
T
 
307 AP(I), Art. 83, para. 1. 
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 and employ political initiatives for the purpose of ensuring that the military understands 
and exercises civilian protection through military education and training. 
In Section 5. 3. 1, I have considered two functions of the government in 
Western
. 3. 2. Tasks of the Military 
f the government in Western industrial democracies in 
 industrial democracies in assuring civilian protection. I have proposed that the 
first function of the government is to set civilian protection as one of the political 
objectives in military operations which it commissions so that civilian protection can be 
assured at operational as well as policy levels. I have also proposed that the second 
function of the government is to create and employ political initiatives for the purpose 
of ensuring that the military understands and exercises civilian protection through 
military education and training. In Section 5. 3. 2, I will examine the tasks undertaken 
by the armed forces in Western industrial democracies. 
 
5
Having considered the role o
assuring civilian protection in Section 5. 3. 1, in Section 5. 3. 2, I will examine the tasks 
of the armed forces in those countries for assuring civilian protection, in order to 
consider how civilians could be better protected. The military is responsible for two 
tasks regarding civilian protection: the first is to make its members recognise and 
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 understand the benefits of civilian protection, and the second is to work as a guardian of 
civilian protection when the government imposes military policies that offset the 
protection of civilians against other political/military objectives. 
The first task of the armed forces in Western industrial democracies is to make 
their mem
 protection for the military is 
that blan
                                                 
bers aware of the benefits of civilian protection. There are at least two types 
of benefit for the armed forces which occur as a result of protecting civilians; one is the 
benefit brought by the general observation of a set of war conventions and the other is 
the benefit derived from the prevention of demoralisation. 
The first of the two types of benefit from civilian
ket compliance with civilian protection, together with other rules in IHL, 
entitles the military and its members to the benefits enshrined in IHL. Axinn argues that 
not only civilians but also soldiers in current and future conflicts are beneficiaries of the 
Geneva Conventions in which the protection of hors de combat people as well as of 
civilians is codified.308 If the military understood the benefits of complying with 
civilian protection as part of the conventions of war, then its members would have 
incentives to comply with civilian protection. One of the ways to ensure observance is 
to educate military personnel, as discussed in Section 5. 2. 2. 
 
308 Axinn, A Moral Military, pp. 164–5. 
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 The other benefit which the armed forces may find in the protection of 
civilians 
 those of their 
fellows, 
                                                 
springs from the fact that violations and breaches of civilian protection 
sometimes deteriorate soldiers’ morale. One such example can be found in the case of 
Dennis Conti in the My Lai massacre, who, according to Glover, first tried to evade the 
order to kill civilians and then ‘was in tears and could not go on’; this is a moral 
reaction that Glover calls the ‘breakthrough of conscience or of sympathy’ by which 
Conti avoided obeying a superior order that directly targeted civilians.309 
Morale of soldiers can be lowered by their own acts as well as
which might contradict their idea of military honour and their ideal self-image 
as soldiers, or simply go against their consciences. Demoralisation of soldiers by 
harming civilians seems to be more likely to happen to members of professional armed 
forces than to irregulars and members of militant groups who might be more 
accustomed to deliberate attacks on civilians, as was illustrated by an incident in which 
IDF reservists refused to serve in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the petition 
published in Yedioth, an Israeli daily newspaper, a group of reservists reportedly 
accused the IDF of mistreatment and persecution of Palestinians in the occupied 
territories.310 The reservists claimed that they were willing to accept regular reserve 
 
309 Glover, Humanity, p. 62. 
jectors add to Sharon’s Woes as Approval Ratings Slide’, Guardian 310 Graham Usher, ‘Army Ob
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 duty, but refused to serve in the Occupied Territories, in which the IDF has frequently 
and repeatedly been alleged to oppress the Palestinian population. 
In addition to the first task which I have discussed, the second task of the 
armed f
mocracies is, therefore, to 
shield it
           
orces in Western industrial democracies for civilian protection is to work as 
guardians of civilian protection against political manoeuvres. This task becomes 
important particularly when the mission-setting of military operations at the level of 
political decision becomes incompatible with, or even contradicts, the protection of 
civilians. Even having recognised and understood civilian protection as part of its 
professional code of ethics, the military could still be vulnerable to violations of civilian 
protection when politics interfere with military matters. The armed forces might be 
compromised or compelled to breach civilian protection for a politically-decided 
greater good, the overall consequence, or mission objectives. 
The task of the armed forces in Western industrial de
self from political pressure against civilian protection. Although military policy 
in Western industrial democracies is made and decided in the domain of politics, 
military professionalism cannot single-handedly be modified by politics. The reason for 
this is that professionalism is an expression of the self-realisation of professionals and is 
                                                                                                                                       
(2/2/2002), p. 17; and Phil Reeves, ‘Rebellion grows among Israeli reserve officers’, Independent 
(1/2/2002), p. 17. 
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 an integral part of their identity. If civilian protection is an aspect of military 
professionalism, then the conduct of professionals regarding civilian protection is not 
only monitored by other stakeholders of civilian protection such as ICRC, human rights 
organisations, mass media, other governments, and, above all, civilians, but is also 
subject to self- and peer-regulation. In Kenneth Boyd’s words: ‘The nature of 
professional work means that its potential for mutual encouragement to better practice is 
realised through day to day negotiation between professionals themselves, taking into 
account the interests and reactions of those they serve’. 311  By exerting civilian 
protection as part of their professionalism, the military professionals in the armed forces 
of Western industrial democracies would become more concerned and self-regulating 
regarding civilian protection and would be more cautious of breaching it. 
In Section 5. 3. 2, I have examined the tasks of the armed forces in Western 
industria
                                                 
l democracies for civilian protection in order to clarify what the armed forces 
could and should do to protect civilians better in armed conflict. I have argued that one 
of the two tasks of the armed forces is to make its members aware of the benefits of 
civilian protection, in order to recognise incentives to sustain civilian protection as part 
of the professional code of ethics. I have then argued that the second task of the armed 
 
311 Kenneth M. Boyd (ed.), The Ethics of Resource Allocation in Health Care (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1979), p. 95. 
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 forces is to work as guardians of civilian protection against political manoeuvres by 
exerting military professionalism on civilian protection so that it cannot be violated for 
political reasons. 
 
Concluding Remarks for Chapter 5 
protection from the perspective of military ethics In Chapter 5, I have examined civilian 
in order to consider how civilians could be better protected in this framework. In order 
to construct my argument that the incorporation of civilian protection into professional 
codes of ethics of military personnel would further promote civilian protection and 
hugely benefit armed forces as well as civilians, I have primarily focused on the 
professional ethics of the British Army as an example. In Section 5. 1, I have explored 
the four reasons that combatants fail to protect civilians from a moral-psychological 
point of view. I have found that soldiers’ respect for civilians often lapses in armed 
conflicts. I have also found that the three other reasons that soldiers may potentially 
commit atrocities; namely emotional responses that overwhelm respect for civilians, the 
consequence-oriented military mindset, and physical and psychological combat stress, 
indicate that civilian protection is likely to be marginalised in combat situations. These 
four main reasons for the failure to protect civilians appeared to indicate that some 
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 measures need to be introduced to ensure the better protection of civilians by armed 
forces in combat situations. In Section 5. 2, I have examined the professional ethics of 
the armed forces with regard to civilian protection in order to consider how to 
incorporate civilian protection into a code of military ethics. I have argued that military 
professionals need to recognise and understand the value of civilian protection as part of 
the professional code of military ethics through military education and training. I have 
then argued that military education and training work effectively as vehicles to enable 
military personnel to recognise, understand and exercise civilian protection as part of 
their professional code of ethics. I have also proposed that the enemy’s violation of 
civilian protection should not necessarily make the military abandon civilian protection 
if and when civilian protection is incorporated into military ethics. In Section 5. 3, I 
have considered the role of the government and the tasks of the military for 
incorporating civilian protection as part of the professional code of military ethics. I 
have argued that the role of the government is to set civilian protection as one of the 
political objectives in military operations and to exert political initiatives to lead the 
military to ensure civilian protection through education and training. I have also argued 
that the tasks of the military are to make its members aware of the benefits of civilian 
protection and to work as guardians of civilian protection against political manoeuvres. 
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  Having argued and made the case that civilian protection should be 
incorporated into the professional ethics of military personnel in Chapter 5, in Chapter 6 
I will examine torture as an extreme example of the need for civilian protection, in order 
to defend my position that civilians must be protected and that torture is completely 
against the professional ethics of military personnel.  
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 CHAPTER 6: MORAL JUSTIFIABILITY OF CIVILIAN PROTECTION: 
A CASE AGAINST TORTURE 
 
Introduction 
Having considered the role of the government and tasks of the military for incorporating 
civilian protection as part of the professional ethics of military personnel in Chapter 5, 
in Chapter 6 I will examine the moral unjustifiability of torture and other forms of 
inhuman treatment312 of civilians in armed conflict through meso and micro level 
analysis, in order to demonstrate the moral requirement of civilian protection in an 
extreme situation. More specifically, I will develop and analyse a theory of ‘just torture’ 
by reference to the framework of just war theory, which proposes moral presumptions 
against war, in order that I can critically consider the morality or otherwise of torture, 
even that undertaken for interrogation purposes against civilians. In the chapter, if I 
succeed in demonstrating the moral unjustifiability of torture against any person, I can 
further make a strong case against the torture of civilians, and therefore for the moral  
requirement of civilian protection. Furthermore, this demonstration of the moral 
unjustifiability of torture will prove that such an act is totally against the idea of civilian 
                                                  
312 In this thesis the term torture means broadly defined torture, in which both narrowly defined torture 
and other forms of ill treatment are included, unless otherwise stated. 
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 protection and therefore contrary to the ideal of the professional ethics of military 
personnel. 
Initially, I will open up my discussion on the ethics of torture by briefly 
addressing the ethical concerns surrounding torture brought up by current practice. 
Secondly, in order to recognise this presumption against torture, I will explore the legal 
definitions and regulations of torture. Thirdly, in order to demonstrate the moral 
unjustifiability of torture, I will investigate several ethical aspects of torture. Finally, in 
order to further demonstrate the moral unjustifiability of torture against civilians, I will 
establish a framework of just torture, by reference to which I will argue that torture can 
never be justified in practice. 
 
6. 1. Arguments surrounding the Ethics and Practice of Torture 
Few doubt that torture is wrong. However, we cannot entirely eliminate torture once and 
for all, despite the fact that the vast majority of us believe it to be wrong, because there 
are people who think that torture can occasionally be morally justified. In fact, torture is 
conducted around the world, often by military and security professionals, which is a 
clear deviance from the professional ethics of military personnel in Western countries, at 
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 least.313 One high-profile recent case involved the torture of ‘high value’ terror suspects 
by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). According to the report prepared by the 
ICRC, some of the ill-treatment of prisoners and the methods and means of 
interrogation undertaken in CIA-controlled detention facilities in undisclosed places 
‘constitute torture’, and others ‘constitute cruel, inhumane, degrading treatment’.314 
Furthermore, there is some evidence that not only terror suspects but also innocent 
civilians have been tortured or inhumanely treated by members of the armed forces. 
One such example is the case of Baha Mousa, who died due to ill treatment by members 
of the British Army while in its custody.315 
Jessica Wolfendale points out that commentators who believe that torture can 
sometimes be morally justified give their reason for this justification as one of national 
security.316 Thus, torture sponsored by government agencies which take charge of 
national security cannot be entirely eliminated until and unless all major threats to 
national security, actual or perceived, vanish. Nevertheless, the fact that torture is 
undertaken in the noble cause of national security does not necessarily mean that it can 
                                                  
313 van Doorn, ‘The Military and the Crisis of Legitimacy’, p. 32. 
314 ICRC, ‘ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen “High Value Detainees” in CIA Custody’ (Geneva: 
ICRC, 2007), p. 26. 
315 Quoted in Andrew Johnson, Francis Elliott and Severin Carrell, ‘Iraq Abuse Scandal: Ministry of 
Defence Accused of Buying Silence of Families’ over Civilian Deaths’, Independent on Sunday 
(20/6/2004), p. 13. 
316 Jessica Wolfendale, Torture and Military Profession (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2007), p. 104. 
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 be morally justified. The fact that torture is still conducted at all, despite the fact that the 
vast majority of us share the view that it is wrong, is of major concern. This concern 
gives rise to a vital question: whether it can ever be morally permissible for agencies 
responsible for national security to allow their agents to conduct torture on suspects for 
interrogation in the name of national security. We do not yet seem to have a 
fully-fledged ethical framework to consider the immorality of torture. Given this 
situation, in the following sections, I will consider the moral unjustifiability of torture 
against the innocent in order to demonstrate that civilian protection is our moral 
imperative. 
 
6. 2. Legal Definitions and Regulations of Torture 
Torture is prohibited and regulated by various international legal arrangements 
including international/multinational treaties and declarations. For example, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that ‘No one shall be subjected to torture 
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.317 Similarly, the European 
Convention of Human Rights outlines the prohibition of torture in the following way: 
‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
                                                  
317 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Article 5. 
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 punishment’.318 
The first point to establish is the legal definition of torture. According to the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment: 
 
torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such 
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a 
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by 
or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not 
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental 
to lawful sanctions.319 
 
Furthermore, the Convention elaborates on the prohibition of torture under any 
exceptional circumstances in the following way: ‘No exceptional circumstances 
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any 
other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture’ in Article 2, 
Section 2. This Convention also clearly states that superior order in the public chain of 
                                                  
318 European Convention of Human Rights (1950), Article 3. 
319 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(1984), Article 1, Section 1. 
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 command does not justify the exercise of torture: ‘An order from a superior officer or a 
public authority may not be invoked as a justification of torture’. 
Similarly, in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), 
torture is defined as acts of the ‘intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the 
accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, 
inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions’ (Article 7, Section 2-e). In Article 7, 
Section 1, torture can be considered to constitute a ‘crime against humanity’ when 
‘committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack’; and in Article 8, ‘torture or inhuman 
treatment, including biological experiments’ can be considered to be ‘grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949’, which therefore constitute ‘war crimes’, 
over which ‘the Court shall have jurisdiction…in particular when committed as part of a 
plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes’. 
As seen in this section, torture and other ill treatment are prohibited in various 
different legal texts. However, these legal texts do not explicitly provide sufficient 
reasons for the proscription of torture so that we can fully understand why torture is 
wrong. In the next section, let us consider in detail the reasons against the use of torture.  
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6. 3. Ethical Issues surrounding Torture 
In the previous section, I have examined the legal definitions and regulations of torture, 
and found that it is prohibited in various ways. Nonetheless, there have been many cases 
of torture all over the world, despite our moral conviction that torture is wrong, and that 
we usually consider torture to be morally blameworthy. In Section 6.3, in order to 
demonstrate the moral unjustifiability of torture, I will consider the ethical issues 
surrounding torture within this paradoxical situation. 
Many commentators stand by the claim that torture can never be morally 
justified, and this claim can be vindicated by reference to conventional normative 
ethical theories. Using simplistic versions of these theories, let us briefly demonstrate 
why this is so. Initially, according to Kantian deontology, torture cannot be morally 
justified if an individual’s humanity and dignity are denied through torture and the 
torture victim is used merely as a means for achieving the purpose of torture (regardless 
of what that purpose is). Secondly, considered from the standpoint of Rossian pluralism, 
torture cannot be morally justified if a duty not to torture becomes an absolute 
imperative. Finally, various versions of consequentialism argue against the moral 
justification of torture; for example, from a rule-utilitarian point of view, Michael 
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 Skerker argues that torture cannot be justified.320 
Let us further contemplate the morality of torture: can we say that all kinds of 
torture are equally wrong, since we have established that torture is inherently wrong? In 
order to consider this question, let us focus initially on the purposes of torture. Michael 
Davis defines six categories of torture according to the reasons for its infliction: 
 
1) to obtain a confession (‘judicial torture’) 
2) to obtain information (‘interrogational torture’) 
3) to punish (‘penal torture’) 
4) to intimidate or coerce the sufferer or others to act in certain ways 
(‘terroristic’ or ‘deterrent’ torture). 
5) to destroy opponents without killing them (what we may call 
‘disabling torture’) 
6) to please the torturer or others (‘recreational torture’)321 
 
These reasons are not exclusive, and multiple reasons sometimes co-exist when torture 
is conducted. Although what we are most concerned with in this thesis is interrogational 
torture, in order to demonstrate the immorality of torture conducted for various reasons, 
let us briefly examine each one. 
Initially, regarding categories 5 (disabling torture) and 6 (recreational torture), 
                                                  
320 Michael Skerker, ‘Interrogation Ethics in the Context of Intelligence Collection’, in Jan Goldman 
(ed.), Ethics of Spying: A Reader for the Intelligence Professional (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2006), 
pp. 141–70. 
321 Michael Davis, ‘The Moral Justifiability of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment’, International Journal of Applied Philosophy 19:2 (2005), 161–78. 
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 it is not possible to find any moral rectitude in these types of torture, because causing 
pain and suffering to the victim, or indeed the act of torture itself, is deemed to be its 
purpose – in these cases, we may doubt the moral status of the motives of a torturer. If 
someone finds torture entertaining or has a proclivity for enjoying torture, we may 
consider that they lack morality and humanity or have a defective personality, and are 
thus blameworthy. On the other hand, with regard to disabling torture in particular, what 
if this torture is conducted as a precautionary measure? Suppose someone who has been 
identified as a serious threat to national/international security in the future is being 
tortured; in order to prevent a future disaster, should we incapacitate a potential threat 
through torture? If there is absolutely no doubt that the individual will cause an 
apocalyptic atrocity, perhaps it might be worth considering pre-emptive torture and 
incapacitation. However, the probability that they will become a serious threat must be 
offset by the fact that they are not a threat at the moment and the possibility that they 
will not become a threat. 
Secondly, to take category 4 – terroristic or deterrent torture – if terrorism is 
morally unjustifiable, as many commentators argue, terroristic torture must also be 
morally unjustifiable, since it also causes its victim and others to feel fear and 
intimidation through torture, and can therefore count as an act of terrorism itself. From 
 - 257 - 
 the perspective of Kantian deontology, Henry Shue argues against the moral 
permissibility of terroristic torture: 
 
The victim’s suffering—indeed, the victim—is being used entirely as 
a means to an end over which the victim has no control. Terroristic 
torture is a pure case—the purest possible case—of the violation of 
the Kantian principle that no person may be used only as a 
means…322 
 
Thirdly, let us examine categories 1 (judicial torture) and 3 (penal torture). 
These two types of torture share a common characteristic in that the reason for inflicting 
the torture is retrospective: it is based on a past crime committed by the tortured person. 
With regard to these two types of torture, two questions arise: one is whether guilt can 
justify torture, and the other is what levels of harshness and duration, and what means 
and methods of torture, can be considered to correspond to the degree and seriousness 
of guilt. If a claim is made that guilt justifies torture and a specification of torture 
according to the degree and seriousness of guilt can be provided, then the torturer and 
the agency sanctioning the torture carry the burden of proof to defend the claim. No 
decisively persuasive reason to justify these types of torture can be found, however. 
Finally, to consider category 2: interrogational torture. In this type of torture, 
                                                  
322 Henry Shue, ‘Torture’, in Sanford Levinson (ed.), Torture: A Collection (Oxford University Press, 
2004), pp. 47–60, at p. 53. 
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 national and international security – understood as the protection of the members of the 
public – are at issue, and torture is conducted to extract information from the torture 
victim in order to prevent a catastrophic situation. When considering interrogational 
torture, a ‘ticking bomb’ scenario is often used. A standard version of this hypothetical 
case is provided by Shue: 
 
Suppose a fanatic, perfectly willing to die rather than collaborate in 
the thwarting of his own scheme, has set a hidden nuclear device to 
explode in the heart of Paris. There is no time to evacuate the 
innocent people or even the movable art treasures—the only hope of 
preventing tragedy is to torture the perpetrator, find the device, and 
deactivate it. 
 
Shue concedes that there is ‘no way to deny the permissibility of torture in a case just 
like this’; however, he opposes any legalization of torture by arguing that ‘artificial 
cases make bad ethics’. Indeed, in the real world, the ticking bomb scenario is unlikely 
to occur. Situations are usually murky and compromising: judgments might be formed 
on limited, unconfirmed and even unreliable information and influenced by both known 
and unknown elements; decisions might be made within the unpredictability of the 
future event and consequence. In the hypothetical case, meanwhile, key elements and 
factors for moral deliberation are clearly set up. Shue continues: 
 - 259 - 
  
The proposed victim of our torture is not someone we suspect of 
planning the device: he is the perpetrator. He is not some pitiful 
psychotic making one last play for attention: he did plant the device. 
The wiring is not backwards, the mechanism is not jammed: the 
device will destroy the city if not deactivated.323 
 
Davis also argues that torture in the real world can never be morally justified. From the 
standpoint of ‘practical moral absolutism’, he argues that there is no morally justifiable 
torture in practice: 
 
we now have no clear example of morally justified torture – and, 
more importantly, that we are unlikely ever to have one. While the 
possibility of such an example remains, it should be of no more 
comfort to potential torturers than other possibilities we can imagine 
but do not expect to see realized, for example, that the world will end 
tomorrow. We are not entitled to act on such bare possibilities. 
Absent some unlikely experience, torture can in practice never be 
morally justified.324 
 
In this argument, it is worth noting that Davis defends the position that torture cannot be 
morally justified in practice, but does not deny the possibility that morally permissible 
torture exists at a theoretical level. This line of thought does not nullify the construction 
of a framework of just torture by invoking the just war framework in order to constitute 
                                                  
323 Shue, ‘Torture’, p. 57. 
324 Davis, ‘The Moral Justifiability of Torture’, p. 147.  
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 just torture theory at an ideological level. 
Before exploring this topic in the next section, let us examine one of the 
fundamental ethical puzzles which we cannot avoid considering if we are to make a 
serious argument on the morality of torture: do ends justify means? Rephrasing this 
query to align with our current subject, can it ever be justified to resort to evil means 
(torture) in order to bring about a good end (preventing a catastrophe)? In the ticking 
bomb scenario, there are three premises: 1) the victim of torture is the perpetrator who 
set a nuclear device by himself for the purpose of destroying Paris; 2) there is no time to 
evacuate innocent people or movable art treasures; and 3) the only hope to avoid the 
disastrous consequence is to torture the perpetrator, find the device, and deactivate it. 
Given these premises, the ticking bomb scenario might be one of the few cases in the 
hypothetical world in which an act based on consequentialist moral judgment – i.e. to 
torture the perpetrator – can be justified when we take all the following elements into 
account: limited time and means, an emergent situation, the magnitude and seriousness 
of the consequences, and necessity. In this regard, we might consider that it is morally 
justified, although exceptionally, to resort to evil means in order to bring about a good 
end. 
However, it is worth mentioning that this ticking bomb scenario is one 
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 designed to demonstrate the justifiability of consequentialist moral judgment and 
reasoning in a straightforward, clear-cut manner, provided that we take these three 
premises at face value, without taking into account any ancillary conditions. If we 
modify these premises, however, the consequentialist moral judgment and reasoning 
lose their theoretical ability to defend the torture of the perpetrator. In order to 
demonstrate this, let us consider a modified ticking bomb scenario: 
 
Suppose a suspect has allegedly set a hidden nuclear device to 
explode in the heart of Paris, according to unconfirmed intelligence 
reports. There is little time to evacuate the innocent people or even 
the movable art treasures—the most effective and efficient method to 
extract information from the suspect to prevent the tragedy may be 
torture, to gain the information to find the device, and deactivate it. 
 
In this variant of the original ticking bomb scenario, we can identify three main changed 
premises: 1) the prospective victim of torture is a suspect who is alleged to have set a 
nuclear device to explode in the heart of Paris – we are not entirely sure whether he is 
the perpetrator or not; 2) it is impossible to evacuate all the innocent people and the 
movable art treasures, but possible to evacuate some; 3) the most effective and efficient 
method to extract information from the suspect to prevent the tragedy may be torture, to 
gain the information to find the device, and deactivate it, but this is not the only hope – 
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 there are other alternatives, even though some of them may not be as effective or 
efficient to achieve the goal. In conclusion, the consequentialist moral judgment and 
reasoning lose their ability to justify torture if we take into account elements that 
mitigate or negate the absolute necessity for torture. Furthermore, in this scenario, the 
torturer might have some moral uneasiness about torturing the suspect, and must have a 
chance to choose a lesser evil than torture; this is also an additional factor, if taken into 
account, for reconsidering the persuasiveness of the consequentialist moral judgment 
and reasoning for justifying torture. 
If we have moral uneasiness about or objections to the torture of a suspect, a 
civilian or another non-combatant, then we can argue that civilians should not be 
tortured. The reason for this is straightforward: if a civilian actually committed a serious 
offence, then he will forfeit his claim to protection and considered to be a perpetrator 
and therefore, in time of armed conflict, to be a legitimate target to be neutralised. In 
this situation, might the civilian in question be tortured? Having considered the earlier 
discussion in this section, we must give a negative answer to this question. Under such a 
hypothetical situation as one which Shue described, torture against the perpetrator can 
in theory be morally justified. However, in practice, torture against the perpetrator 
cannot be morally justified. If this is the case, then torture against civilians, whether 
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 innocent or suspect, can never be morally justified. 
In Section 6. 3, I have discussed the moral unjustifiability of torture. I have 
argued that although torture in a hypothetical situation might in theory be morally 
justified, in almost all practical cases it cannot be justified. In fact, since such a 
hypothetical situation is never likely to occur in the real world, then torture cannot in 
practice ever be morally justified. If this is the case, then I have succeeded in 
demonstrating the moral unjustifiability of torture against civilians. In Section 6. 4, in 
order to demonstrate further the moral unjustifiability of torture against civilians, I will 
codify a set of principles for just torture, which will show that it can never be justified 
in practice. 
 
6. 4. From Just War to Just Torture: the Principles against Torture 
Having demonstrated the moral unjustifiability of torture against civilians in Section 6. 
3, in Section 6. 4, in order further to demonstrate the moral unjustifiability of torture 
against civilians, I will establish a framework of just torture, by reference to which I 
argue that torture can never be justified in practice. 
The framework of just war theory seems to be a useful way to consider 
different kinds of violence at the meso and micro levels, since it can be applied to a 
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 variety of situations where violence is used, although as already discussed, the just war 
framework does not provide sufficient protection for civilians at a macro level. The 
reason for this can be found in the very nature of just war theory, which starts from a 
presumption against war and then shifts its mode of contemplation to a critical 
investigation by reference to the ideal of a ‘just war’, which in turn can be characterised, 
analysed, and judged by a set of conditions established by different principles at 
different stages (i.e. before, during, and after the war). Indeed, the flexible applicability 
of the framework of just war theory at the meso and micro levels, backed by the 
abundant accumulation of thought on moral judgment and reasoning for war, can be 
exemplified by David Perry’s seminal work, in which he applies the just war framework 
to an examination of the CIA’s intelligence and covert operations.325 In the same manner, 
and by applying the same framework, we can make a case for considering the ethics of 
interrogational torture. Indeed, several ethical issues we have examined in the ticking 
bomb scenario and its modified version in the previous section share common structures 
with the principles of the just war framework, which focus on motives, the act itself, 
and the consequence for moral reasoning and judgment. 
By following the framework of just war, which is broadly divided into three 
                                                  
325 David L. Perry, Partly Cloudy: Ethics in War, Espionage, Covert Action, and Interrogation ( Lanham, 
MD: Scarecrow Press, 2009), pp. 94–6. 
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 clusters (jus ad bellum: justice of war, jus in bello: justice in war, and jus post bellum: 
justice after war), each of which consists of a set of principles, I will consider the ethics 
of torture by framing it in the same structure (jus ad cruciamentum: justice of torture, 
jus in cruciamento: justice in torture, and jus post cruciamentum: justice after torture). If 
every principle of just torture is satisfied at once, such torture could in theory be 
morally justified; however, more importantly, such a situation cannot in practice be 
morally justified from the perspective of practical moral absolutism which Davis 
proposes. In other words, torture cannot be morally justified unless and until a torturer, 
carrying the burden of proof, demonstrates that torture in a certain case satisfies every 
principle at once. This can, however, again from the perspective of practical moral 
absolutism, never occur in practice. 
Below are the principles for a just torture framework, which I will develop by 
reference to the just war framework which I described in the introductory section: 
 
1. Jus Ad Cruciamentum 
1-1. Just cause: torture must be undertaken under rightful grounds. 
1-2. Legitimate authority: torture must only be conducted by a legitimate authority. 
1-3. Right intention: torture must be undertaken for an appropriate purpose. 
1-4. Last resort: torture must be conducted as a final resort after all other means of 
coercion, as well as all peaceful means to solve the situation, are exhausted. 
1-5. Reasonable prospect of success: torture must be conducted with a reasonable 
chance of achieving its aim. 
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 1-6. Proportionality in ends: the overall advantage brought by torture must be 
proportionate to the overall harm it causes. 
 
2. Jus In Cruciamento  
2-1. Distinction: perpetrators, suspects and innocents must be distinguished; torture 
against the first two groups of people is not unconditional but torture against the 
last group should be subject to much more extremely strict conditions and 
qualifications. The last should be protected and immune from torture under any 
circumstances. 
2-2. Proportionality in means: the specific advantage brought by torture must be 
proportionate to the specific harm caused; appropriate means, methods, duration, 
intensity, and degree of pain, suffering and stress applied must be chosen. 
2-3. Recording: details of torture, including means, methods, duration, intensity, 
degree of pain, suffering and stress, and health of the torture victim, must be 
recorded. 
 
3. Jus Post Cruciamentum 
3-1. Rehabilitation: medical care and treatment, as well as other necessary means, 
must be taken for recovering the mental/physical health of the torture victim, 
regardless of his guilt or innocence. 
3-2. Disclosure: the entire process of the decision-making leading to torture, as well as 
the procedures and conduct of the torture, must be disclosed to the public. 
 
1. Jus Ad Cruciamentum 
Having listed the prospective candidates for the potential principles, let us consider the 
justifiability of these principles. Initially, I will consider the principles for jus ad 
cruciamentum. The principle of just cause stipulates that torture must be undertaken 
under rightful grounds. In the framework of just torture, protection of the innocent or 
defence of others by avoiding a serious and imminent catastrophe is the only condition 
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 that can be counted as just cause. Unlike the corresponding principle in just war theory, 
punishment of wrongdoers and recapturing of things wrongly taken cannot be counted 
as elements that constitute just cause, because these are aimed at retribution, which, as 
demonstrated earlier, would not be considered a justifiable reason for torture. 
What about self-defence, which is first and foremost considered to be a just 
cause in the just war framework? There could not be a situation in which interrogational 
torture is conducted solely for the purpose of self-defence. The idea that one person can 
torture another is based on the premise that the torturer or his superior perfectly controls 
the situation. If the torturer finds himself in a situation where self-defence is necessary 
to save his own life, he will still have alternatives to torture available. Imagine a 
situation in which torture is to be conducted in a closed chamber of a dungeon in an 
undisclosed location. The prospective torture victim has confessed that he has hidden a 
micro-explosive device somewhere in the room but has not divulged its location, and 
the device will bring an explosion powerful enough to destroy the entire dungeon. In 
this situation, the prospective torturer would be highly likely to defend himself by 
evacuating the dungeon without torturing the perpetrator, in order to find the place 
where the device is placed. If torture is conducted for the purpose of protecting others in 
and around the dungeon, the reason for torture is not only self-defence but also the 
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 defence of others. In this sense, the just cause of torture is primarily considered to be the 
defence of others and secondarily self-defence, only under the condition that an act of 
self-defence accompanies the defence of others. 
In fact, self-defence could be a just cause, but it is unlikely, except in highly 
unusual circumstances, to stand alone as the sole reason for torture to take place. 
Imagine another situation in which a crew of two is in a spaceship equipped with no 
emergency evacuation system. Imagine also that one of the crew has informed the other 
that he has placed a micro-explosive device somewhere in the spaceship but has not 
divulged its location, and the device will bring an explosion powerful enough to destroy 
the entire spaceship. In this case, if torture was conducted for the purpose of extracting 
information about the location of the device, then self-defence could well be counted as 
just cause. However, in addition, as a result of successfully extracting the information, 
finding the device and deactivating it, the spaceship, which can be seen as a 
common/public good, as well as the lives of the two crew members would be saved. In 
this spaceship case, we can find the element of the defence of others in an extended 
sense, as well as self-defence, as the reasons for the torture to take place. In other words, 
there might be exceptional cases in which the element of self-defence could be found to 
be a just cause for torture; however, even in this very extreme and unlikely case, 
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 self-defence is contingent on the defence of others, and by itself cannot be considered to 
be a just cause. Therefore, while the proposed theory of just torture can be used to set 
out a list of strict criteria under which torture for self-defence might be permissible, it is 
clear that there is virtually no possibility of all these criteria being met at once in the 
real world, and thus no way to justify torture for self-defence reasons in practical terms. 
With regard to the principle of legitimate authority, let us remind ourselves 
that our discussion of torture is limited to torture for the purpose of preventing a 
disastrous situation that causes a serious and imminent threat to national security, 
understood as the protection of people who are under the jurisdiction of a state. If 
torture is conducted for that purpose, potential candidates to be agents of legitimate 
authority to conduct torture are the government agencies that take charge of national 
security; namely the military, police, intelligence agencies, and other security and 
law-enforcement agencies. In other words, other government agencies, such as the 
Inland Revenue or tax agencies, are not considered legitimate authorities which could 
authorise the torture of, for example, tax-dodgers for the purpose of extracting 
information about their secret offshore bank accounts. Should their tax-avoidance cause 
a disaster that amounts to a serious threat to national security, the case would be taken 
over and dealt with by those government agencies that take charge of national security. 
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 What could we denote as the principle of right intention in the framework of 
just torture? In the just war framework, the right intention for waging war is to recover 
or achieve peace. In the case of torture, the right intention may be to prevent a 
catastrophe that causes a disastrous situation to national security. Other reasons, such as 
criminal investigations and police/judicial interviews in ordinary cases, cannot be 
considered right intentions. 
The principle of last resort in the framework of just torture also aligns with the 
corresponding principle in that of just war. As with the use of military force, torture is 
an act causing physical and/or mental pain and suffering forcibly against the will of the 
victims; therefore, precisely as in the just war framework, the principle of last resort can 
be stipulated as: torture must be conducted as a final means after all other means of 
coercion, as well as all peaceful or non-violent means to solve the situation, are 
exhausted. The purpose of the principle is to set and sustain the threshold for opting for 
torture higher, so that it will not be chosen as a means to resolve a situation prematurely, 
while other means, even though less effective or efficient, are still available, and while 
the given situation is not extremely serious, and a disaster is not imminent or even 
probable. 
For the principle of having a reasonable prospect of success, we must consider 
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 what this success would be. The definition of success through torture is that it achieves 
its purpose; that is, to extract the information necessary to prevent a catastrophic 
situation. If the prospective torturer, and/or his superior, does not have a reasonable 
prospect of such success, then the principle dictates that the would-be torturer must 
withhold torture and/or the superior order him to do so. 
The principle of proportionality in ends stipulates that the overall advantage 
brought by torture must be proportionate to the overall harm it causes. The questions to 
be explored regarding this principle are what we may consider to be the overall 
advantage and what exactly harm means; i.e. the prevention of a disaster and the 
physical and mental harm inflicted upon the victim of torture. Just as the corresponding 
principle in the just war framework does not provide or suggest exact numbers or ratios 
of people at stake, or degrees of magnitude of a disaster which could constitute this 
proportionality, neither is it useful or practical – and it could even be counterproductive 
– to set or work out these parameters mathematically. The message which this principle 
suggests is, rather, a critical question that can be phrased in the following way: are we 
convinced, and are we really ready to claim that the advantage brought by torture is 
proportionate to the harm it causes? 
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 2. Jus In Cruciamento 
In jus in cruciamento, three principles are envisaged: distinction, proportionality in 
means, and recording. The first two are common with those in the just war framework 
but the last is probably unique in similar frameworks. Let us examine what these 
principles prescribe and how they constitute part of the framework of just torture. As 
with the corresponding principle in the just war framework, the principle of distinction 
in the just torture framework prescribes a discrimination between those people who 
should be protected and those who should not. In the just torture framework, the 
principle may stipulate that perpetrators, suspects and innocents must be distinguished; 
torture against the first two groups of people is not unconditional, but torture against the 
last group should be subject to much more extremely strict conditions and qualifications. 
The innocent should be protected and immune from torture under any circumstances. 
The reason for this is that the moral status of these three groups can be considered to be 
different according to their culpability for a crime which they had committed, which 
they were suspected of committing, or which they had been falsely accused of, but had 
never committed. In other words, besides moral intuition, we might feel moral 
uneasiness and concern at finding equal acceptance given to the torture of a perpetrator, 
a suspect and an innocent person. This uneasiness and concern is perhaps derived from 
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 moral convictions on desert as an element of justice. One of the most serious concerns 
about torturing a suspect is that the charge on which they are accused may be false, and 
thus the treatment based on it would be unjust and undeserved; in the case of 
interrogational torture, just as in ordinary cases of criminal justice, the burden of proof 
must be on the side of the torturer, and until proven, the prospective candidate of torture 
should be considered to be and treated as innocent. 
This argument leads us to the following conclusion: proof of the perpetrator’s 
guilt may lower the threshold of the degree of inviolability of his rights (such as bodily 
freedom) or annulment of his rights (such as the right not to be tortured), and we might 
consider that torture of a guilty person could morally be permissible under certain 
circumstances if and when certain conditions are met. 
The second of the three principles of jus in cruciamento is the principle of 
proportionality in means, which can be stipulated as follows: the specific advantage 
brought by torture must be proportionate to the specific harm caused: appropriate means, 
methods, duration, intensity, and degree of pain, suffering and stress applied must be 
chosen. This principle is aimed at ensuring the maximum protection for the victims and 
prospective candidates of torture, just as the protection of civilians is envisaged the 
corresponding principle of the just war framework. The principle not only makes torture 
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 extremely exceptional, but also provides the victims with humane treatment and the 
highest level of care, should torture be conducted. The principle instructs that torture 
should be most effectively and efficiently conducted and that the means and methods 
applied must meet these criteria while minimising the infliction of pain, suffering and 
stress upon the torture victim. Specifically, in this principle, some kinds of extremely 
cruel and inhuman means and methods of torture – such as amputation (cutting off 
hands and feet), and acts that cause irreversible effects to neuro-nervous systems – are 
absolutely prohibited. Besides, the principle also prescribes taking precautionary 
measures to closely and constantly monitor the health of the torture victim in order to 
prevent him experiencing rapid health deterioration or unexpected death. If necessary, 
according to the health condition of the torture victim, a change to the means and 
methods of torture, or a suspension or temporary termination of torture, should be 
considered from a medical point of view, and appropriate medical care and treatment 
should be provided. Finally, if and when the purpose of torture – to extract the 
information necessary to prevent the national security disaster – has been achieved, 
torture should immediately be terminated. 
The third principle is the principle of recording, which is probably unique to 
the just torture framework. The principle of recording can be stipulated as follows: 
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 details of torture, including means, methods, duration, intensity, degree of pain, 
suffering and stress, and health of the torture victim, must be recorded. This principle 
ensures transparency, which is closely connected not only to the principles of 
rehabilitation and of disclosure in jus in cruciamento listed above, but also to the 
supplementary principles for jus post cruciamentum, which – I will propose later – are 
aimed at restorative justice for the victims of torture. Records of torture can be most 
favourably used as something similar to those of police interviews in the UK, in which 
both the police and the suspect hold one of two copies on which the same content is 
recorded. If a case demands, either or both sides may use the record as evidence at 
judicial trials. 
 
3. Jus Post Cruciamentum 
The third cluster of which the framework of just torture consists is jus post 
cruciamentum. The victim of torture, regardless of his culpability, is entitled to 
rehabilitation. The principle of rehabilitation, which may be considered to be one of the 
two principles of jus post cruciamentum, can be stipulated as follows: medical care and 
treatment, as well as other necessary means, must be given to assist with the recovery of 
the mental/physical health of the tortured person, regardless of his/her guilt or 
 - 276 - 
 innocence. In this principle, we can find a parallel structure with the corresponding 
principle of reconstruction in the just war framework. Once the purpose is achieved, the 
tortured are no longer considered a means for extracting information; they should 
instead be considered victims, and they are entitled to reclaim their rights either as 
innocents, suspects or guilty parties. If the termination of torture recovers the rights of 
victims, the torturers have an obligation to remove the pain, suffering and stress 
inflicted and to enable their victims to recover their health and any other damages 
inflicted. 
The other principle in jus post cruciamentum is the principle of disclosure, 
which can be stipulated as: the entire process of the decision-making leading to torture, 
as well as the procedures and conduct of the torture, must be disclosed to the public. 
This principle is closely connected with, and indeed based upon, the principle of 
recording, which we have examined as one of the jus in cruciamento principles. The 
principle of disclosure ensures transparency of the series of events and procedures 
regarding an instance of torture. This principle not only clarifies the decision-making 
process that led to the torture and the responsibility of the torturers for their acts, but 
also reveals the procedures of the torture – how it was conducted and which means and 
methods were applied. Disclosure of the sequence of events that culminated in torture 
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 and of the operational procedures of the torture ensures procedural justice, and leads to 
restrictions of any torture disproportionate to the principle of proportionality in means. 
The significance of the principle of disclosure can thus be found in those advantages. 
If a certain kind of torture satisfied all of the principles listed above, then such 
a kind of torture could be called ‘just torture’; however, as I have already outlined, no 
torture in practice could satisfy every principle at once, and this being the case, then no 
torture can ever be morally justified. 
 
Concluding Remarks for Chapter 6 
In Chapter 6, in order to demonstrate that civilians should be protected from torture and 
other ill treatment, I have considered the ethics of torture in primarily meso and micro 
level analysis. More specifically, I have proposed a just torture theory: a new framework 
for contemplating the ethics of torture, by establishing a set of principles for moral 
reasoning and judgment, inspired by the just war framework. I have argued that there 
might not be such a thing as just torture in practice, but only at a theoretical level, in 
order to defend my moral objections to the torture of civilians. In the same way that just 
war theory is a critical theory against war, just torture theory will function as a critical 
theory against torture. Furthermore, just torture theory will play an important role to 
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 provide a useful common language for contemplating the ethics of violence with 
coercion. The raison d’être of the just torture framework is to be a first step from which 
we can continue and expand discussions on the ethics of civilian protection, in order to 
explore why and how torture against civilians cannot be morally justified and to develop 
critical arguments against the torture of civilians.
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis, I have discussed the ethics of civilian protection in armed conflict. 
Specifically, I have attempted to explore ways to supplement the limitations of just war 
theory on civilian protection by providing a fundamental case for civilian protection by 
way of considering insights gleaned from David Hume’s conception of justice and from 
the perspective of professional military ethics. Furthermore, I have discussed the ethics 
of torture so that I can further reinforce my argument for the protection of civilians from 
harm and violence in armed conflict by demonstrating the unjustifiability of torture of 
the innocent and suspects alike. 
Taken together, I have made a case for the protection of civilians at the 
maximum level and defended my position by considering both the moral significance of 
civilian protection and the moral impermissibility of killing civilians from different 
angles. In order to make my case, I have used a number of different methodologies; 
namely, case studies, the ‘fruits of theory’ approach, contextualism or professional 
ethics for meso level ethical analysis, and casuistry. This is what the existing literature 
in the fields of war/military ethics and international ethics has not yet done. 
 In Chapter 1, I opened up my investigation on the ethics of civilian protection 
by examining the legal and ethical definitions and concepts of civilians, their status and 
conditions of protection. By analysing the accepted legal definitions, and considering 
five ethical concepts emerging from the literature of war ethics and just war theory that 
differentiate civilians from combatants and justify civilian protection; namely moral 
innocence, innocence as harmlessness, responsibility, rights, and personal project, I 
consolidated claims and counter-claims for the moral importance of the protection of 
civilians in armed conflict. Through the discussion in Chapter 1, I argued that while 
civilian protection is perceived to be a moral imperative in armed conflict, none of the 
available legal and ethical frameworks for considering civilian status is sufficient alone 
to uphold this perception. Indeed, there are in practice people who might fall within a 
‘grey area’ and who cannot straightforwardly be categorised as civilians or combatants; 
however, this does not mean that civilians should not be protected in armed conflict. It 
is only by taking together all the possible definitions and classifications of civilian 
status that the moral justification for the protection of civilians can be established.  
In Chapter 2, I critically examined the framework of civilian protection set out 
in just war theory, and concluded that it has a fundamental limitation in that it overlooks 
civilians who are killed or maimed in legitimate attacks. By introducing the possibility 
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 of offering restorative justice to those victims, I attempted, at least partially, to 
overcome this shortcoming of the current just war framework. This does not mean, 
however, that the conventional version of just war theory can sufficiently ensure the 
protection of civilians. 
In Chapter 3, I considered the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict as a case study to 
see whether and how civilian protection has been practised in an actual armed conflict. 
Through this exploration I found that the protection of civilians was primarily meant 
and practised as the protection of fellow civilians, and the protection of non-fellow 
civilians was often overlooked by both warring parties. My investigation in Chapter 3 
revealed that one of the fundamental ethical issues surrounding civilian protection is 
that warring parties do not always commit to the protection of civilians when those 
civilians are on the enemy side, and indeed, warring parties sometimes directly target 
civilians on the opposing side. 
In Chapter 4, I explored the Humean conception of justice, in a primarily 
macro level analysis, in order to reconceptualise and expand the scope of justice at a 
global level. By locating the foundation of justice upon utility, I argued that utility 
should be employed at a global level as one of the key foundations of the ethics of 
civilian protection, and defended my position. This way of understanding justice as 
 - 282 - 
 utility at a global level opens up further possibilities; for example, broadening the 
argument could make a case for the protection of other non-combatants, including 
prisoners of war, although this is not the topic of the thesis. The discussion of utility 
introduced concerns about how such utility can be secured. In other words, who is 
required to sustain and promote the utility of civilian protection? This issue was 
addressed in Chapter 5, where military professionals were considered as the appropriate 
responsible agents.   
In Chapter 5, I examined civilian protection as set out in examples of the 
professional ethics of military personnel, in a primarily meso level analysis, in order to 
contemplate ways of further promoting and ensuring civilian protection in Western 
industrial democracies’ armed forces. I constructed an argument that the incorporation 
of civilian protection into the professional ethics of military personnel would further 
promote civilian protection and hugely benefit armed forces as well as civilians. To do 
this, I primarily focused on the UK and US Armed Forces as examples of agents which 
can promote civilian protection as the utility at the global level. I also argued that the 
protection of civilians is beneficial not only for the civilians themselves, but also for 
governments and military professionals. The upshot of the argument in Chapter 5 is that 
it is imperative for Western industrial democracies’ armed forces both to ensure that 
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 their members enforce such protection by incorporating it into their codes of practice, 
and to stand by this rule if political manoeuvring occurs that attempts to motivate the 
forces to abandon civilian protection. 
In Chapter 6, I further argued for the protection of civilians by contemplating 
the ethics of torture as an extreme example of the need for civilian protection, in micro 
and meso level analysis, considering some of the most horrific and horrendous acts of 
violence which civilians might be faced with in armed conflict as well as in peacetime. 
By examining the moral unjustifiability of torturing civilians, suspects or the innocent, I 
aimed to show that civilian protection should be a moral imperative under any 
circumstances. Furthermore, I attempted to salvage one of the core ideas of just war 
theory – i.e. the protection of civilians – by modifying the just war framework as a ‘just 
torture’ framework; this could be used to set out ethical guidelines for an individual 
agent who was considering torturing another person. My argument is that just torture 
theory would play an important role to provide a useful common language for 
contemplating the ethics of violence with coercion against civilians. The raison d’être 
of the just torture framework is to be a first step from which we can continue and 
expand discussions on the ethics of civilian protection, in order to explore why and how 
violence of any sort against civilians in armed conflict cannot be morally justified, and 
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 to further develop critical arguments for civilian protection. 
In order to contemplate the moral issues surrounding civilian protection, the 
thesis employed a number of different methodological approaches, as described in the 
Methodology section, all of which fall within applied ethics; namely, a fruits of theory 
approach, a top-down approach or macro level analysis, a bottom-up approach or micro 
level analysis, casuistry, and an approach of professional ethics as a contextualist 
approach or meso level analysis. In each chapter, these approaches were used, often in 
combination. The approaches, as well as the findings and conclusions to which they led, 
had strengths and weaknesses that were also interlocked and interconnected.  
The strength of the methodological approach of casuistry with regards to the 
investigation of the moral case for civilian protection which we conducted in Chapter 1 
was twofold: it successfully clarified the moral status of civilians with different moral 
attributes and features, and also located, narrowed down and delimited the grey area in 
which the protected status of civilians could be considered to be doubtful; for example, 
the cases of the combative, warmongering bishop and the veteran who inspires and 
boosts the morale of a nation and its citizens. More specifically, by employing casuistry 
as a methodological tool, I clarified the difference in the moral status of civilians 
between the above-illustrated examples and the morally innocent and harmless persons 
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 who are not held responsible for war or war conduct, such as young children. However, 
the weakness of casuistry as a methodological approach when considering the moral 
status of civilians is that the closer a person or a group of persons in question is to the 
heart of the grey area, the less clear its moral status by employing casuistry, since this 
method relies on considering a wide range of arguments and paradigm cases to consider 
the point in hand, none of which can give a precisely considered answer since none was 
addressing the exact topic at issue. Indeed, there are certain kinds of person that could 
be categorised as ‘borderline cases’, and their protected status in moral terms cannot be 
determined by simply employing casuistry, which otherwise provides a clear yes or no 
answer on each case. One such example would be seven-year-old child soldiers who are 
engaged in combat under coercion and possibly under the influence of mind-altering 
substances (such as alcohol, cocaine, cannabis and its related products, or heroin and 
other opiates). Since the child soldiers might not be considered to be full-fledged moral 
agents who are capable of exerting their free will, their protected status in moral terms 
would better be understood in a different way; although harmful and potentially lethal, it 
might be considered that they should be taken into care and offered protection. The 
limitation of casuistry in reaching a definitive conclusion is that opinions on such 
borderline cases can be widely divided among commentators; for example, some 
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 commentators might consider that the above-described child soldiers are entitled to 
some kind of protection, and that therefore they should somehow be immune from 
attack, even in combat situations; whereas others might consider that they have forfeited 
their claim to protection by entering the war as fighters, and therefore it is morally 
permissible to attack them in combat. 
 With such widely divergent opinions on offer, ‘triangulation’ to reach a 
definite answer becomes more problematic. Nevertheless, despite this limitation, the 
casuistry approach was useful in general as, except in these borderline cases, it did 
enable a distinction to be drawn between those civilians who are entitled to protection 
and those who are not. 
The bottom-up approach was primarily employed in Chapter 3, which 
explored a series of events in which Palestinian civilians were harmed by the IDF and 
Israeli civilians were harmed by Palestinian militants. A primary strength of this 
bottom-up approach with regards to the investigation of the ethics of civilian protection 
is that it provides a detailed account of each specific event, which allows the mapping 
of cases and examples in order to illustrate the claims. These cases, in which civilians 
on both sides were killed or injured by military attacks, clearly show the dubious nature 
of the moral legitimacy claimed by both warring parties. However, the weakness of the 
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 bottom-up approach is that the findings and conclusions to which it leads are inherently 
limited in a spatial–temporal sense due to the peculiarity of each event, case and 
example; in other words, those findings and conclusions are seriously challenged by the 
demand of generalisation and universalisability tests. The weakness of the bottom-up 
approach is similar to that of an inductive method, and can be summarised in the 
following question: could the pattern and manner of harming civilians, witnessed in a 
specific period of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, be applicable to those in different 
periods and/or those in different armed conflicts in different places?  
Nevertheless, the overall benefits brought by employing the bottom-up 
approach when analysing the practice of civilian protection in the Israeli–Palestinian 
conflict were two-fold: first, the bottom-up approach provides very important examples 
of a lack of civilian protection in armed conflict, showing, as addressed above, that 
warring parties do not always commit to the protection of civilians on the hostile side, a 
fact sadly also observable in many other conflicts; and second, the shortcomings of the 
bottom-up approach draw attention to the need to employ other approaches, such as a 
top-down approach and meso level analysis, to reinforce the argument. Thus, the 
findings and conclusions of the bottom-up approach are complemented by the other 
approaches, so strengthening the overall claims. 
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 The fruits of theory approach, top-down approach or macro level analysis, 
which I primarily employed in Chapter 4, provided us with one possible, overarching, 
global understanding of civilian protection; that of justice in war from a Humean 
perspective. The fruits of theory approach also provided a descriptive overview of one 
universally applicable hypothetical idea with regard to civilian protection, by reference 
to justice, human nature and utility; this approach demonstrated one potential way to 
recognise how the moral world surrounding civilian protection is constructed. Indeed, 
the fruits of theory approach described possible ways to improve civilian protection as 
utility at a global level by applying a Humean understanding of human nature, justice as 
an artificial virtue, utility, and the dynamics of moral motivational force in order to 
commit to and promote utility as the essential practice of agents in international 
relations. By employing this approach, the thesis examined the theoretical foundation of 
the utility of civilian protection as justice in war at the global level. However, the fruits 
of theory approach revealed a shortcoming by failing to address the question of which 
agents could and should commit to, sustain and promote the utility of civilian protection 
as justice in war at the global level, and how they should undertake this in practice. This 
shortcoming would inherently occur when the fruits of theory approach is employed: 
this is because the theory is more concerned with an understanding of the world as a 
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 system or institution, and less with the rules and functions of those individual agents 
who are the integral parts of in the system or institution. In other words, the fruits of 
theory approach does not explain each specific case or agent that does not perfectly fit 
in its overarching ethical theory; for example, one might legitimately argue that there 
are less morally conscious agents who might not always act in the way the Humean 
moral understanding describes, and there are also agents who might act as free riders by 
taking advantage of the moral consciences of others. Just as we could not deny that 
there are such agents in reality, so there might be agents whose actions cannot be 
explained by the fruits of theory approach.  
However, these shortcomings of the fruits of the theory approach were 
somewhat redressed by the use of the contextualist approach or meso level analysis, 
which focused on the roles and functions of the very agents who commit to, sustain and 
promote civilian protection as justice in war at a global level, examined in Chapter 5 
using the UK and US Armed Forces as the primary examples. The use of the 
contextualist approach in Chapter 5 allowed the exploration and illustration of what is 
morally expected and required in terms of the actual roles and functions of governments 
and military personnel. The strength of the contextualist approach was that it focused on 
particular institutions and organisations, and by doing so, it was able to take into 
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 account the methodology, mode of action and ethos peculiar to those institutions and 
organisations. By taking this approach, we can consider one of the most important 
elements that dictates the role of governments in Western industrial democracies to be 
civilian control of armed forces, for example, and investigate it on a case by case basis. 
However, that said, a weakness of the contextualist approach, similar to the bottom-up 
approach, is that its findings and conclusions are context-specific and cannot be 
imported directly into another context. However, the contextualist approach does 
contribute to providing specific recommendations for institutions and organisations and 
also provides useful models for them to follow. More particularly, by employing the 
contextualist approach in Chapter 5, recommendations for Western industrial 
democracies’ governments and their armed forces to further commit to, sustain and 
promote the norm of civilian protection were made, and the expectation that other 
armed forces and governments would be morally required to follow those 
recommendations was implied. 
An overall strength of using this mixture of methodologies was that it allowed 
an investigation of a number of different supporting arguments and an exploration of the 
issues from theory to practice. By using the combined methodology, the thesis offers a 
broader understanding of the morality of civilian protection as a whole and devises 
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 more useful approaches to the issue than would have been possible with one 
methodology alone. 
Throughout this thesis, I have discussed the protection of civilians in armed 
conflicts, and the civilians at issue are usually those who do not belong to the side of the 
attacking force. This is because the protection of fellow civilians is a raison d’être of 
the government and armed forces of a state: they have a perfect obligation for their 
protection. Meanwhile, attention is not always sufficiently paid to the protection of 
non-fellow civilians, as the protection of fellow civilians usually takes precedence. 
Perhaps the reason for this is that the protection of non-fellow civilians is often 
considered, however wrongly, to be an imperfect obligation or charitable act. Indeed, a 
member of the armed forces or military professional does not act as an agent of 
non-fellow civilians, according to Walzer, since ‘no legal or bureaucratic procedures 
make him answerable’ to the civilians of other countries. However, Walzer also points 
out that a military officer comes to recognise the ‘interest and rights’ of these civilians 
when ‘he looks outward, away from his hierarchical responsibility deriving from the 
chain of command’. If and when this happens, the civilians of the countries where 
conflicts are occurring can be offered protection by the intervening or occupying forces, 
and in return for this, the officer ‘may well have to turn away from his hierarchical 
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 responsibilities and diminish the care and protection he afford to his own soldiers – that 
is, he may have to impose added risks on the soldiers for the sake of civilians’.326  
This dilemma – whether to allow casualties among the soldiers under his 
command for the sake of the protection of civilians of other countries – is a real and 
serious one in an actual combat situation. However, the protection of civilians of other 
countries is not always considered to be out of an officer’s hierarchical responsibility. In 
other words, civilian protection has been to some extent incorporated as part of accepted 
military conduct as shown in the LOAC (law of armed conflict) manuals of the UK 
Armed Forces. This does not deny that military commanders do face this dilemma when 
they conduct military operations that put their soldiers and civilians at risk. However, 
the point to be stressed here is that force protection should not always be prioritised 
over civilian protection, even though these two opposing exercises are often in conflict. 
Once civilian protection is enshrined in military professionalism, this opens a way for it 
to be better emphasised in relation to force protection, and the balance may be shifted 
more toward the protection of civilians than ever. This is applicable as demonstrated in 
the examples of the UK and US Armed Forces discussed earlier, but it is equally 
applicable to the armed forces of other Western industrial democracies, and potentially 
                                                  
326 Walzer, Arguing about War, p. 29. 
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 further afield too. 
This argument may further be reinforced if we consider the current trend of 
military operations; that is, West-led expeditionary operations in which the immediate 
national survival of a participating state or group of states is not directly at stake, unlike, 
for example, the Second World War, in which many of the parties to the conflict 
experienced an actual or perceived threat to national survival. Indeed in the post-Cold 
War era, we have observed a series of military expeditions that were partly motivated 
and initiated on humanitarian grounds, such as those Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo 
and Sierra Leone. In these military expeditions, the missions and objectives of the 
expeditionary forces were not primarily assigned for major war fighting, but for the 
limited use of military force for well-specified mission objectives, such as peace 
enforcement, peacekeeping including policing and riot control, and various activities 
concerning humanitarian assistance such as convoy guarding and the distribution of 
humanitarian aid.327 
This trend points to a future direction of research into civilian protection in 
armed conflict: civilian protection in a broader perspective; namely, the protection of 
civilians beyond the jus in bello framework. In this thesis, I have primarily focused on 
                                                  
327 Weiss and Collins, Humanitarian Challenges, pp. 30–37. 
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 the protection of civilians during an armed conflict; in other words, civilian protection 
has been investigated mainly within the jus in bello framework. What I have not 
discussed is civilian protection after an armed conflict. In the just war tradition, in 
addition to the two existing, well-established frameworks – namely, jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello – jus post bellum has been put forward as the third framework for just war 
theory. Indeed, the protection of civilians should continue once hostilities cease. The 
major combat operations (March–May 2003) and their aftermath in the Iraq War remind 
us of the importance and necessity of the protection of civilians both during and after a 
conflict  
One promising topic for future research is to explore the protection of civilians 
in a broader sense: protection as prevention of harm, care and restoration, the last of 
which I briefly mentioned toward the end of Chapter 2. There are several ways to 
protect civilians after the end of hostilities. For example, the protection of civilians from 
paramilitary threats and violence by armed militants and militias could be considered to 
be one of the most urgent priorities for the intervening force and local political 
authorities if a power vacuum was caused in the post-conflict situation. If and when the 
situation becomes stable, other measures – such as retribution for any breaches and 
violations of the rules and customs of armed conflict against perpetrators, reparation and 
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 rehabilitation for civilians who were physically and/or psychologically traumatised, 
repatriation of evacuees, refugees and internally displaced people, reconstruction of 
infrastructure damaged or destroyed during the conflict, and reconciliation of people 
who were in hostilities during the conflict – would be more easily undertaken. 
In this thesis, by employing several approaches in applied ethics, I argued that 
civilian protection should be sustained and promoted by various agents (armed forces, 
governments, members of the military profession and other combatants) at various 
levels (macro, meso and micro ones). The vast majority of existing literature in applied 
ethics does not use this mixed methodological approach. Rather, it tends to employ a 
single methodology for exploring moral issues on the subject matter. Examples, as 
introduced in the literature review section in the introductory chapter, include Hare and 
Brandt, who use the fruits of theory approach to examine the ethics of war, whereas 
Nagel employs a casuistry approach. In addition, in Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer 
employs the contextualist approach by drawing moral issues from several key events in 
the history of warfare. In this sense, from the perspective of the various fields of applied 
ethics – including war/military ethics and international ethics in which this thesis would 
be situated – this thesis might be seen as a more comprehensive approach to the ethics 
of civilian protection, since it considers the subject from a wide variety of angles and 
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 perspectives. The mixed methodology approach is a promising one which could be 
useful in other areas of applied ethics when contemplating moral issues, because this 
approach makes it possible to investigate and analyse the subject matter in question 
from different perspectives at different levels, including macro, meso and micro ones. 
The practice of quarantine in the ethics of emergency medicine and public health is one 
promising example of another subject area which could benefit from consideration 
using this mixed methodology approach. A brief strategy outline would include several 
areas of focus: when considering quarantine from the perspective of the fruits of theory 
approach, moral judgments might tend towards the consequentialist – what are the 
possible outcomes when using quarantine procedures, and what are the consequences of 
abandoning them? Casuistry then provides an additional moral foundation to consider 
who should be quarantined; should the quarantine include only those already infected, 
or should it also encompass those who are suspected of having come into contact with 
the infection? Furthermore, the contextualist approach provides guidance to consider 
who should implement and enforce the quarantine, and who should have responsibility 
for authorising its implementation. A similar approach might also be useful to consider 
the subject areas of triage and of the ethics of public policy in the public health sector. 
In the field of war/military ethics and international ethics, civilian protection is 
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 not a minor topic, and there is ongoing discussion on the ethics of civilian protection. 
Arguments range between absolute protection – such as the deontological position 
exemplified by absolute pacifism – and contingent protection – such as the 
instrumentalist position exemplified by various forms of consequentialism – just as 
discussions on many other topics in this and other fields of applied ethics are explored 
and driven by those two mainstream ethical theories, as discussed in the literature 
review section of the introductory chapter. 
However, the strength and originality of this thesis are found in its use of a 
mixed methodology, which allows consideration of different approaches to support the 
claim made in the thesis. Indeed, the thesis attempts to demonstrate the usefulness of 
this mixed methodological approach in exploring moral issues surrounding civilian 
protection. If this approach is plausible and promising as an alternative to the other 
current major approaches, such as the use of individual methodologies like the fruits of 
theory approach, the contextualist approach and casuistry, then it could also contribute 
an analytical tool to establish argument and develop claims on topics other than civilian 
protection in the field of war/military ethics and international ethics, as well as other 
subjects in the broader field of applied ethics.   
The aim of this thesis is to show the necessity of making the rule of civilian 
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 protection more stringent and rigid, by making consequence-oriented agents such as the 
armed forces, governments and their individual members (who often emphasise an 
instrumental value in civilian protection) recognise that civilian protection is not an idea 
that contradicts statecraft and soldiering. If the argument of this thesis – which is that 
subscription to and further promotion of the rule of civilian protection are beneficial to 
armed forces and governments – is plausible, then it will provide an incentive, and 
indeed an imperative for policy-makers and military practitioners to further commit to, 
sustain and promote civilian protection as one of the roles of the armed forces and the 
functions of the government. 
It is my hope that this thesis will contribute to the ongoing contemporary 
discussion of war/military ethics and international ethics in general, and the ethics of 
civilian protection in particular. It is also my hope that this thesis will prompt further 
discussion, not only among academics in these fields, but also among a wider audience, 
such as policy-makers who are concerned about civilian protection and interested in a 
theoretical justification of their protection, and academics who are also concerned and 
interested in bridging the gap between theoretical aspects and practice with regard to the 
protection of civilians and indeed to other subject areas. I believe that this thesis has 
succeeded in providing ample and sufficient grounds to defend my conviction of the 
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 necessity to protect civilians in times of armed conflict, and I hope that it will assist 
with the further promotion and discussion of the idea and ideal of civilian protection at 
the global level. 
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